Abstract
We continue the discussion on rule choices in dichotomous settings. An argument for the simple majority principle is built by assuming that each ballot configuration is equally likely. In a situation where just three voters are present it turns out that the probability of each voter being on the winning side is maximized when the simple majority rule is adopted. This highly theoretical insight is then developed by discussing May’s axiomatic characterization of the simple majority rule.
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de Almeida, A.T., Morais, D.C., Nurmi, H. (2019). The Majority Rule. In: Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context . Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_3
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