Skip to main content

Belnap and Nāgārjuna on How Computers and Sentient Beings Should Think: Truth, Trust and the Catuṣkoṭi

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
New Essays on Belnap-­Dunn Logic

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 418))

Abstract

The Meyer-Dunn semantics for First Degree Entailment and the Belnap four-valued data base logic are strikingly similar to the Buddhist catuṣkoṭi, or four-cornered logic deployed by Nāgārjuna. I show that we can exploit this similarity to better understand the nature of truth.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Belnap, N.D. (1977). “How a Computer Should Think,” in: G. Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 30–56.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Belnap, N.D. (1977). “A Useful Four-Valued Logic,” in: J. M. Dunn and G. Epstein (eds.), Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 5–37

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Cowherds. (2010). Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  4. Deguchi, Y., J. Garfield and G. Priest. (2008). “The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhist Philosophy”, Philosophy East and West 58: 3, pp. 395–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Deguchi, Y., J. Garfield and G. Priest. (2013). “How We Think Mādhyamikas Think: Reply to Tillemans,” Philosophy East and West 63:3, pp. 427–436.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Deguchi, Y., J. Garfield and G. Priest. (2013). “Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs: Reply to Siderits,” Philosophy East and West 63:3, pp. 387–398.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Deguchi, Y., J. Garfield and G. Priest. (2013). “A Mountain By Any Other Name: Reply to Tanaka,” Philosophy East and West 63:3, pp. 335–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Dunn, J.M. (1976). “Intuitive Semantics for First-Degree Entailments and ‘Coupled Trees’,” Philosophical Studies 29, pp.149–168.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Garfield, J. (1995). Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Garfield, J. (2008). “Turning a Madhyamaka Trick: Reply to Huntington,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 36:4, pp. 428–449.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Garfield, J. (2015). Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  12. Garfield, J. and G. Priest. (2003). “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought,” Philosophy East and West 53:1, pp. 1–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Garfield, J. and G. Priest. (2009). “Mountains are Just Mountains”, in M D’Amato, J Garfield and T Tillemans, (eds.), “Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analysis”, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 71–82.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Guerrero, L. (2014). Truth for the Rest of Us: Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Truth. PhD dissertation, University of New Mexico.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Gupta, N. and N. Belnap. (1993). The Revision Theory of Truth. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  16. Jones, R. (2018). “Dialetheism, Paradox, and Nāgārjuna’s Way of Thinking,” Comparative Philosophy 9:2, pp. 41–68.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Priest, G. (2010). “The Logic of the Catuṣkoṭi,” Comparative Philosophy 1:2, pp. 24–54.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Priest, G. and R. Routley. (1989). “First Historical Introduction: A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches,” in G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman (eds), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Düsseldorf: Philosophia Verlag, pp. 3–75.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Siderits, M. (2013). “Does a Table Have Buddha Nature,” Philosophy East and West 63:3, pp. 373–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Tillemans, T. (2013). “How Do Mādhyamikas Thin? Revisited,” Philosophy East and West 63:3, pp. 417–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Tsongkhapa. (2006). Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. (N. Samten and J. Garfield, trans.). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Westerhoff, J. (2010). Twelve Examples of Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jay L. Garfield .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Garfield, J.L. (2019). Belnap and Nāgārjuna on How Computers and Sentient Beings Should Think: Truth, Trust and the Catuṣkoṭi. In: Omori, H., Wansing, H. (eds) New Essays on Belnap-­Dunn Logic. Synthese Library, vol 418. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31136-0_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics