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The Dialectic of Strengthening and Weakening the European Union

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Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy
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Abstract

In this chapter, the author presents Poland’s behavior within the EU. He discusses Warsaw’s position on EU institutional reform in the years 2002–2004. Poland favored strengthening the intergovernmental nature of this organization and after 2005 refused to ratify the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which it had signed. Subsequently, the Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party (PO-PSL) governments played a constructive role in efforts to overcome the financial crisis in the euro area. Poland adopted changing positions in regard to EU defense policy. It initially criticized the EU’s initiatives, but later it cautiously joined in. Beginning in 2009 it made attempts, jointly with Germany and France, to reinforce the CSDP; later, it advocated unrealistic ideas about creating a European army and it was not, particularly after 2015, interested in overcoming the stagnation of the CSDP. During the immigration crisis, the PO-PSL government showed solidarity with the majority of EU member states, but the succeeding PiS government adopted the opposite stance and rejected the mandatory relocation of illegal immigrants and refugees. The PiS government’s view of the future of the EU also differs from that of the majority of EU countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bartoszewski, W. (2001). Ponad podziałami. Wybrane przemówienia i wywiady lipiec—grudzień 2000 r., Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 27 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Bartoszewski, W. (2001). Traktat z Nicei—polski punkt widzenia, wystąpienie na konferencji pt. “Traktat z Nicei—polskie interesy”, 22 lutego 2001 r. In J. Barcz, et al. (Eds.). Traktat z Nicei. Wnioski dla Polski (pp. 7–16). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych.

  3. 3.

    Bartoszewski, W. (2001). The European Union’s Future Shape—The Polish Point of View. In: J. Barcz, K. Żukrowska (Eds.). The Future of the European Union: The Polish Point of View (pp. 106–108). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych.

  4. 4.

    Ibidem, pp. 108–109.

  5. 5.

    Droga do nowej Unii. Rzeczpospolita, February 19, 2002.

  6. 6.

    Cimoszewicz, W. (2002, February 19). Polska wizja Europy, Rzeczpospolita.

  7. 7.

    Ibidem.

  8. 8.

    Ibidem; Droga do nowej Unii. Rzeczpospolita, February 19, 2002.

  9. 9.

    This treaty provided for 27 votes for Poland, that is, the same number as for Spain, only two votes less than for Germany, France, Italy, and the UK.

  10. 10.

    See Z prac prezesa i wiceprezesów Rady Ministrów. Przegląd Rządowy, No. 6 (156), June 2004, p. 26.

  11. 11.

    For more, see Węc, J. J. (2011). Traktat Lizboński. Polityczne aspekty reformy ustrojowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 20072009. Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, pp. 168–176.

  12. 12.

    The Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a first referendum on June 9, 2008 (53.4% voted “no”). A year later, the European Council agreed on a special protocol to guarantee Ireland’s neutrality and its representative in the European Commission. In a second referendum held on October 2, 2009, 67.1% of the voters voted to ratify of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009, after this second referendum and after the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic ratified it.

  13. 13.

    During the EU–Russia Summit held in Khabarovsk on May 21–22, 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev said that Moscow did not want this to be a Partnership against Russia. Vaclav Klaus, President of the Czech Republic, which held the EU presidency at the time, disclosed that attempts were made during the meeting to convince President Medvedev that the Eastern Partnership was not directed against Russia.

  14. 14.

    For more, see Węc, J. J. (2012). Pierwsza polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Uwarunkowania—procesy decyzyjne—osiągnięcia i niepowodzenia. Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, pp. 47–130.

  15. 15.

    Croatia, which entered the EU in July 2013, also acceded to the Fiscal Compact on March 7, 2018.

  16. 16.

    Osobny budżet strefy euro to nic dobrego dla Polski. Odsunie nas na peryferie i pozbawi pieniędzy? Money.pl, April 4, 2018. https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/osobny-budzet-dla-strefy-euro-janusz,208,0,2305488.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  17. 17.

    Budżet strefy euro nie może być konstruowany kosztem ogólnego budżetu UE. TVPInfo, June 26, 2018. https://www.tvp.info/37744572/budzet-strefy-euro-nie-moze-byc-konstruowany-kosztem-ogolnego-budzetu-ue, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  18. 18.

    Projekt unijnego budżetu gotowy. KE chce uzależnienia wypłat od przestrzegania praworządności. TVPInfo, May 2, 2018. https://www.tvp.info/37045613/projekt-unijnego-budzetu-gotowy-ke-chce-uzaleznienia-wyplat-od-przestrzegania-praworzadnosci, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  19. 19.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2005). Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, pp. 46–51.

  20. 20.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2000). Europejska Tożsamość Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony: koncepcja—struktura—funkcjonowanie. Warsaw: Scholar, pp. 99–100.

  21. 21.

    See Osica, O. (1999, July 9). Kopciuszek urasta w siłę. Polska Zbrojna, No. 28, pp. 32–33; Wojna, K. (1999, December 17). Amerykanie i Europejczycy. Polska Zbrojna, No. 50, p. 34.

  22. 22.

    Rotfeld, A. D. (1999, August 27). Interview with… . Polska Zbrojna, No. 35, p. 6; Berezowski, M. (1999, September 17). Orkiestra i kapelmistrz. Polska Zbrojna, No. 38, p. 32.

  23. 23.

    Polska krytykuje plany obronne UE. Rzeczpospolita, December 7, 1999.

  24. 24.

    Ibidem.

  25. 25.

    Reiter, J. (1999, December 12). Na europejski rozkaz. Rzeczpospolita.

  26. 26.

    Wołek, T. (2000, March 2). Polska mięsem armatnim? Życie.

  27. 27.

    Pułapka z wyboru. Polityka, No. 18, April 29, 2000, pp. 36–37. See too Nowak Jeziorański, J. (2000, June 23). Ameryka, Europa i Polska. Polska Zbrojna, No. 26, pp. 7–8.

  28. 28.

    See Michta, A.A. (1999, November 21). Transatlantyk. Czy plany stworzenia europejskiego systemu obrony mogą zagrozić NATO? Wprost, No. 47; Świerczyński, M. (2000, March 10). Unia nie chce NATO. Polska Zbrojna, No. 11, p. 47.

  29. 29.

    Geremek, B. On European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), NAC, Brussels, December 15, 1999.

  30. 30.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2002). Visegrad Group towards Common European Security and Defence Policy. Polish Political Science Yearbook, XXXI, 81 et seq.

  31. 31.

    Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland—Warsaw, January 4, 2000. Zbiór Dokumentów–Recueil de Documents, 2000, 56(1), pp. 103–104.

  32. 32.

    Exposé by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 2000, Warsaw, May 9, 2000. Zbiór Dokumentów–Recueil de Documents, 2000, 56(2), p. 23.

  33. 33.

    Bartoszewski, W. (2001, May 11). Europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa. Polski punkt widzenia, Speech delivered during a conference in Warsaw organized by the University of Warsaw and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

  34. 34.

    See Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, July 22, 2003. The Strategy was approved by the President of the Republic of Poland on September 8, 2003.

  35. 35.

    As indicated by the announcement of the NRF concept during the visit to Warsaw of the US Secretary of Defense in October 2002, before the NATO summit in Prague.

  36. 36.

    Udział bez entuzjazmu. Rzeczpospolita, November 22, 2000.

  37. 37.

    Ibidem. Poland’s position was averse to the ESDP, but as opposed as that of Turkey, which maintained its veto on the EU’s automatic access to NATO planning resources and military capabilities.

  38. 38.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2004). Polska wobec polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej. Przegląd Europejski, 2, 7 et seq.

  39. 39.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2013). Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 89-98.

  40. 40.

    This is indicated by the agreement signed on August 20, 2008, with the USA on the construction of an American anti-missile shield in Poland.

  41. 41.

    Wojciechowski, M. (2009, July 21). Kouchner u Sikorskiego i ambasadorów. Gazeta Wyborcza. Chobielin is a locality near Bydgoszcz, where minister Sikorski owns a residence and where he occasionally hosted his foreign partners.

  42. 42.

    Deklaracja Francusko-Polskiego Szczytu w sprawie Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony, Paris, November 5, 2009.

  43. 43.

    Text of the Weimar letter—in the author’s archive.

  44. 44.

    For more on this subject, see Ciupiński, A. (2018). Polska wobec rozwoju polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej. Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, No. 12, p. 362; Węc, J.J. (2014), pp. 110–116.

  45. 45.

    On May 8–9, 2013, Polish President Bronisław Komorowski traveled to France on an official visit. The strategic partnership between Poland and France was confirmed on that occasion. The subject of bilateral talks was, among others, the cooperation of Poland and France (as well as Germany) for the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the involvement of French capital in Poland. The Polish President said to journalists that “since Hollande took office as President, we have had an absolutely unusual and exceptional period in Polish–French relations. We should not only appreciate this, but also make the most of it. During the visit, the Polish and French defense ministers signed a letter of intent about bilateral military cooperation. Presidents Komorowski and Hollande took part in celebrations under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the end of Second World War in Europe. See Prezydent RP z premierem Francji o współpracy wojskowej i polityce zagranicznej, May 8, 2013. https://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-bronislawa-komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/art,241,prezydent-rp-z-premierem-francji-o-wspolpracy-wojskowej-i-polityce-zagranicznej.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  46. 46.

    See the report prepared by the former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine (1997–2002) and submitted to president François Hollande in December 2012: Rapport pour le Président de la République Française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le Commandement Intégré de l’OTAN, sur l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l’Europe de la défense, Paris, November 14, 2012.

  47. 47.

    Minister R. Sikorski spoke about this outright in a speech for Radio TOK.FM on January 25, 2013, as he commented on the statement made two days earlier by the British Prime Minister David Cameron. In it, the Cameron announced that his country would withdraw from the political union and probably from the EU, if the British people so decided in a future referendum. The Polish foreign minister spoke of his vision of Poland becoming one of the EU’s leading countries within 10 years.

  48. 48.

    Grupa Wyszehradzka w Wiśle. O bezpieczeństwie UE. TVN24.pl, January 13, 2013. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/grupa-wyszehradzka-w-wisle-o-bezpieczenstwie-ue,299915.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  49. 49.

    Grupa Wyszehradzka z prezydentem Francji i kanclerz Niemiec, March 6, 2013. http://www.kprm.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/grupa-wyszehradzka-z-prezydentem-francji-i-kanclerz-niemiec.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  50. 50.

    The Weimar Battle Group consists of nearly 3000 soldiers, of which about 2200 are Poles. The tour of duty of this group took place in the first half of 2013.

  51. 51.

    In April 2013 Ukraine was invited to join the Visegrád Battle Group.

  52. 52.

    Komunikat prasowy Prezydencji Polskiej w Grupie Wyszehradzkiej po spotkaniu premierów państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej (V4), prezydenta Republiki Francuskiej i kanclerza Republiki Federalnej Niemiec, Warsaw, March 6, 2013.

  53. 53.

    Poland is a Framework Nation of this group and out of 3900 soldiers, 1870 are from Poland. In November 2018, an agreement on Croatia’s participation in the battle group was signed and it was agreed that the extended battle group would be operational by the second half of 2019.

  54. 54.

    See Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative PESCO projects—Overview http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  55. 55.

    These include the development of a European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR) and a further project aimed at improving the mobility of military forces across Europe—a goal shared with NATO to facilitate reinforcements towards the Eastern flank. See Muti, K. (2018, September 20). Poland: The Missing Link in European Defence. IAI Commentaries, 18/48, p. 2.

  56. 56.

    Muti, (2018, September 20), p. 3.

  57. 57.

    In this section, I make use of excerpts from an earlier book. See Zięba, R. (2018). The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century: From Cooperation to Crisis. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 195–198.

  58. 58.

    J. Kaczyński wymyśla 100-tysięczną euroarmię. Gazeta Wyborcza, November 3, 2006.

  59. 59.

    Kaczyński, L. (2006, November 6). UE potrzebuje własnej armii. Wirtualna Polska (wp.pl). https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/lech-kaczynski-ue-potrzebuje-wlasnej-armii-6037670794683009a, Accessed June 28, 2019; Cienski, J., & Wagstyl, S. (2006, November 5). Poland Proposes an EU Army Tied to NATO. Financial Times.

  60. 60.

    Military Unity Could Make EU a Superpower: Kaczynski, September 10, 2011. http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/poland-politics.c3t/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  61. 61.

    Juncker, J-C., (2015, March 8). Halten Sie sich an Frau Merkel. Ich mache das! Welt am Sontag. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article138178098/Halten-Sie-sich-an-Frau-Merkel-Ich-mache-das.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  62. 62.

    More Union in European Defense. Report of a CEPS Task Force, Brussels, February 2015.

  63. 63.

    Janning, J. A Pragmatic Approach to Building a European Army, European Council of Foreign Relations, April 1, 2015.

  64. 64.

    Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Poland on Defence and Security Cooperation, Warsaw, December 21, 2017. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728126/TS_3.2018_Poland_Defence_Cm_9673.pdf, Accessed June 30, 2019.

  65. 65.

    Kaczyński: Musimy wyjść z inicjatywą zmian UE. Rzeczpospolita, June 26, 2016.

  66. 66.

    Skutki Brexitu: Europejska armia bez Brytyjczyków. Rzeczpospolita, August 23, 2016; Niemiecka minister obrony chce “europejskiej unii obronnej”. Dziennik.pl, September 8, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530449,niemiecka-minister-obrony-chce-europejskiej-unii-obronnej-razem-jestesmy-bardzo-silni.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  67. 67.

    Niemcy i Francja stawiają na europejską armię. Dziennik.pl, September 10, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530597,niemcy-i-francja-stawiaja-na-europejska-armie-to-bylaby-wlasciwa-odpowiedzia-na-brexit.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  68. 68.

    In 2019 Poland was supposed to assume command of the Eurocorps. See Macierewicz: Polska nie wycofuje się z Eurokorpusu. Rzeczpospolita. March 28, 2017.

  69. 69.

    Keohane, D. (2018, January 15). EU Military Cooperation and National Defense, (The German Marshall Found of the United States), Policy Brief.

  70. 70.

    In 2014, 283,000 persons crossed the external EU border illegally, 1,823,000 persons in 2015 and more than 503,700 in 2016.

  71. 71.

    Migration and migrant population statistics, Eurostat Statistics Explained, March 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information, Accessed June 28, 2019. All in all, in the years 2014–2016, 1,424,000 immigrants applied for asylum in Germany.

  72. 72.

    For more, see Zięba, A. (2016). Oczekując nieoczekiwanego: zagrożenie terrorystyczne w Unii Europejskiej. In Z. Siemiątkowski & A. Zięba (Eds.), Służby specjalne we współczesnym świecie (pp. 217–233). Warsaw: Elipsa.

  73. 73.

    The realization of this EU commitment was suspended after the EU criticized the Turkish authorities’ announcement of a state of emergency and after the Turkish repressions, which followed the attempted coup, which was quashed on July 15, 2016. The president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, criticized the EU, and Brussels’ dilatoriness in EU accession negotiations.

  74. 74.

    Batalla Adam, L. (2017). The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: A Delicate Balancing Act, The International Spectator, 57(2), 44–58; Collett, E. (2016). The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  75. 75.

    In October 2015 Jarosław Kaczyński, at an election meeting in Maków Mazowiecki, insinuated that the previous government of the Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party (PO-PSL) had agreed to admit 100,000 immigrants to Poland who may spread dangerous diseases (“Various types of parasites and protozoa, which are not dangerous in the organisms of these people, may be dangerous here”). See Jarosław Kaczyński boi się, że uchodźcy sprowadzą zarazę? Tak mówił na wyborczym wiecu. Wyborcza.pl, October 13, 2015. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19014711,kaczynski-boi-sie-zarazy.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  76. 76.

    Abp Gądecki: Bezpieczeństwo uchodźcy, który potrzebuje pomocy, jest ważniejsze niż bezpieczeństwo narodowe. PAP, January 15, 2018. https://www.gosc.pl/doc/4455355.Abp-Gadecki-Bezpieczenstwo-uchodzcy-ktory-potrzebuje-pomocy, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  77. 77.

    Kościół za organizacją korytarzy humanitarnych. eKai, January 2, 2018. https://ekai.pl/kosciol-niezmiennie-opowiada-sie-za-organizacja-korytarzy-humanitarnych/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  78. 78.

    Poland even threatened to use its veto if the majority of EU member states sought to impose a mandatory relocation of illegal immigrants.

  79. 79.

    European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018, Brussels. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  80. 80.

    Nyyssönen, H. (2018). The East is Different, Isn’t It?—Poland and Hungary in Search of Prestige. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(3), pp. 258 et seq.; Cianetti, L., Dawson, J., Hanley, S. (2018). Rethinking “Democratic Backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe—Looking beyond Hungary and Poland. East European Politics, 34(3), pp. 243 et seq.; Rohac, D. (2018, February 5). Hungary and Poland Aren’t Democratic. They’re Authoritarian. Foreign Policy.

  81. 81.

    Kupchan, C. (2010, August 29). As nationalism rises, will the European Union fall?, The Washington Post. Also see Populism and the Crisis of European Integration: An Interview with Erik Jones. EuropeNow, July 6, 2017. http://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/07/05/populism-and-the-crisis-of-european-integration-an-interview-with-erik-jones/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  82. 82.

    Grabbe, H., Lehne, S. (2017, November 15). An Existential Threat, Berlin Policy Journal. https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/an-existential-threat/, Accessed June 28, 2019. On December 20, 2017 the European Commission undertook measures to defend the independence of the judiciary in Poland. It has concluded that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland. The EC initiated the infringement procedure under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission has also issued a complementary Rule of Law Recommendation, setting out clearly the steps that the Polish authorities can take to remedy the current situation. Should the Polish authorities implement the recommended actions, the Commission is ready, in close consultation with the European Parliament and the Council, to reconsider its proposal. Furthermore, the EC has decided to take the next step in its procedure against Poland for breaches of EU law by the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organization, referring Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU. Whilst taking these unprecedented steps, the Commission has maintained its offer for a constructive dialogue with Polish authorities to remedy the current situation.

  83. 83.

    For more, see Modern Populism and its Effect in Foreign Policy. (2017). The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 37(1), 3–100; Luce, E. (2017). The Retreat of Western Liberalism. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press; Jones, E. (2017–2018). From the End of History to the Retreat of Liberalism. Survival, 59(6), 165–174.

  84. 84.

    From President Macron’s speech before the Arc de Triomphe on November 11, 2018. See https://www.france24.com/en/20181112-amid-unity-over-wwi-centennial-celebrations-macron-nationalist-trump-stands-alone, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  85. 85.

    Marek Orzechowski, a Polish journalist living in Brussels has written a book in which he calls for the reconstruction of our co-responsibility for our common fate, expressed in the slogan “Europe first”. Marek Orzechowski: Silna grupa może sparaliżować prace UE. Nasz wspólny dorobek wystawi na pośmiewisko. Onet.pl, November 18, 2018. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/niemcy-po-wyborach-i-przyszlosc-ue-orzechowski-prace-ue-moga-byc-sparalizowane/rt9hnd6, Accessed June 28, 2019. See Orzechowski, M. (2018). Chaos. Nowy porządek świata. Warsaw: Muza.

  86. 86.

    Prime Minister Beata Szydło, among others, spoke of this in the Sejm on July 21, 2016. See Premier Szydło ws. Brexitu: to krytyczny moment dla całej Unii Europejskiej, July 21, 2016. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/premier-szydlo-ws-brexitu-to-krytyczny-moment-dla-calej-unii-europejskiej-6025265683354753a, Accessed June 28, 2019. About this, see also the statement by foreign minister Witold Waszykowski: Polska chce radykalnych zmian w UE, July 28, 2016. https://fakty.interia.pl/news-polska-chce-radykalnych-zmian-w-ue,nId,2226475, Accessed June 28, 2019; PiS szykuje “dobrą zmianę” dla… UE. Kaczyński: “Poprosiłem prawnika, by przygotował nowe traktaty”. July 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,20381405,kaczynski-chce-zmieniac-ue-poprosilem-waznego-prawnika-by.html, Accessed June 28, 2019; Osiecki, G. (2016, July 26). Albo nowy traktat europejski, albo kolejne trzaśnięcia drzwiami. Trzy zadania dla polskiej dyplomacji. https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/524783,brexit-albo-nowy-traktat-europejski-albo-kolejne-trzasniecia-drzwiami.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  87. 87.

    Kaczyński: Nie jestem dyktatorem, July 11, 2016. Rzeczpospolita. https://www.rp.pl/Prawo-i-Sprawiedliwosc/307109958-Kaczynski-Nie-jestem-dyktatorem.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  88. 88.

    Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2017, p. 13.

  89. 89.

    Ibidem, pp. 13–14.

  90. 90.

    Poland often lost votes in various EU bodies. The measure of its isolation was its failure to thwart the re-election of Donald Tusk as President of the European Council, when during the vote on this matter in March 2017. Poland lost by 27 votes to 1. After this vote, PiS politicians claimed that it was not Poland which had lost, but the EU. Almost two years later the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacek Czaputowicz, went so far as to claim that Tusk did not represent Poland because he was Germany’s candidate. See Jacek Czaputowicz: Donald Tusk w Radzie Europejskiej znalazł się jako reprezentant Niemiec. January 4, 2018. https://polskatimes.pl/jacek-czaputowicz-donald-tusk-w-radzie-europejskiej-znalazl-sie-jako-reprezentant-niemiec/ar/13780319, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  91. 91.

    Szydło: rząd będzie prowadził aktywną politykę zagraniczną, January 24, 2017. http://www.tvpparlament.pl/aktualnosci/szydlo-rzad-bedzie-prowadzil-aktywna-polityke-zagraniczna/28764293, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  92. 92.

    Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2017, p. 16.

  93. 93.

    Ibidem.

  94. 94.

    Interestingly, the Polish President said this in front of a magnificent manor house renovated with EU money. Thanks to the funds from Brussels, the city also built a by-pass road. See Andrzej Duda o UE: Wyimaginowana wspólnota, z której dla nas niewiele wynika. Dziennik.pl, Accessed June 28, 2019. https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/580955,prezydent-andrzej-duda-ue-wyimaginowana-wspolnota-lezajsk.html, Accessed June 30, 2019; Moody, O., Waterfield, B. (2018, September 14). EU is an Imaginary Community, Polish President tells Supporters”, The Sunday Times, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eu-is-an-imaginary-community-polish-president-tells-supporters-hmdsgb8p5, Accessed June 30, 2019.

  95. 95.

    Kaczyński: mówimy “nie” euro, mówimy “nie” europejskim cenom. TVN24, April 13, 2019. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/jaroslaw-kaczynski-o-przyjeciu-euro-watpliwe-by-polska-zyskala,927156.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  96. 96.

    Taylor, P. (2018, October 4). Poland’s risky ‘America first’ policy. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-risky-america-first-policy-jaroslaw-kaczynski-donald-trump/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

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Zięba, R. (2020). The Dialectic of Strengthening and Weakening the European Union. In: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_5

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