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‘The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is Contrary to the Rule of Law’: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singapore

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Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 39))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the state of judicial deference in Singapore. For much of Singapore’s independent history, Singapore courts did not substantively engage with the issue of deference—until about a decade ago. While there is yet to be a general doctrine of deference in Singapore, the contours of the courts’ broad approach to deference can be discerned, which tends towards erring on the side of prudence and caution in the fair and just protection of governmental autonomy. In the last few years, rights protection has, arguably, been enhanced in judicial review. The courts have articulated a more robust approach towards curial deference and justiciability. Recent jurisprudence point to the courts seeking an even-handed approach towards the separation of powers and the fundamental purpose and objective of judicial review. Singapore’s jurisprudence points to the imperative for judicial review reflect the socio-political culture, norms and values of the community. Regardless, the bottom line in judicial review in Singapore is that “the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power”.

This chapter is an updated version of an article originally published in (2017) 29 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 800. Republished with permission.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint), Arts 23, 38 and 93.

  2. 2.

    Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v PP [2012] 4 SLR 947.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., at p. 957.

  4. 4.

    R (Pro-Life Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corp [2004] 1 AC 185 at [76].

  5. 5.

    Wee Chong Jin CJ in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [86]. Article 93 of the Constitution is commonly cited to support the Judiciary’s power of judicial review.

  6. 6.

    For the view that judicial review may not effectively serve to further redistributive politics or abet the diffusion of power, see Hirschl (2007).

  7. 7.

    R (Pro-Life Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corp [2004] 1 AC 185 at [76].

  8. 8.

    [2016] 1 SLR 779, especially at [90]–[106]. A more detailed discussion of the case follows.

  9. 9.

    Chan Sek Keong, “Judicial review - from angst to empathy” 22 SAcLJ 469 (2010) at [29].

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Further, at [29], Chan added: “[i]n other words, seek good government through the political process and public avenues rather than redress bad government through the courts”.

  12. 12.

    [2014] 1 SLR 345.

  13. 13.

    This traffic lights metaphor is taken from Harlow and Rawlings (2009, pp. 22–48). In Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal did not appear to differentiate between judicial review in administrative law and constitutional law.

  14. 14.

    Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 at [48]–[49].

  15. 15.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [90].

  16. 16.

    Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed.

  17. 17.

    Ministry of Home Affairs, “MHA Statement on Detention of Dan Tan Seet Eng” (5 December 2015) <https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/press-releases/Pages/MHA-Statement-on-Detention-of-Dan-Tan-Seet-Eng.aspx> (accessed 18 May 2017).

  18. 18.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [91].

  19. 19.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [95].

  20. 20.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [96].

  21. 21.

    Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 304 at [30].

  22. 22.

    R v Minister of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] 1 QB 517, per Sir Thomas Bingham at 556.

  23. 23.

    [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676.

  24. 24.

    Re Wong Sin Yee [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676 at [46].

  25. 25.

    On Wednesbury irrationality, see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223.

  26. 26.

    The applicant had asserted that s 30 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed) did not apply to criminal activities outside Singapore.

  27. 27.

    [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453.

  28. 28.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [98].

  29. 29.

    Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [63].

  30. 30.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [98].

  31. 31.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [105]. Emphasis added.

  32. 32.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [100].

  33. 33.

    Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525.

  34. 34.

    Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed.

  35. 35.

    Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [86].

  36. 36.

    [1985] AC 374.

  37. 37.

    Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [94].

  38. 38.

    [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135.

  39. 39.

    Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [55].

  40. 40.

    Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [55].

  41. 41.

    Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act 1 of 1989).

  42. 42.

    Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209.

  43. 43.

    Cap 338, 1985 Rev Ed.

  44. 44.

    [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676.

  45. 45.

    Re Wong Sin Yee [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676 at [46].

  46. 46.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [8].

  47. 47.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 2 SLR 453 at [31]–[35].

  48. 48.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [146]–[147].

  49. 49.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [148].

  50. 50.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [133]–[134].

  51. 51.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [117].

  52. 52.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [119].

  53. 53.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [120].

  54. 54.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [133]–[134].

  55. 55.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [107]–[128].

  56. 56.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [64], [128] and [147].

  57. 57.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [130]–[131] and [147].

  58. 58.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [74].

  59. 59.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 2 SLR 453 at [31]–[35]. In contrast, the High Court’s decision in Tan Seet Eng reflected the prior position where it noted that s 30 of the CLTPA did not specify any particular category of criminal activity, and concluded that the provision did not restrict its scope to any specific type of criminal activity.

  60. 60.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [90].

  61. 61.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [97]–[98] and [134]. In making no fewer than eight such references in the judgment, including in the opening paragraph, the Court of Appeal was highlighting the court’s exclusive responsibility to ensure that state power is exercised within the prescribed legal limits.

  62. 62.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [128]. The court’s adoption of the “traditional test”, rather than the “probable cause test”, underscores a less deferential approach. Under the probable cause test, which the Court of Appeal applied in Kamal Jit Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [1992] 3 SLR(R) 352, the Executive is only obliged to demonstrate compliance with the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed)’s procedural requirements. The applicant bears the burden of showing probable cause that his detention was unlawful. In contrast, under the traditional test, the court “closely scrutinizes the grounds put forward by the Minister” within “the usual ambit of judicial review, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety”: see Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [63] and [66].

  63. 63.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [131].

  64. 64.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [98]. Then Menon JC illustrated it as such: “where what appears to raise a question of international law in fact bears on the application of domestic law, that is something the courts may well find justiciable”.

  65. 65.

    [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [92].

  66. 66.

    [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [128].

  67. 67.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [105].

  68. 68.

    In Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [97], the court emphasised the important distinction between the legality and merits of a decision:

    [W]hile it is one thing to say that the court must not substitute its view as to the way in which the discretion that is vested in the Minister should be exercised, it is quite another to say that the Minister’s exercise of discretion may not be scrutinised by the court at all …

  69. 69.

    Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [85].

  70. 70.

    Lon Fuller (1978–1979) had likened a polycentric problem to a spider’s web:

    A pull on one strand will distribute tensions throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but rather create a different complicated pattern [especially] if the double pull caused one or more of the weaker strands to snap …

  71. 71.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [106].

  72. 72.

    Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 at [98].

  73. 73.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [105].

  74. 74.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [128].

  75. 75.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [131].

  76. 76.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [147].

  77. 77.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [137].

  78. 78.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [130].

  79. 79.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [131] and [147].

  80. 80.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [146].

  81. 81.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [147].

  82. 82.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [148].

  83. 83.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [96].

  84. 84.

    Past cases involving the legality of the detention orders under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed) did not appear to explicitly consider the implications of detention orders on individuals. See, e.g., Re Wong Sin Yee [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676, Shamm bin Sulong v Minister for Home Affairs [1996] 2 SLR(R) 350 and Kamal Jit Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [1992] 3 SLR(R) 352.

  85. 85.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [131].

  86. 86.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [147].

  87. 87.

    Cf Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779, the Court of Appeal subjected the written grounds of detention to rigorous scrutiny to determine if the decision-maker had acted within his scope of discretion in the first place. This divergence in approach is arguably subtle but important.

  88. 88.

    Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779 at [105].

  89. 89.

    Lord Woolf et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th Ed, 2007) at para 11-004.

  90. 90.

    Pearlman v Keepers of Harrow School [1979] QB 56 at 70, per Lord Denning. But the UK position is also evolving in light of the tribunal system put in place by the UK’s Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (c 15), creating a two-tier system of administrative adjudication comprising specialised tribunals and the courts. The UK Supreme Court in R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663 held that even though some tribunal decisions can be judicially reviewed, the courts would only do so where some important point of principle or practice is involved, or that there was some other compelling reason for the court to undertake judicial review. See also Daly (2011) where he argues that the general presumption that the resolution of questions of law is a matter for the courts should be jettisoned especially where the Legislature had intended to delegate the resolution of many questions of law to administrators and where courts lack institutional competence to resolve those questions of law.

  91. 91.

    Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at [47].

  92. 92.

    Smith v Alliance Pipeline [2011] 1 SCR 160 at [26]. A similar approach is found in the influential US Supreme Court decision of Chevron USA Inc v National Resources Defence Council 467 US 837 (1984) (“Chevron”). Attorney-General V K Rajah summarised the Chevron approach as such:

    At the first stage, the court considers whether Congress has addressed the interpretive problem at issue. If so, the court will apply a correctness standard to implement Congress’s intent. If not, the court will proceed to the second stage to determine whether the administrative decision-maker’s interpretation is reasonable. If it is, the court must defer to that interpretation.

  93. 93.

    467 US 837 at 865–866 (1984).

  94. 94.

    Ibid. This is also aligned with what Etienne Mureinik (1994) had described as the movement from a “culture of authority” to a “culture of justification”. See also Dyzenhaus (1997).

  95. 95.

    In computing, the operating system, or “OS”, is the program that controls and manages the hardware and other software such as apps on a computer, laptop, smartphone, smartwatch, etc.

  96. 96.

    This brief reflection on hierarchies in the exercise of governmental power was sparked by the views in Stephen C Angle et al, “In Defence of Hierarchy” Aeon (22 March 2017) <https://aeon.co/essays/hierarchies-have-a-place-even-in-societies-built-on-equality> (accessed 23 March 2017).

  97. 97.

    In one study, the deference regime of the US Supreme Court was found to be theoretically complex and unpredictable in practice: see Eskridge and Baer (2008). Cf the view that judges have not lost their “cloak of neutrality” even where they refuse to defer to an administrator’s expertise: Osorio and O’Leary (2017).

  98. 98.

    On the waxing and waning developments in Singapore public law, see Thio and Tan (2009) and Neo (2017).

  99. 99.

    Ministry of Home Affairs, “MHA Statement on Three Members of Match-fixing Syndicate Released from Detention and Placed on Police Supervision Orders” (18 January 2016) <https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/press-releases/Pages/MHA-Statement-on-Three-Members-of-Matchfixing-Syndicate-Released-from-Detention-and-Placed-on-Police-Supervision-Orders.aspx>.

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Tan, E.K.B. (2019). ‘The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is Contrary to the Rule of Law’: Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singapore. In: Zhu, G. (eds) Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 39. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31539-9_17

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