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Poland Pushes NATO and the EU Eastward

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Abstract

The author claims that Poland is seeking to bring about an active NATO and EU policy in the east of Europe. He shows how Poland participates, by close cooperation with the USA and EU, in the West’s promotion of democracy in the East. The consequences of this have included the inducement of “color revolutions” in post-Soviet countries and rivalry with Russia. The author demonstrates how this policy led to the crisis in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013. He details Poland’s participation in NATO’s “open door” policy of expansion, including to post-Soviet states. He also analyzes Poland’s efforts to have NATO’s eastern flank reinforced, with the consequence that European security has become militarized.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Tulmets, E. (2014). East Central European Foreign Policy Identity in Perspective: Back to Europe and the EU’s Neighbourhood. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 119–120.

  2. 2.

    Sharp, G. (2011). From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. London: Serpent’s Tail.

  3. 3.

    Moniz Bandeira, L. A. (2015). The Second Cold War: Geopolitics and Strategic Dimension of the USA, Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 42, 46.

  4. 4.

    The literature on the subject distinguishes four models of promoting democracy abroad: (a) coercion, (b) conditionality, (c) persuasion, (d) socialization. See Beichelt, T. (2012). The Research Field of Democracy Promotion. Living Reviews in Democracy (Vol. 2, pp. 5–6). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich.

  5. 5.

    Surkov, V. (2006, November 20). Natsionalizatsia Budushchego. Ekspert online 43. http://expert.ru/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_buduschego/. Accessed June 28, 2019; Ambrosio, T. (2009). Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union. Farnham: Ashgat, pp. 45–72.

  6. 6.

    See Pifer, S. (2007). European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Problems of Post-Communism, 54(6), 30–37; Kapuśniak, T. (2009). Polityka Polski wobec Ukrainy. In Gil, A., Kapuśniak, T. (Eds.) Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania. Koncepcje. Realizacja (pp. 227–230). Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej; Omolesky, M. (2007, September 11). Between the Seas: Międzymorze and the Nature of Polish-Ukrainian Relations. LEAP (Laboratoire européen d’Anticipation politique). http://www.leap2020.net/english-between-the-seas-midzymorze-and-the-nature-of-polish-ukrainian-relations/?lang=en. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  7. 7.

    The Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus “confirming the aspiration to the status of a neutral state” voted on 9 April 1993 to join the system of collective defence of the CIS, but its chairman Stanislau Shushkevich refused to sign the Tashkent Treaty as contrary to the declared in 1990 policy of neutrality of the republic. He did not do so until 5 January 1994.

  8. 8.

    Czachor, R. (2011). Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Białoruś w latach 1991–2011. Studium politologiczne. Polkowice: Wydawnictwo DWSPiT, pp. 113–128.

  9. 9.

    Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation – Warsaw, June 23, 1992. Zbiór Dokumentów – Recueil de Documents, 1993, XLIX(1), pp. 38–51.

  10. 10.

    See the text in Alarm trzech prezydentów. Gazeta Wyborcza, November 21, 1996. Comp. Stolarczyk, M. (1998). Stosunki polsko-białoruskie w okresie pozimnowojennym (niektóre aspekty). In B. Łomiński, M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). Polska i jej sąsiedzi w latach dziewięćdziesiątych. Polityczne i ekonomiczne aspekty współpracy i integracji (p. 262). Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

  11. 11.

    Fedorowicz, K. (2009). Polityka Polski wobec Białorusi. In A. Gil, T. Kapuśniak (Eds.) Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania. Koncepcje. Realizacja (p. 246). Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.

  12. 12.

    Between October 2002 and February 2006, due to a lack of financial resources, this radio ceased its activities for a time.

  13. 13.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2013). Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 246–248.

  14. 14.

    Rice Calls for Change in Belarus. BBC News, April 21, 2005; Rice: Belarus is ‘dictatorship’. CNN.com , April 20, 2005.

  15. 15.

    Kubin, T. (2011). Stosunki polsko-białoruskie w końcu XX i na początku XXI wieku. In M. Stolarczyk (Ed.). Stosunki Polski z sąsiadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku (pp. 178–179). Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

  16. 16.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2013), pp. 250–253.

  17. 17.

    For more, see Wierzbicki, A. (2018). Polish-Belarusian Relations: Between a Common Past and the Future. Bade-Baden: Nomos, pp. 86–92.

  18. 18.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2002). The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and Ukraine. The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2(3), 195–226.

  19. 19.

    Prof. Bronisław Łagowski: rusofobia to jest obecnie ideologia państwowa. Onet.pl, October 7, 2014. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/prof-bronislaw-lagowski-rusofobia-to-jest-obecnie-ideologia-panstwowa/51vhw. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  20. 20.

    Cimoszewicz, W. (2002, February 19). Polska wizja Europy, Rzeczpospolita.

  21. 21.

    Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, May 7 2009, Council of the European Union, Brussels, May 7, 2009, doc. 8435/09 (Presse 78), p. 6.

  22. 22.

    The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, called this initiative “Paper” from the Russian abbreviation “Bumaga” from the first letters of the names of the participating states B(elarus), U(kraine), M(oldova), A(menia), G(eorgia), A(zerbeidjan).

  23. 23.

    The Eurasian Economic Union included Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan as founding members, and was joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

  24. 24.

    Cohen, S. F. (2014, March 3). Distorting Russia: How the American media misrepresent Putin, Sochi and Ukraine. The Nation.

  25. 25.

    That’s what the former US ambassador in the USSR in the years 1987–1991 Jack Matlock claimed, See Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union: The U.S. and NATO Are Provoking the Ukrainian Crisis. Centre for Research on Globalization. September 5, 2014. https://www.globalresearch.ca/former-u-s-ambassador-to-the-soviet-union-the-u-s-and-nato-are-provoking-the-ukrainian-crisis/5399602. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  26. 26.

    Mearsheimer, J.J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77–89; Walt, S.M. (2018). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 33. See too Menon, R., Rumer, E. (2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order. Boston: MIT Press, pp. 66–67.

  27. 27.

    Soroka, S. (2018). Pozitsiya ES otnositelno nepodpisaniya Ukrainoy Soglasheniya ob Assotsiatsii v 2013 godu kak predposylka ukrainskogo krizisa. Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, 4, 188.

  28. 28.

    Zięba, R. (2017). The Ukraine Crisis as a Rivalry for Spheres of Influence between the West and Russia. International and Security Studies, 1, 119.

  29. 29.

    Sejm potępia agresję i wspiera Ukrainę. Uchwała przyjęta przez Sejm. Polska-Zbrojna.pl, March 5, 2015. http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/11744?t=Sejm-potepia-agresje-i-wspiera-Ukraine. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  30. 30.

    Smith, N. R. (2016). The EU under a Realist Scope: Employing a Neoclassical Realist Framework for the Analysis of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement Offer to Ukraine. International Relations, 30(1), 35.

  31. 31.

    This is borne out by the outcome of the April 2019 presidential election, won by Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian with no political experience. This result clearly indicates that the Ukrainian people rejected the policies of the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. In July 2019, early parliamentary elections in Ukraine were won by the party of the new president “Servant of the People”.

  32. 32.

    TVPInfo, TVN24, IAR, August 17, 2014.

  33. 33.

    Barburska, O. (2018). Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej jako część składowa polityki zagranicznej UE. Warsaw: Aspra, pp. 227–228.

  34. 34.

    Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2014, May 9, 2014; Minister Grzegorz Schetyna on Polish foreign policy priorities, November 6, 2014.

  35. 35.

    This can be seen in two following sentence: “The reassertion of Russia’s position as a major power at the expense of its neighborhood, as well as the escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact on the security in the region”. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Warsaw: National Security Bureau, 2014, p. 21.

  36. 36.

    For more, see Stolarczyk, M. (2015). Polska i Niemcy wobec kryzysu i konfliktu ukraińskiego. Zbieżność i różnice stanowisk. In K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk (Eds.). Implikacje konfliktu ukraińskiego dla polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Polski. Aspekty polityczne, wojskowe, gospodarcze oraz społeczne (pp. 363–367). Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej.

  37. 37.

    For more, see Barburska, O. (2018), p. 200 et seq.

  38. 38.

    Speech by President of the Republic of Poland Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski. NATO Summit, April 23, 1999. https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990423n.htm. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  39. 39.

    R. Sikorski. Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2011 r. przedstawiona na 87. Posiedzeniu Sejmu RP VI kadencji – 16 marca 2011 r. In Exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych 1990–2011 (p. 449). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 2011.

  40. 40.

    The Polish Press Agency (PAP) reported that according to public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine in August 2018, if a referendum had been held then, 63% of respondents would have taken part in it and 67% of them would have declared in favor and 28% would have been against, while 5% had no opinion on the matter. See “Rozłączamy się ostatecznie i bezpowrotnie”. Ukraina zmienia konstytucję. TVN24.pl, November 23, 2018. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/ukraina-dazenie-do-czlonkostwa-w-ue-i-nato-bedzie-zapisane-w-konstytucji,886111.html. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  41. 41.

    Duda przed szczytem NATO: Potrzebujemy sprawnych procesów decyzyjnych, July 11, 2018. https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1171275,duda-przed-szczytem-nato-potrzebujemy-sprawnych-procesow-decyzyjnych.html. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  42. 42.

    Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021. Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, p. 9.

  43. 43.

    Ibidem, p. 10.

  44. 44.

    See Ex-Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe fordert Aufnahme Russlands in die Nato. Der Spiegel, March 6, 2010.

  45. 45.

    At the conference on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the National Security Bureau, entitled “National Security of the Republic of Poland at the turn of the century: the experience of the National Security Bureau and strategic challenges”, organized on January 31, 2011 in the Presidential Palace in Warsaw, this politician clearly did not have a wide range of interlocutors around him, as was the case before his above-mentioned statement.

  46. 46.

    I witnessed this statement by Minister Sikorski, as I also took part in this debate.

  47. 47.

    See Komorowski, B. (2010, November 18). Sojusz z przyszłością. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  48. 48.

    Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010.

  49. 49.

    See Nowak, J. M. (2010, October 27). Niech NATO działa z automatu, Gazeta Wyborcza.

  50. 50.

    Fakty po Faktach. TVN24, October 27, 2010.

  51. 51.

    Linkevicius, L. (2010, September 9). Reset With Russia, but With Reassurance. New York Times.

  52. 52.

    See Nowak, J. M. (2010, October 27). Niech NATO działa z automatu. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  53. 53.

    According to SPIPRI data, US military spending at that time increased by more than half from 404.8 billion USD to 609.6 billion USD. See Military expenditure by country, in constant (2016) US$, 2009–2017, SIPRI 2018. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/1_Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932017%20in%20constant%20%282016%29%20USD.pdf. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  54. 54.

    From terms of offensive realism, the Georgian-Russian war was a sign of rivalry between Russia and the USA for dominance in the South Caucasus, and Russia entered the war to restore its dominance in this region. See Karagiannis, E. (2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian War Via the Lens of Offensive Realism. European Security, 22(1), 74–93.

  55. 55.

    See Komorowski, B. (2010, November 18). Sojusz z przyszłością. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  56. 56.

    The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signet on Paris May 27, 1997, says, “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”.

  57. 57.

    See Chap. 4.

  58. 58.

    Zięba, R. (2018). The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st century: From cooperation to crisis (p. 174). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

  59. 59.

    See Chap. 4.

  60. 60.

    Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. NATO Press Release (2014), 120, September 5, 2014.

  61. 61.

    Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July, 2016. NATO Press Release (2016), 100, July 9, 2016.

  62. 62.

    As a result, in mid-2018, 774 from the USA, 130 from the UK, 120 from Romania and 69 from Croatia were stationed in the battalion (battlegroup) located in Poland.

  63. 63.

    Zając, J. (2017). Polish-Romanian Relations in the 21st Century: Back to the Future. International and Security Studies, 1, 99–101. This declaration also includes other announcements of close cooperation, to ensure energy security and within the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which are important for both countries.

  64. 64.

    Rumunia jest dla Polski strategicznym partnerem w regionie, November 3, 2015. https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,25,oficjalna-wizyta-prezydenta-andrzeja-dudy-w-rumunii.html. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  65. 65.

    Joint Declaration on Allied Solidarity and Shared Responsibility, November 4, 20915. https://www.prezident.sk/en/article/joint-declaration-on-allied-solidarity-and-shared-responsibility/. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  66. 66.

    The summit of the Presidents of the Bucharest Nine, February 28, 2019. Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bratislava. https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/bratyslawa_sk_a_en/news/the_summit_of_the_presidents_of_the_bucharest_nine. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  67. 67.

    Rotaru, V., Umland, A. (2017, November 10). How Romania and Poland Can Strengthen NATO and the EU: Two New Cooperation Initiatives Could Improve Regional Security. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2017-11-10/how-romania-and-poland-can-strengthen-nato-and-eu. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  68. 68.

    Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on Polish diplomacy priorities in 2019, Warsaw, March 2019. https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/minister-jacek-czaputowicz-on-polish-diplomacy-priorities-in-2019. Accessed June 28, 2019.

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Zięba, R. (2020). Poland Pushes NATO and the EU Eastward. In: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_6

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