Abstract
A fixed or multi-member district has the advantage of not needing to be periodically redrawn like a single-member district. This advantage, however, does not avoid the task of accommodating demographic changes. As the Code of Good Practice states, “With multi-member constituencies, seats should be redistributed preferably without redefining constituency boundaries, which should, where possible, coincide with administrative boundaries.”
For a good overview of the history of redistricting in certain subject countries see REDISTRICTING IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).
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Notes
- 1.
Appendix B.
- 2.
Appendix B. Please note that this guideline provides only for “review” at least every 10 years, not for action.
- 3.
The Venice Commission should not be blamed for an expectation that if a review showed an imbalance, the national legislature would act to correct it.
- 4.
See, Chap. 14, The Role of the Courts.
- 5.
These include Botswana, Canada, India, Japan, Kenya Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea , Tanzania, the United States, and Yemen.
- 6.
It did so in 2002.
- 7.
Projections of growth are notoriously unreliable. Different experts may disagree about when, where, or even if such growth will happen.
- 8.
See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Turkey.
- 9.
U.S. courts have rejected congressional districting plans with less than a 1% deviation among congressional districts.
- 10.
These are Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Alaska.
- 11.
See, PUTTING VOTERS IN THEIR PLACE by Ron Johnson & Charles Pattie, Oxford Univ. Press (2006); FIXING THE BOUNDARIES: DEFINING AND REDEFINING SINGLE-MEMBER ELECTORAL DISTRICTS by Ian McLean & David Butler, eds., Dartmouth Pub. Co. (1996); Electoral Distortion Despite Redistricting by Independent Commissions : The British Case, 1950–2005 by Ron Johnston, Charles Puttie, and David Rossiter at page 205 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008); and DRAWING A NEW CONSTITUENCY MAP FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM : The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill 2010 by Michel Balinski, Ron Johnston, Iain McLean, Peyton Young, and Angela Cummine, a report prepared for the British Academy London (2010); and National Parliaments: United Kingdom, Library of Congress (accessed July, 2018).
- 12.
The House of Commons Redistribution of Seats Act 1958 eliminated the previous common electoral quota for the whole United Kingdom and replaced it with four separate quotas. These first quotas were England 69,534, Northern Ireland 67,145, Wales 58,383 and in Scotland 54,741 electors.
- 13.
Islands create a special case, see Chap. 12. The Parliamentary constituency with the smallest-sized electorate in 2017 was Na h-Eileanan an Iar in Scotland [21,200 electors] and the largest was the Isle of Wight [109,900 electors] in England. Both are islands with a single constituency.
- 14.
In 2017, the median total parliamentary electorate across constituencies was about 72,200 in England, 56,000 in Wales, 68,300 in Northern Ireland, and 67,200 in Scotland.
- 15.
See, Districting and Redistricting in Eastern Europe: Regulations and Practices by Marina Popescu and Gabor Toka, at pages 251 and 260 in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).
- 16.
Several of these courts and authorities are quoted in Chap. 14.
- 17.
See, REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2036, Final Report, at page 4, OSCE/ODIHR (October 9, 2016).
- 18.
See, Chap. 14.
- 19.
The quotations in this paragraph are from Redistricting in France under Changing Electoral Rules by Michel Balinski at pages 173 and 185 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008), citing Villepin enterre le redécoupage électoral, Le Figaro (June 17, 2005) and Le gouvernement renonce au redécoupage de la carte électorale, Le Monde (June 17, 2005. See, Decision No. 2008–24 ELEC of May 29, 2008, Observations of the Conseil Constitutionnel on the parliamentary elections of 10 and 17 June 2007; and Decision no. 2008–573 DC, Conseil Constitutionnel (January 8, 2009). The English version of the opinions have no page numbers. (@ https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en).
- 20.
See, The Paradox of Political Representation (in India) by Yogendra Yadav (2008) available @ www.india-seminar.com
- 21.
See, Delimitation in India by Alistair McMillan at page 75 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).
- 22.
This makes the data already at least 3 1/2 years old. It will be at least seven plus years before any new constituencies are used in U.K.-wide (Scotland may be an exception) Parliamentary election.
- 23.
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, GENERAL ELECTION, Final Report, at pages 2–3, OSCE/ODHIR (May 7, 2015).
- 24.
Annex, Case Study, Germany, Delimiting Districts in a Mixed Member Proportional System, at Conclusion, ACE available at https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/annex/bdy/bdy_de
- 25.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ELECTIONS TO THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT (BUNDESTAG), OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report (September 2009). Following 2005 ELECTION, the CEC prepared proposals for amending some boundaries. As a result of the review, Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg each gained one SSED seat and Anhalt and Sachsen each lost one seat. In addition, the boundaries of 31 single-member districts were redrawn prior to the 2009 federal elections. However, the finalized districting plan includes some 53 districts which deviate from the federal average by more than ±15%, of which some 18 deviate by more than ±20%.
- 26.
This statement was made in jest by the renowned German Professor Friedrich Pukelsheim in an e-mail to the author on June 16, 2016.
- 27.
See, Decision No. 86-208 DC, Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] (July 2, 1986); and Decision No. 86–218, Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] (Nov. 18, 1986).
- 28.
Decision no. 2008–573 DC, 8 January 2009. The Conseil even declared the guarantee of two seats for each département unconstitutional.
- 29.
OBSERVATIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL SUR LES ECHEANCES ELECTORALES DE 2007, Conseil Constitutionnel (July 7, 2008). See Chap. 14 for more of this opinion.
- 30.
This redistricting was upheld, but claims of gerrymandering and population imbalance persisted.
- 31.
For example in 2011, a total of 12 additional seats were apportioned to Texas (4), Florida (2), Arizona (1), Georgia (1), Nevada (1), South Carolina (1), Utah (1), and Washington (1). An equivalent number of seats were lost at the same time by New York (2), Ohio (2), Illinois (1), Iowa (1), Louisiana (1), Massachusetts (1), Michigan (1), Missouri (1), New Jersey (1), and Pennsylvania (1).
- 32.
The United States apportions using the method of equal proportions.
- 33.
See, An Independent Commission with Political Input: New Zealand’s Electoral Redistribution Practices by Alan McRobie at page 27 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).
- 34.
See, Understanding Electoral Reform: Electoral Reform and Direct Democracy in Canada : When Citizens Become Involved by Lawrence LeDuc, 34 West European Politics 551–567 (Issue 3, 2011), available online at www.tandfonline.co; and The Electoral Boundary Revolution in Canada by R. K. Carty, 15 American Review of Canadian Studies 273 (Issue 3, 1985), published online: November 10, 2009. These commissions consist of judges and politicians.
- 35.
See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Uruguay.
- 36.
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Bickerstaff, S. (2020). Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats. In: Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_8
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