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Rebuilding the State Institutions
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Abstract

A central task of a state is to establish order within its territory. The mere creation of the state is justified by this statement. A proper order that allows citizens to develop in all dimensions is based upon the rule of law . An insecure environment (i.e. disorder) signals a weakness in the rule of law , which is further weakened as crime and violence unfold. Mexico has been suffering an insecurity crisis since 2007 – which is not unique, or even the worst in its recent history. It is, however, the worst insecurity crisis since the country’s democratization process began. The combination of a deficient rule of law , an ineffective war on drugs , a fiscal system disconnected from citizens’ preferences, and the democratization process itself, has provided fertile ground for a dramatic increase in crime and violence . Under these circumstances, strengthening the rule of law is paramount, yet conditions are such that improving it will prove problematic.

Vidal Romero is Professor at the Political Science Department at ITAM and Visiting Fellow (2018–2021) at the Latin America and Caribbean Centre (LACC) at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. He was visiting Professor at Stanford University (2012–13). Romero is Co-Director of ITAM’s Center of Studies on Security, Intelligence, and Governance. His current research examines the conditions under which governments can establish (democratic) order in their territories. He has collaborated on different research projects with the World Bank, the Wilson Center, México Evalúa, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Email: vromero@itam.mx.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Zepeda Gil (2018) for an excellent analysis of the main explanations for violence in Mexico.

  2. 2.

    Available at: https://goo.gl/YM2qJY.

  3. 3.

    An inelastic demand is one in which a change in price will have a smaller than proportional effect upon the quantity demanded. If demand is perfectly inelastic, a change in price will have no effect whatsoever upon the quantity sought.

  4. 4.

    Data from to the National Survey on Victimization and Security Perception (ENVIPE) . Available at: https://goo.gl/htQTuy.

  5. 5.

    Data from INEGI . Available at: https://goo.gl/uxrBXK.

  6. 6.

    As reported by Etellekt Consulting to CNN in Spanish https://goo.gl/Ki7J3p. Other media outlets have reported similar figures.

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Romero, V. (2020). Security. In: Le Clercq, J., Abreu Sacramento, J. (eds) Rebuilding the State Institutions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31314-2_6

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