Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the dilemma of foreknowledge and human freedom. We present first the logical version of the problem—which dates back to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione—and then the theological version—which is the main theme of this book. We cast some light on the notions of logical fatalism, determinism and the interplay between truth and necessity. We then offer an analysis of the concept of bivalence.
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Notes
- 1.
One may wonder whether future contingents that do not depend on the free action of human beings may exist. We will deal later with this issue.
- 2.
Zagzebski, Linda, “Foreknowledge and Free Will”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/.
- 3.
A necessitist universe should not be confused with a necessary universe; the latter is as it is and cannot be otherwise. On the contrary, it is strictly contingent that a necessitist universe has got that particular structure.
- 4.
Put in more technical terms, we affirm that these universes dictate the existence of convergent histories and, consequently, the branching also towards the past. As we shall see in the book, there are valid reasons to consider such structures as problematic.
- 5.
Readers will forgive us for such an unorthodox version of Aristotle’s naval battle.
- 6.
See Bernstein (2002, p. 70).
- 7.
- 8.
Proposition and sentence are often used in literature with two different meanings: the term “sentences” refers to linguistic entities, while the term “propositions” refers to the meaning of these entities. As this distinction is not relevant for the aims of this book, we will not follow this convention: we will be very sloppy in using these two terms, which are to be considered as synonymous in this book except in some particular cases, apparent from the context, in which we come back to the traditional distinction between these two terms.
- 9.
In this introductory chapter, we tried to limit the logic symbols. However, some exceptions have to be made. As we have stated in the Preface, the use of logic-mathematical models should help clarify the instances at stake.
- 10.
It is a mere introduction of disjunction: if ψ follows from φ, then from φ follows that ψ ∨ θ, where θ is any closed formula. The correctness of this rule can be easily recognized if we consider that the truth of a disjunct is enough to make the disjunction true.
- 11.
As we shall see in Chap. 2 and following, the semantics of future tensed propositions are crucial to understand the issues of foreknowledge and free will.
- 12.
The philosophical tradition dates back to Aristotle the first formulation of such a view, which is called the correspondence theory of truth. Since the concept of correspondence is rather demanding from a theoretical point of view, we will call this view the classical conception of truth.
- 13.
- 14.
Many other views can be interpreted as more or less sophisticated specifications of the two above-mentioned main strategies.
- 15.
Understanding which strategy Aristotle has really endorsed is a vexata quaestio. Standard view is that Aristotle rethought the extension of the principle of bivalence. But there are positions contrary to it. For an overview, Crivelli (2004).
- 16.
Again, this passage is guaranteed by the fact that if the proposition p is true, then also the proposition p ∨¬p is true; analogously, in the scenarios where ¬p is true, the proposition p ∨¬p is also true.
- 17.
- 18.
Here we assume that divine properties such as omniscience are necessary; the case of a God only contingently omniscient or choosing not to be omniscient is not accounted for. Some scholars proposed similar solutions: see, for instance, Kreiner (1997, ch. 3).
- 19.
It is a very plausible logical principle. It is particularly easy to understand if we use a possible words semantic where \( \square r \) means that r is true in all possible worlds. If r is true in all possible worlds and it is also true in all possible worlds that r → s, then it is true in all possible worlds that s, by modus ponens. But, in this semantic, the fact that s is true in all possible worlds means that s is necessary.
- 20.
- 21.
This does not deny the close affinity between the two arguments and that the solutions to logical and theological fatalism have something in common.
- 22.
Of course, there are tons of other problems of the philosophical and theological kind connected to such topics. For instance, the modality of God’s knowledge. A frequent criticism claims that the modality by which God knows is not propositional, rather He benefits from a sort of direct intuition (Alston 1986). We are not going to investigate this issue; nonetheless, we think that, with some adjustments and corrections, our analysis can be applied to a conception of that kind.
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De Florio, C., Frigerio, A. (2019). The Battle for Free Will. In: Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31300-5_1
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