Abstract
The Code of Good Practice states that “seats (in the national parliament) must be evenly distributed between constituencies.” This principle, sometimes popularized as “one person, one vote” is perhaps the most widely acknowledged principle throughout representative democratic societies—i.e. that each person or voter should have an equal opportunity through his or her representative to determine national policy. This equality is measured by the relative number of persons or voters per representative.
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- 1.
Appendix A.
- 2.
See, Chap. 12.
- 3.
See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1996); and Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, 183 (Can.). Excerpts from these cases appear in Chap. 14.
- 4.
The “de minimis” or essentially no deviation standard in the U.S. applies only to congressional districts within a state.
- 5.
This measure is used in a few nations, including the United States and Japan.
- 6.
For example, in a jurisdiction that has one district that is 20% above the ideal, there necessarily must be districts totaling a negative percentage of 20%, such as four districts each of minus 5%.
- 7.
For example, if the ideal is 50,000 and the district has 40,000 persons or electors, the result is −10,000. If this result is divided by the ideal (50,000), the deviation is −20% from the ideal.
- 8.
Although the U.S. requires essentially absolute equality in population among congressional districts within a state, there is no such requirement of equality among districts nationwide. However, both calculations are important.
- 9.
E.g. if the difference is 400 persons or voters, and the number of persons or electors in the smaller of the two districts is 800 persons or electors then the difference is 50% of the smaller district. For the larger district with 1200 persons, the difference is 33.3% of the number of persons or electors in the district.
- 10.
See, Chap. 12.
- 11.
Appendix B. Use of the word “norm” is unfortunate and misleading.
- 12.
These nations include: Albania (±5%), Armenia (±15%), Australia (±15% at creation), Belarus (±10%), Canada (±25%), Croatia (±5%), Germany (±25%), Hungary (±20%), Italy (±20%), Lithuania (±25%), Macedonia (±3%), New Zealand (±5%), Papua New Guinea (±20%), Singapore (±30%), Ukraine (±10%), United Kingdom (±5% with exceptions; pending), United States (court imposed de Minimis), Yemen (±5%), and Zimbabwe (±20%). Most of these measurements are explicitly or implicitly from the quota.
- 13.
These nations include: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Poland, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, and Uruguay.
- 14.
These limits are lifted primarily from Toward Developing International Standards, Appendix C, ACE (2004). This invaluable compilation of election practices for 87 countries was headed by Lisa Handley, but is incomplete and was based in part on inaccurate surveys. The information contained in this chart is accurate for these countries.
- 15.
See, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010)
- 16.
Decision no. 2008-573 DC, Conseil Constitutional (January 8, 2009). See Chap. 14.
- 17.
See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010) and THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, ON THE COMPLIANCE OF ARTICLE 9, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA LAW ON THE ELECTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA (CONVENTION OF 6 NOVEMBER 2012) TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, No. KT27-N16 (October 20, 2015).
- 18.
Decision no. 2008-573 DC, Conseil Constitutional at paras 21 and 26 (January 8, 2009); See Decision No. 2008-24 ELEC of May 29, 2008, Observations of the Conseil Constitutionnel on the parliamentary elections of 10 and 17 June 2007.
- 19.
I acknowledge that some minor deviations from the ideal occur because the legislature or commission finds it easier to draw districts in an allowable range than it is to try to meet an ideal. This is scant justification for any significant deviation.
- 20.
Of course, it is impossible to redraw only one district. A change in the boundaries of one district necessarily affects the boundaries of one or more other districts.
- 21.
See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1996); and Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask), 2 S.C.R. 158 (Can.) (1991).
- 22.
Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
- 23.
The Court has allowed state and local governments greater leeway in drawing their districts. The strict standard applies only to congressional districts within a state. I doubt that the Supreme Court foresaw how technology would allow legislatures the flexibility and means to meet this voter equality requirement, and by gerrymandering to still achieve most of their political goals.
- 24.
In the hypothetical illustrated at the end of this chapter I added a third party C with 10% of the vote. The presence of this third party is intended to give the hypothetical a European flare, but is not necessary for the result that Party A can win a majority of the seats.
- 25.
Bush v. Martin, 224 F Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff’d per curium, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
- 26.
Still, gerrymandering of equally populated districts in the United States is always a subject of interest worldwide. Appendix C describes another incident of congressional redistricting from Texas in 2003 that attracted worldwide attention.
- 27.
See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1986).
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Bickerstaff, S. (2020). Unequal Voting Power. In: Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_4
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