Abstract
The central goal of this work is to assess the evolutionary sustainability of liberalism. Based on the model of multilevel selection, the book appraises the capacity of liberal democracy and free markets to satisfy preferences and analyses the evolutionary impact of the liberal satisfaction of preferences on social groups. The book develops an evolutionary political theory of preference satisfaction that operates in the tradition of scientific realism and that constitutes a more accurate explanation of public choice.
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- 1.
A “free” market is hereby regarded as a market economy which is directed by market prices and that results from an institutional political arrangement that, through the general absence of government economic intervention, aims at conserving market prices.
- 2.
In this book, unless stated otherwise, liberal democracy is defined as a form of democracy that respects the principles of liberalism (i.e. the defence of individual freedom and equality). It is a democracy operating under constitutions that protect individual rights and minorities from the abuse of power of autocratic regimes or from the tyranny of the majority. It upholds human or natural rights, the rule of law, universal suffrage and political and civic freedoms.
- 3.
Classic public choice theory assumes that individuals are the same (i.e. rationally self-interested/egoist) in all institutional contexts. It rejects the pluralistic or bifurcated vision that sees individuals as self-interested/egoist in markets while at the same time considering that they can be publicly interested in politics. Thus, it assumes that the motivation of behaviour is unified and universal (Tullock, Seldon, & Brady, 2002, p. 4).
- 4.
This “pluralism of types ” postulates that natural selection generated different types of individuals with different behavioural tendencies (i.e. altruistic, self-interested/egoist, pro-group, anti-group, etc.) and that this pluralism of types should be taken into consideration when analysing and comparing social/political institutions (like markets and liberal democracy ).
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Faria, F.N. (2019). Introduction. In: The Evolutionary Limits of Liberalism. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31496-5_1
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