Abstract
This chapter outlines some important stages in the history of the evolution of the philosophical conception of the self. It overviews the philosophical theories of Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Kant about notions of the mind, perception, cognition, and the self. In this chapter, I also introduce some important ideas of the book, for example, substantivalism about the self and structuralism. I show that the theories of Aristotle and Descartes line up with substantivalism, whereas views of Hume and Kant border on what is called a structural realist theory of the self in this book. The chapter also alludes to some scientific breakthroughs in psychology in the two last centuries and argues that the development of cognitive sciences occasions a break from the orthodox substantivalism about the self. I suggest that to give structure to the confusing pluralism that is caused by the divergence from substantivalism in scientific psychology, we may advocate a form of structural realism.
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Notes
- 1.
The notion of “self” has been used interchangeably with the notions of “mind” and “person” through the history of philosophy. In this book, too, I am usually using these three notions interchangeably (unless remarked otherwise).
- 2.
This point would be even more conspicuous, if we remember that Thales had also asserted that the god is the mind or the soul of the world, the soul is mixed in everything, and all things are full of gods (Graham, 2010, p. 34 fragments A22–23). Despite its mystical air, as I explain immediately, Thales diverged from the mythological tradition, or at least so could it be argued, in the light of Aristotle’s later development of Thales’ approach (which could be recognised as somewhat functionalist).
- 3.
According to the Aristotelian view, in explaining a phenomenon, we have to specify four causes, that is, material, formal, efficient, and final causes. The body of an organism is enformed according to Aristotle, and the formal cause (the soul) explains the organism’s capacity to grow (Aristotle, 2016, p. 411b).
- 4.
I thank the reviewer of this book for this remark.
- 5.
In addition to page numbers, I add the universal method of referring to De Anima.
- 6.
To be clear, I am particularly sympathetic to parts of Melnick’s construal that specify the self as a dynamical structure. For example, take the following phrase:
There is always a structure of clustering or coalescing of inchoate thoughts about any thought in “peak” condition of being fully formed as a specific comprehension). There may be one or several such clusters depending on whether my marshaling is in regard to having a single thought or several different thoughts. It is such a structure to the marshaling that gives a distinction between the thoughts and the subject that is settled on them, holding them, etcetera. Although such clusters can “divide” and enter into subsequent marshalings, they can only do so by altering their degree or intensity (how strong the settling is, how intense the hold is). (Melnick, 2010, p. 48)
- 7.
By speaking of classical computationalism I am referring to digital information processing in a classical Turning machine. Turing’s idea of computation is spelt out in terms of the processing in a universal Turing computer, which consists of a head that can read the symbols on an infinite type that is divided into discrete units (representing the steps of the algorithm). This abstract machine operates on the basis of a finite number of rules that indicate when the machine should write or erase symbols on the type, when it should move the type and proceed to the next instruction or halt. Turing conjectures that this abstract machine could process any computable algorithm (Turing, 1936).
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Beni, M.D. (2019). The Self, Its Substance, and Its Structure: A Selective History. In: Structuring the Self. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31102-5_1
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