Abstract
The second part of the book is dedicated to the philosophy of human affectivity. It further evolves the idea that affectivity plays a fundamental role in the way we exist as subjective, human beings. The arguments carved out in this part of the book build the second pillar in the development of an account of self-feeling. In order to explore what role affectivity may play in self-consciousness this chapter takes a closer look at contemporary philosophy of human affectivity, which has reached an enormous level of detail and complexity today. However, it is mainly concerned with short-term, object-oriented emotions. The reader is introduced to the field, especially to the controversy between feeling vs. cognitive theories of emotions. Moreover, this chapter starts an exploration of more fundamental levels of human affectivity, by using examples from neuroscience (Damasio) and phenomenology (e.g. Voigtländer, Scheler, Waldenfels, Henry).
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Notes
- 1.
See Graver (2009) for qualifying arguments to show that the Greek Stoa after all did have a concept of “good” affectivity (“eupatheiai”).
- 2.
For a notable exception, see e.g. Max Scheler’s (1921) detailed analysis of human affectivity.
- 3.
See Campbell for a similar diagnosis: “There are more feelings on heaven and earth than are discussed in most people’s philosophies”(Campbell 1997, p. 153).
- 4.
- 5.
Note that this experiment is itself subject to criticism (e.g. De Sousa 1987, p. 55).
- 6.
In his later works (e.g. Solomon 2003), however, he qualified this claim and conceded that he previously denied the role of the body too harshly.
- 7.
Solomon and Nussbaum are generally seen as most prominent proponents of cognitivism in the philosophy of emotions. However, there are differences between them. For example, Nussbaum (2001, p. 43) argues for an objectivism of emotions (emotions are about items that are important for our well-being), while Solomon (Solomon 1976, p. 108), inspired by Sartre, sympathises with a rather subjectivist view (emotions are projections of value into the world).
- 8.
Sometimes these accounts are labelled “weak cognitivists” (Döring 2009; Müller 2011; Slaby 2008b). Note that Slaby and Stephan (Slaby 2012a; Slaby et al. 2013; Slaby and Stephan 2012; Slaby and Wüschner 2014) criticised this view for neglecting the active and bodily character of emotions. Instead, they propose to view emotions as part of embodied, goal-directed agency. Helm (2015) expressed some critical thoughts on the analogy between perception and emotion, too.
- 9.
It should be acknowledged at this point that the actual difference between cognitive and feeling theories has eroded in the last years. Cognitive theories (such as Nussbaum) have included many feeling-characteristics into their account (and thereby overstretched the term “judgement”) and contemporary versions of feeling theories emphasize the world-directed intentionality (and thereby concede a quasi-cognitive character) of emotions (Landweer 2004).
- 10.
Jan Slaby (2008b, chapters 5–7) applies a useful distinction between emotions, bodily sensations, and background feelings and moods.
- 11.
Compare e.g. Fingerhut/Marienberg’s remark that „It has been to a large extent due to Ratcliffe’s work (2005, 2008) that these topics [fundamental feelings of being alive, G.K.] have regained a broader interest and are treated in a larger context“ (Fingerhut and Marienberg 2012, p. 9)
- 12.
Colombetti presents a summary of alternative accounts of “primordial affectivity” (Colombetti 2014, chapter 1).
- 13.
Compare his famous “somatic marker hypothesis” as introduced in Damasio (1994).
- 14.
- 15.
See Colombetti (2014, chapter 1), for an overview.
- 16.
Notably, Fuchs comes from a neuroscientific background but integrates lots of phenomenological insights to his theory. So this criticism applies only partly to him.
- 17.
We cannot go into the details of Scheler’s theory here. For a brief reference to the topic of values and affectivity, compare Sect. 1 of this chapter above or chapter “Appropriateness of Self-Feeling” below.
- 18.
- 19.
Compare Schmitz et al. (2011) for a brief introduction in English.
- 20.
In this book Stambaugh’s (Heidegger 1996 [1927]) more recent translation is preferred when it comes to Heidegger’s passages concerning affectivity. The classical translation of Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 1962 [1927]) translates “Befindlichkeit” as “state of mind”, which has been criticized as misleading (e.g. Colombetti 2014, p. 11) because it suggests a private, psychological state, something Heidegger strongly rejected. The reflexive German verb “sich befinden” literally translates as “to find oneself” or “to be”. It may feature in both the questions “Where are you? Wo befinden Sie sich?” and “How are you? Wie befinden sie sich?”. Stambaugh’s translation as “attunement” does not exactly capture this feature but it still seems to fit better for the purposes of this book, since it avoids the misleading suggestions of the classical translation. Ratcliffe (2005, 2008) is along the same line in this regard.
- 21.
See also Tengelyi (2007) for an explicit interpretation of Henry’s work on selfhood and affectivity.
- 22.
Please note that Ratcliffe predominantly engages with fundamental affectivity that shapes our experience of the world, and not ourselves. So you might argue that it is an unnecessary detour to build on Ratclife, given that Henry already focuses on self-affection. However, Ratcliffes analysis of existential feelings are so rich that they provide significant additional insight to the phenomenon of fundamental affectivity. Thus it makes sense in the context of this book to build on his work rather than Henry’s.
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Kreuch, G. (2019). A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Human Affectivity. In: Self-Feeling. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 107. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_5
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