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Russia as the Main Problem in Polish Foreign and Security Policy

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Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy

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Abstract

The author claims that contemporary Polish foreign and security policy is under the overwhelming influence of historical events in relations with Russia. Poland’s focus on its negative experiences in relations with Russia and disputes over interpretations of history greatly hinder the evolution of those relations in a positive direction. Different visions of European security and Poland’s fears about energy security are also important problems. The author’s analysis leads him to advance the idea that the generally poor state of Poland’s relations with Russia has a negative impact on Poland’s ability to pursue its interests successfully on the international stage, both in its immediate vicinity and in the European Union. Poland’s fears of Russia have persisted throughout the period since Poland regained its sovereignty in 1989 and have led successive Polish governments to adopt a pro-American stance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As Timothy Snyder writes, “Even before the Krewo Union of 1385, Lithuania was in religion and in language rather an Orthodox Slavic than a pagan Baltic country. Jogaila’s promise of conversion to Catholic Christianity applied to himself and remaining pagans, most of his realm, and many of his relatives, were already Orthodox Christians. The result of Jogaila’s conversion was not so much the Christianization of a pagan country as the introduction of Roman Catholicism into a largely Orthodox country. The introduction of Catholicism established a cultural link between Lithuania and Europe, and created the potential for Polish influence.” Snyder, T. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 17–18.

  2. 2.

    Ozbay, F., Aras, B. (2008). Polish-Russian Relations: History, Geography and Geopolitics. East European Quarterly. XLII(1), 28–29. This quote was edited for grammar and clarity.

  3. 3.

    Romanowski, A. (2017). „Fałszywa historia mistrzynią fałszywej polityki”. Jak wyjść z zaklętego kręgu wzajemnych win i oskarżeń polsko-rosyjskich? In S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek (Eds.). Pamięć i polityka historyczna w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich (pp. 173–178). Warsaw: Aspra.

  4. 4.

    This occurred during the “golden period” of the Congress Kingdom (an entity established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815), when Russia’s progressive Tsar, Alexander I, was also Poland’s constitutional king. The rest of the partition period under Alexander’s more autocratic successors was not as mild. Poles experienced, in succession, pressing into the Russian army for periods of up to 25 years, the expropriation of hundreds of thousands of Gentry families, many of whose members were exiled to Siberia, etc. Nothing comparable happened in the Prussian partition.

  5. 5.

    It is worth noting that during the three partitions of Poland, Russia occupied very little ethnically Polish land. It only truly did so after the Napoleonic wars.

  6. 6.

    After German unification (1870), the German Reich took over the Prussian policy of forcible Germanization of Poles living in the Prussian partition.

  7. 7.

    For more see: Wierzbicki, A. (2017). Ksenofobia, etnofobia i rasim w polskiej świadomości historycznej wobec Rosjan. In S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek (Eds.), Pamięć i polityka historyczna w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich (pp. 145–167). Warsaw: Aspra.

  8. 8.

    Speaking on the occasion of Polish Army Day on August 15, 2018, President Andrzej Duda repeated the megalomaniac thesis that the victorious Battle of Warsaw in August 1920 was of key importance for Europe, because by stopping Russian expansion, Poland had saved Europe from the “red plague.” He also repeated the thesis about the Miracle on the Vistula, he said “God stood up for Poland, the Blessed Mother stood up for her children so that they could defend themselves against the Soviet red torrent, to defend independence, Christianity and life. But this is one of the elements of success.” See Szef MON i prezydent o Wojsku Polskim: “Jesteście dumą narodu”. Niezależna, August 15, 2018. https://niezalezna.pl/233356-szef-mon-i-prezydent-o-wojsku-polskim-jestescie-duma-narodu%20Accessed%20October%2019. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  9. 9.

    On December 7, 1970, the Polish People’s Republic and Germany concluded an agreement about the bases for the normalization of their mutual relations in which the existing border on the Oder and Neisse River was recognized as Poland’s western border, but the decisions of the German Constitutional Court meant that the Federal Republic treated this border as a modus vivendi.

  10. 10.

    In the Polish literature of the subject it is most often called the “October Breakthrough.”

  11. 11.

    But at universities, lecturers took advantage of the freedom to conduct scientific research “on their own responsibility.” So-called “difficult topics” in Polish–Russian and Polish–Soviet relations were discussed during seminars and scholarly discussions, more and more boldly in the 1970s and 1980s. My experience included, among other things, the necessity of answering a “difficult” question about the Katyń massacre asked by an unknown member of the audience during the public defense of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Warsaw on December 21, 1977. This question was not related to my doctoral dissertation, but I undertook to answer it.

  12. 12.

    See Zając, J., Zięba, R. (2005). Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945-1989. Toruń: Adam Marszałek, pp. 87–88, 141, 194.

  13. 13.

    A serious incident took place on September 14, 1999, when the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement questioning Soviet aggression against Poland on September 17, 1999. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested against this, and pointed out that the USSR had committed armed aggression against Poland in violation of international law and of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty of 1932. On January 20, 2000, Warsaw declared 9 Russian diplomats as personae non gratae, accusing them of engaging in espionage in Poland. Russia responded in similar fashion. The following month (February 23), opponents of Russia’s intervention in Chechnya demonstrating in Poznań poured paint over the Russian consulate and desecrated the Russian flag. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov cancelled his visit to Poland planned for March in response, and a few days later Russian demonstrators attacked the Polish Consulate in St. Petersburg and the Polish Embassy in Moscow and burned Polish flags publicly. The media of both countries contributed to the flaring of tensions and fed public opinion with tendentious reports about these events.

  14. 14.

    Pifer, S. (2007). European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Problem of Post-Communism, 54(6), 28–42; Petrova, T. (2014, October 15). Polish Democracy Promotion in Ukraine, The Rising Democracies Network, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 2. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RDN_Petrova_Ukraine.pdf. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  15. 15.

    According to many observers, Poland’s support for Chechen separatism is one of the sources of tension in Polish-Russian relations. See, for example, F. Ozbay, B. Aras, op. cit., p. 38.

  16. 16.

    Kaczmarski, M., Konończuk, W. (2009). Rosyjski dylemat w polityce zagranicznej Polski po 1999 roku. In A. Gil, T. Kapuśniak (Eds.), Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania. Koncepcje. Realizacja (p. 205). Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.

  17. 17.

    Stefan Meller, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2006 r. przedstawiona na 10. posiedzeniu Sejmu RP V kadencji, Warszawa, 15 lutego 2006 r. In Exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych 1990-2011 (pp. 339–340). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2011.

  18. 18.

    Such as the ban on imports of Polish meat and vegetable products to Russia introduced by Moscow in November 2005. See Anna Fotyga, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007 r. przedstawiona na 41. posiedzeniu Sejmu RP V kadencji, Warszawa, 11 maja 2007 r. In Exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych 1990-2011 (p. 367). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2011.

  19. 19.

    In late September 2009, a Russian Orthodox Church delegation comprising monks from the monastery in Ostashkov visited Poland at the invitation of the Episcopate of the Polish Catholic Church. It was the first meeting of representatives of both churches. The Orthodox side initiated the preparation of a joint declaration with an appeal for reconciliation, following the example of the famous Polish bishops’ letter to Germany (“We forgive and ask forgiveness”) in November 1965. Representatives of both churches discussed how to warm up relations between Poland and Russia. A little under three years of preparation later, the Polish Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church agreed on the content of a joint address calling for reconciliation between Poles and Russians. It was the first document in history with an appeal to the nations of Poland and Russia. It was signed during the visit of a delegation of the Moscow Patriarchate, headed by the Patriarch of Moscow and of all-Russia, Cyril I, on August 16–19, 2012. Among other things, stated, “We appeal to our faithful to ask for forgiveness of wrongs, injustice and all evil done to each other. We are convinced that this is the first and most important step towards restoring mutual trust, without which there is no lasting human community or full reconciliation. Of course, forgiveness does not mean forgetting. To forgive, however, means to renounce revenge and hatred, to participate in building harmony and fraternity between people, our peoples and countries, and this is the basis for a peaceful future.” See Wspólne Przesłanie do Narodów Polski i Rosji, Warsaw, August 17, 2012.

  20. 20.

    For more on what could be done to improve Polish–Russian relations, see Zięba, R. (2009). Czy w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich możliwe jest przejście od »polityki historycznej« do »polityki perspektywicznej«?, Przegląd Zachodni, 3, 179–190; Bieleń, S. (2012). Szanse na pojednanie polsko-rosyjskie w świetle wyzwań geopolitycznych. In S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek (Eds.), Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich (pp. 197–217). Warsaw: Aspra.

  21. 21.

    See Stolarczyk, M. (2013). Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w okresie pozimnowojennym (aspekty polityczne), Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis, 11, 69–70.

  22. 22.

    Sergei Karaganov, advisor to the Russian President, wrote in a government newspaper that “the country ended up fully and unreservedly admitting to Katyń, showing nobleness and compassion for the misfortune of the Poles. But for the time being, our country cannot find in itself the strength to admit that the whole of Russia is one great Katyń, dotted with the nameless graves of millions of victims of the regime that ruled it for most of the last century. [...] Last year Stalinism was condemned by both the President and the Prime Minister. And yet we all cannot sum up the courage to abandon this heritage, to show that we ourselves, our predecessors, persecuted our own ourselves, our people.” See Karaganov, S. (2010, July 22). Russkaya Katyn. Rossiyskaya gazeta, Federalnyy vypusk. No. 5239 (160).

  23. 23.

    The result of this group’s work was a joint publication by Polish and Russian experts – an extensive book on difficult problems in Polish-Russian relations during the years 1918-2008. See Rotfeld, A.D., Torkunow, A.W. (Eds.) (2010), Białe Plamy – Czarne Plamy: sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918–2008). Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, (the entire book has a total of 907 pages). It was presented during an official visit in Poland of the President of thre Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev in December 2010.

  24. 24.

    The agreement came into force on July 27, 2012, and it has been suspended by the Polish government since July 4, 2016, on the pretext that this was needed to ensure the security of the participants of Warsaw NATO. The Polish authorities failed to restore local border traffic for political reasons, despite the obvious losses to Polish citizens from the voivodships bordering on the Kaliningrad District.

  25. 25.

    Uchwała Dumy ws. zbrodni katyńskiej, PAP, November 26, 2010.

  26. 26.

    The well-known British historian Norman Davies assessed the resolution of the Duma of the Russian Federation on Katyń as follows: “The importance of this resolution lies in the fact that it was addressed not only to Polish society, but also to Russian society. The way in which historical truth enters Russian society is important. Mikhail Gorbachev had already admitted that Katyń was a NKVD crime in 1990. Later Boris Yeltsin went to Poland and apologized to the Katyń families, but these were gestures addressed to the Poles. The Russians did not know about it. Now Putin was the first Russian Prime Minister to come to Katyń. Russians saw Andrzej Wajda’s film “Katyń” on national television. Russian citizens saw on the screen how NKVD soldiers were shooting Polish officers in the back of the head. I know that this came as a great shock to them. They learned something not about Polish history, but about their own. After all, the sons and grandchildren of those who died and those who murdered sat in front of the TV sets.” See Davies, N. (2010, December 22). Rozmowa świętej Polski ze świętą Rosją, wywiad z Normanem Daviesem. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  27. 27.

    An example is the behavior of two representatives of the families, which had lost loved ones in the Smolensk catastrophe who, on the eve of the symbolically important meeting of the presidents of Russia D. Medvedev and Poland B. Komorowski (April 11, 2011) in Smolensk and Katyń, without authorization from the Russian side, installed a memorial plaque on the site of the Smoleńsk catastrophe. This caused a new wave of disputes, and a few weeks later unknown people placed a plaque in Strzałkowo, where there was a camp of Russian POWs from the Polish–Bolshevik war of 1920 with the inscription “Here rest 8,000 Red Army soldiers brutally tormented in Polish death camps in the years 1919–1921.”

  28. 28.

    Stolarczyk, M. (2013), p. 73.

  29. 29.

    Anna Wolff-Powęska concluded by criticizing the Polish government’s historical policy in 2005–2007: “Behind the ardent appeals for modern historical policy there is a populist campaign for the project of the 4th Republic of Poland; de facto for the political parties presently in power in Poland.[…]. They are supported intellectually by a group of scientists and publicists, most of whom are institutionally connected with the ruling camp. Their politicized images of the past express a selective approach to Poland’s historical tradition and serve only the interests of one political group. [....] These are, above all, disputes between the supporters of a xenophobic Poland, concentrated around a narrowly understood fatherland, and the advocates of an open, tolerant Poland that seeks a compromise between different ideas and social options. See Wolff-Powęska, A. (2007). Polskie spory o historię i pamięć. Polityka historyczna. Przegląd Zachodni, 10, 39–40 and 43. Comp. Stolarczyk, M. (2015). Dylematy polityki niemieckiej Polski związane z zakresem wpływu obciążeń historycznych na międzypaństwowe stosunki polsko-niemieckie In J. Zając, A. Włodkowska-Bagan, M. Kaczmarski (Eds.). Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe Polska-Europa-Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej (pp. 349–367). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski.

  30. 30.

    This consisted in disseminating fierce propaganda accusing Russia and the government of Donald Tusk of organizing an attack on an airplane carrying the Polish delegation headed by President Lech Kaczyński to Smoleńsk on April 10, 2010. An element of this propaganda effort were investigative commissions led by the Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz, charged with confirming the theory of the attack, as well as the organization of great demonstrations in Warsaw near the Presidential Palace every tenth of the month, the so-called “monthlies,” the last of which took place on April 10, 2018.

  31. 31.

    Bukharin, S. N., Rakityanskiy, N. M. (2011). Rossiya i Polsha: opyt politico-psikhologicheskogo issledovaniya fenomena limitrofizatsii. Posobiye dlya pravyashchikh elit limotrofnykh gosudarstv. Mosow: Institut Russkoy Tsivilizatsii.

  32. 32.

    Dugin, А. (2000). Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoye budushcheye Rossii. Myslit’ Prostranstvom [Fundamentals of Geopolitics. Thinking Spacially]. Моscow: Arctogeya Center, pp. 131, 212–213.

  33. 33.

    Doerre, P. (2014, May 23). Kremlowski szaman. Co Aleksander Dugin myśli o Polsce? https://www.pch24.pl/kremlowski-szaman%2D%2Dco-aleksander-dugin-mysli-o-polsce-,22768,i.html. Accessed June 28, 2019. Also see Dugin, А. (2000), pp. 214–215.

  34. 34.

    See Bahr, J. (2011, January 15). Startujemy…, wywiad Teresy Torańskiej z Jerzym Bahrem, Gazeta Wyborcza.

  35. 35.

    Certain authors also mention opposing visions of the neighbourhood, that is, different policies of Poland and Russia towards countries lying between them. See Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, K. (2010). Stosunki polityczne między Polską a Rosją po 1990 r. In A.D. Rotfeld, A.W. Torkunow (Eds.). Białe Plamy – Czarne Plamy: sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918–2008) (pp. 678-680). Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Relations. In this chapter, these issues are treated in passing, as they addressed more in depth in Chap. 6.

  36. 36.

    For more, see Grudziński, P. (1997). Raport Polska-Rosja: niezgoda i współpraca. Warsaw: Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Instytutu Spraw Publicznych, p. 18 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Comp. Reus-Smith, Ch. (1992). Realists and Resistance Utopias: Community, security and Political Action in the New Europe. Millennium, 21(1), 23–28.

  38. 38.

    For more, see Chap. 8.

  39. 39.

    It was „The Premises of Polish Foreign Policy” and “The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland”. See Przegląd Rządowy, No. 12 (18), December 1992, pp. 73–81.

  40. 40.

    In Poland, excessive importance was given to the following fragment of the joint declaration signed on August 25, 1993, by the Presidents of Poland and Russia: “The presidents raised the issue of Poland’s intention to join NATO. President Lech Wałęsa explained Poland’s well-known position on the matter, which was accepted with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. In the event, such a decision by sovereign Poland, aiming at European integration, is not contrary to the interests of other countries, including Russia.” See Wspólna deklaracja polsko-rosyjska – Warszawa, 25 sierpnia 1993 r. Zbiór Dokumentów – Recueil de Documents, 1993, XLIX (3), p. 63.

  41. 41.

    Stolarczyk, M. (2013), p. 37.

  42. 42.

    Pismo ministra inostrannikh diel Rossiyskoy Federacii A. W. Kozyreva ministra inostrannikh diel Ispanskoy Respubliki, deystvuyushchemu predsedatelu SBSE A. Martino, 23 iunia 1994g., Diplomaticheski Vestnik, No. 15-16, Avgust 1994, p. 23. A.V. Kozyrev, A.V. (1994). Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe, NATO Review, 42(4), 3–6.

  43. 43.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2004). Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie. Warsaw: Scholar, p. 312 et seq.

  44. 44.

    It has to be admitted that the Russians might have had a justified sense of being repulsed or being left to their own devices. After the Cold War, the West invited the Central European countries to join its structures, while Russia was offered nothing other than instructions on how to reform. Benjamin Barber even claims that “Russia was treated badly after the fall of communism. It was put in the corner. It was placed against a wall. He considers this to be a mistake of the West. See Barber, B. (2008, October 11–12). Koniec świata dorosłych dzieci. Rozmowa z Benjaminem Barberem, Rzeczpospolita Plus Minus.

  45. 45.

    Alexeev, D. (2004). NATO enlargement: A Russian outlook. Russian Series, No. 04/33. Conflict Studies Research Centre, pp. 2–4.

  46. 46.

    Moniz Bandeira, L. A. (2015). The second cold war: Geopolitics and strategic dimension of the USA. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 47–52; Wilson J. L. (2010). The legacy of the color revolutions for Russian politics and foreign policy. Problems of Post-Communism, 57(2), p. 21; Becker M.E., Cohen, M.S., Kushi, S., McManus, I. (2016), Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens. European Security, 25(1), 120; Yasterjemskiy, S. (2007, February 22). Gospoda, Rossiya Vemulas! Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

  47. 47.

    Azerbaijan participated in the energy summit in Krakow on May 11–12, 2007, in addition to representatives of four countries, but it was not possible to include Kazakhstan, which was represented only by a representative of the president of the country. For a positive assessment of President Kaczyński’s entire policy toward Russia, including the energy summit in Cracow, see Kowal, P. (2010). Wielki powrót geopolityki i wschodnia idea Lecha Kaczyńskiego. In J. Kloczkowski (Ed.), Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy wewnętrzne (pp. 53–59). Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.

  48. 48.

    Kaczyński w Tbilisi: jesteśmy tu po to, aby podjąć walkę, Onet.pl, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/kaczynski-w-tbilisi-jestesmy-tu-po-to-aby-podjac-walke/13jf8. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  49. 49.

    Kortunov, C. B. (Ed.), (2010). Mirovaya politika v uslovyakh krizisa [World Politics in Conditions of Crisis], Moscow: Aspekt Press, pp. 241–267; Lukyanov, F. (2009). Rethinking Security in “Greater Europe”. Russia in Global Affairs, 3. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13589. Accessed June 28, 2019; Karaganov, S., Bordachev, T. (2009, December 8–10). Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture. Report of the Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club Conference. London-Moscow. https://docgo.net/towards-a-new-euro-atlantic-security-architecture-report-of-the-russian-experts-for-the-valdai-discussion-club-conference. Accessed June 28, 2019; Layton, S. (2014). Reframing European Security: Russia’s Proposal for a New European Security Architecture. International Relations, 28(1), 25–45.

  50. 50.

    Grudziński, P., Pietrusiewicz, J. (2001). Building a Modern Security Community in the Area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 19, 54−55.

  51. 51.

    Stent, A. E. (2014). The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 239.

  52. 52.

    Krzymowski, A. (2009). Plan Miedwiediewa – nowa architektura bezpieczeństwa?, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, LXII(2), 29–32; Kuczyński, G. (2009). Strategia Rosji wobec Zachodu. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 9-10, 155–171.

  53. 53.

    Zięba, R. (2013). Bezpieczeństwo w polityce zagranicznej RP rządu koalicji Platformy Obywatelskiej i Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations, 47(1–2), 19–20.

  54. 54.

    Stolarczyk, M. (2013), pp. 38-39. For more, see Stolarczyk, M. (2016). Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992-2015. Katowice: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, pp. 160 et seq.

  55. 55.

    In March 2010, a group of influential German politicians and generals expressed themselves in an article published in the weekly Der Spiegel in favor of “opening the doors to NATO” to Russia. In their opinion, Russia’s accession to NATO and even the prospect of such accession would significantly strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance. The article was signed by former Defence Minister (under Helmut Kohl) Volker Rühe, former German ambassador to Poland Frank Elbe, as well as two generals: former chairman of the NATO Military Committee Klaus Nauman and vice admiral Ulrich Weisser, who previously headed the Planning Committee at the German Ministry of Defence. See Rühe V. (2010, March 6). Ex-Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe fordert Aufnahme Russlands in die Nato, Der Spiegel. When a year earlier, on March 30, 2009, the Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, at the fourth Copernican Debate in Toruń, stated that he can imagine Russia’s accession to NATO in the future, this triggered a wave of criticism from representatives of the opposition Law and Justice (PiS), whose echoes continued after PiS came to power in Poland in autumn 2015.

  56. 56.

    Riecker, P., & Lundby Gjerde, K. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue—Different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. European Security, 25(3), 305–306.

  57. 57.

    Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B. Tauris, p. 26.

  58. 58.

    Statistical data (Eurostat) shows that Russia is the largest exporter of energy raw materials to Europe. Russian gas accounts for over 49% of EU imports and oil for 34%. The largest importers of Russian oil in 2013 (over 75% of purchases) were seven countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. The group of twelve countries importing more than 75% of their gas from Russia includes: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; by volume, the largest importers of gas from Russia were Germany, Italy, and Spain (but they imported less than 75% of this raw material). Part of the oil and gas imported from Russia is traded on the EU internal market. In 2013, 12% of Russian oil and 38% of gas were traded. See Wójcik, T. (2014, July 22). Gaz z Rosji stanowi połowę importu do Europy. https://www.cire.pl/item,96683,13,0,0,0,0,0,gaz-z-rosji-stanowi-polowe-importu-do-europy.html. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  59. 59.

    Unge, W., Zamarlik, M. et al. (2006). Polish-Russian Relations in an Eastern Dimension Context,, Stockholm: FOI (Sweedish Defence Agency Research), p. 60 et seq.

  60. 60.

    For more, see Kaczmarski, M. (2010). Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.

  61. 61.

    Polska-Rosja. Protokół dodatkowy podpisany. Mniej gazu, mniej problemów. Rzeczpospolita, February 13, 2003. The new agreement called for the first leg of the Yamal pipeline to be financed entirely from the fees for transit of gas through Poland, without involving funds from the state budget.

  62. 62.

    Gazowiec z amerykańskim LNG już w Świnoujściu. Dziś uroczysty odbiór. PAP, June 8, 2017. https://www.tvp.info/32719257/gazowiec-z-amerykanskim-lng-juz-w-swinoujsciu-dzis-uroczysty-odbior. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  63. 63.

    PGNiG podpisał umowę na dostawy gazu na 24 lata. Prezydent: to ważny krok, Business Insider Polska, November 8, 2018. https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/umowa-pgnig-z-cheniere-marketing-international-na-dostawe-gazu/x400skd. Accessed June 28, 2019. The following day, Poland and the USA signed an agreement on strategic dialogue concerning energy.

  64. 64.

    Trzecia umowa na dostawy gazu z USA. “Strategiczny element naszej współpracy”. PAP, December 19, 2018. https://tvn24bis.pl/surowce,78/lng-w-polsce-pgnig-podpisalo-kontrakt-z-port-arthur-lng,893803.html. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  65. 65.

    Kublik, A. (2019, June 13). PGNiG dokupuje gazu w USA. Umowa na początek wizyty prezydenta Andrzeja Dudy. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  66. 66.

    In the fall of 2018, it turned out that the construction of Baltic Pipe is behind schedule. If the project is not completed on time, Poland may be forced to buy gas from that supplied to Germany through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which Warsaw views critically. The Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz indirectly admitted this much at the conference “Poland in a world of crises” organized by the Batory Foundation in Warsaw on October 5, 2018, that Poland will buy this raw material at the cheapest price. Such an outcome is likely because the import of the gas from the USA can only take place through the Świnoujście gas port, whose capacity does not cover all of Poland’s gas needs. See Zaskakująca deklaracja Czaputowicza, Onet.pl. https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/zaskakujaca-deklaracja-czaputowicza-szef-msz-nie-wyklucza-ze-polska-bedzie-odbierac/39b8mh1. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  67. 67.

    The problem, however, is that by concluding a gas supply agreement in 1993, Poland made a negotiation error because it accepted that the transit fee for Russian gas transported through its territory should be paid with the consent of both parties. This later caused Poland to be unable to obtain transit fees when disputes grew sharper.

  68. 68.

    As Minister of National Defence in Jarosław Kaczyński’s government, on April 30, 2007, Radosław Sikorski described the Nord Stream project as a version of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Later, as a PO politician and head of diplomacy in Donald Tusk’s government, he did not repeat such formulas.

  69. 69.

    Kuczyński, W. (2013, April 10). Jak zbudowaliśmy Nord Stream. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  70. 70.

    See Rząd odpowiada Putinowi: budować gazociąg u nas może tylko państwo polskie, TVN24, April 3, 2013.

  71. 71.

    These matters are dealt with by constructivist-oriented researchers. This work mostly follows the neorealistic perspective, which omits the issues of the identity of Poles and Russians, but makes it easier to analyze more thoroughly the functioning of foreign policy and state security in the framework of the ongoing evolution of the international order. Research from the constructivist perspective is valuable, but deserves a different scholarly treatment.

  72. 72.

    Lis, T. (1999). Wielki finał. Kulisy wstępowania Polski do NATO, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak, p. 251.

  73. 73.

    Some US scholars admit as much. This commitment was then recorded in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris on May 27, 1997.

  74. 74.

    B. Geremek, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2011 r. przedstawiona na 47. posiedzeniu Sejmu RP III kadencji – 8 kwietnia 1999 r. In Exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych 1990-2011 (pp. 194–195, 200). Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2011.

  75. 75.

    Exposé by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Bronisław Geremek, to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 2000, Warsaw, May 9, 2000, Zbiór Dokumentów – Recueil de Documents, 2000, 56(2), pp. 35–36.

  76. 76.

    Założenia polskiej polityki zagranicznej wobec Rosji, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Warsaw, June 13, 2000.

  77. 77.

    Założenia polskiej polityki zagranicznej wobec Rosji, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warsaw, January 2001.

  78. 78.

    See Exposé by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Władysław Bartoszewski, to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 2001, Warsaw, June 6, 2001, (excerpts), Zbiór Dokumentów – Recueil de Documents, 2001, 57(2), p. 28.

  79. 79.

    Eastern Policy of the European Union from the Perspective of EU Enlargement by Central- and East-European States: a Polish Point of View, Warsaw, June 13, 2001, Zbiór Dokumentów – Recueil de Documents, 2001, 57(2), pp. 75–78.

  80. 80.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2013). Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 223–229.

  81. 81.

    For more, see Stolarczyk, M. (2010). Zbieżność i różnice interesów w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989-2009. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, p. 371 et seq.

  82. 82.

    Given that Poland’s policy toward Ukraine seeks to fence off or counterbalance Russia, when Tusk’s government began to normalize relations with Russia, Foreign Minister Sikorski called in the press for Poland’s resignation from the Jagiellonian Idea and not supporting certain states against “the larger, stronger neighbour.” He stated that the democratic West, of which Poland is forms a part, should seek to further a strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia and the Eastern Partnership; he did not mention Ukraine once. See Sikorski, R. (2009, August 29–30). Lekcje historii, modernizacja i integracja. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  83. 83.

    Sikorski, R. (2010, December 6). Z Rosją mamy na czym budować. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  84. 84.

    See the opinion of Poland’s ambassador to Russia, Ciosek, S. (2009, May 5). Jest szansa na nową szansę. Gazeta Wyborcza.

  85. 85.

    Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, M. (2018). Polska wobec Rosji. Radykalizm bez polityki. Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.

  86. 86.

    The first meeting of foreign ministers of Poland (Jacek Czaputowicz) and Russia (Sergei Lavrov) since December 2014 took place on May 17, 2019, in the corridors of the Session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Helsinki. It did not produce any concrete results, but both ministers announced that political consultations at the level of directors of both ministries of foreign affairs would take place.

  87. 87.

    Kokot, M. (2019, February 13). Koniec polsko-rosyjskiej grupy ds. trudnych? Gazeta Wyborcza.

  88. 88.

    Ozbay, F., Aras, B. (2008), op. cit., pp. 39–40. This quote was edited for grammar and clarity.

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Zięba, R. (2020). Russia as the Main Problem in Polish Foreign and Security Policy. In: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_3

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