Abstract
Several nations combine single-member electoral districts with proportional representation in a dual system for the election of members of the lower chamber of its national legislature or for its unicameral national legislature.
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Notes
- 1.
Nations that have mixed election systems include: Andorra (P), Armenia (P), Antigua and Barbados (P), Bolivia (MMP), Cameroon (P), Chad (P), Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) (P), Djibouti (P), Ecuador (P), Georgia (P), Germany (MMP), Guatemala (P), Guinea (P), Hungary (P, changed from MMP in 2012), Italy (P, changed in 2018), Japan (P), Jordan (P, with seats reserved for women, Christians, and Chechens/Circassians), Republic of Korea (P, South Korea), Lesotho (MMP), Lithuania (P), Libya (P), Madagascar (P), Mauritania (P), Mexico (P), Monaco (P), Nepal (P) (26 appointed), New Zealand (MMP), Niger (P), Panama (P), Pakistan (P), Philippines (P), Puerto Rico (P), Russian Federation (P beginning in 2016), Romania (MMP), Senegal (P), South Sudan (P),Taiwan (P), Tajikistan (P), Tanzania (P), Thailand (P), Ukraine (P), Venezuela (changed from MMP to P in 2010), and Zanzibar (MMP).
- 2.
As discussed in Chap. 8, Germany has been slow to reallocate seats. In 2012 the average single-member constituency size nationwide was 268,293 persons, but Berlin with a population of 3.56 million had 12 constituencies (average 296,666); while Lower Saxony with a population of 7.79 million had 30 constituencies (average 259,666); and Thuringia with 2.181 million had 9 constituencies (average 242,333).
- 3.
BVerfGE 121 (2009) 266–317, Judgment of 3 July 2008 (2 BvC 1/07, 2 BvC 7/07). One of the Court’s conclusions was that the “negative voting weights” characteristic of the system actually caused parties sometimes to win more seats by getting fewer votes—causing voters to speculate whether casting their vote for their favored party would help or harm it. On a personal note: while teaching in Germany in the early 2000s, I recall being startled by Chancellor Merkel’s plea that supporters of her CDU party actually vote for another party to prevent CDU from losing seats.
- 4.
APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION at 247 (Second Edition 2018).
- 5.
See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Germany .
- 6.
See Chap. 7.
- 7.
Mexico : Final Report, Observing the 2000 Mexico Elections by Marcela Szymansic, Carter Center and ACE (2000); and From Politics to Technicalities: Mexican Redistricting in Historical Perspective by Alonso Lujambio and Horacio Vives Segi in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).
- 8.
For example, both Mexico and Japan allow a voter’s preference to affect the ranking of candidates on a party list.
- 9.
APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION at 247 (Second Edition 2018).
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Bickerstaff, S. (2020). Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with Proportional Representation Elections. In: Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_10
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