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The Main Determinants of Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy in the Twenty-First Century

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Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy
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Abstract

In this chapter, the author presents the main determinants of Poland’s foreign and security policy, with an emphasis on those appearing in the twenty-first century. The author makes his point of departure Poland’s geopolitical location at the center of Europe and he examines the country’s potential as a medium-rank state. He analyzes how Polish foreign and security policy is immersed in history and how this manifests itself in a selective memory of the past, in the theory of “two enemies” (Russia and Germany), and in the idea of Poland’s mission in Eastern Europe. The author points to how the instability of Poland’s political system and the lack of consensus over its foreign and security policy affect the country’s behavior on the international stage. Next, he characterizes Poland as a member of the Atlantic community within NATO and the EU. In conclusion, he shows Poland’s lack of adaptation to the changing international order in the twenty-first century and to its return to Central European geopolitics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Frankel, J. (1963). The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–61; Merle, M. (1974). Sociologie des relations internationales. Paris: Dalloz, pp. 149–158; Morgenthau H. J., revised by Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief edition. Boston: McGrow-Hill, pp. 124–133.

  2. 2.

    For more on the essence of geopolitics, see Moczulski, L. (2010). Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni, Warsaw, Bellona, pp. 70–78.

  3. 3.

    About how this aspect is understood, see Jean, C. (2003). Geopolityka. Wrocław: Ossolineum, pp. 60–97. For more, see Chauprade, A. (2003). Géopolitique: constantes et changements dans l’histoire. Paris: Ellipses.

  4. 4.

    See: Merle, M. (1974). op. cit., pp. 190–197; Colard, D. (1977). Les relations internationales. Paris: Masson, p. 38.

  5. 5.

    Population Projection 2014–2050, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw 2014, p. 162.

  6. 6.

    Comp. Hajec, M. (2015, November 24). Wpływ zmian demograficznych na rynek pracy w Polsce, Rynek pracy w Polsce. https://rynekpracy.pl/artykuly/wplyw-zmian-demograficznych-na-rynek-pracy-w-polsce. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  7. 7.

    According to studies conducted by the Statistical Institute of the Catholic Church, in 2017 Catholics represented 91.3% of Poland’s population, while only 38.3% went to mass on Sunday. See Krzyżak, T. (2019, January 9). Polacy są ciągle religijni, ale bierni. Rzeczpospolita.

  8. 8.

    Comp. Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reding MA: Addison-Wesley Company, p. 131.

  9. 9.

    World Economic Outlook, Washington, April 2019; Tempo rozwoju gospodarczego Polski na tle Europy. https://www.locja.pl/raport-rynkowy/tempo-rozwoju-gospodarczego-polski-na-tle-europy,142. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  10. 10.

    Real GDP growth rate—volume.

    https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  11. 11.

    Chabasiński, R. (2018, August 9). Ile pieniędzy Polska dostała od Unii Europejskiej przez cały okres członkostwa? https://bezprawnik.pl/ile-pieniedzy-polska-dostala-od-unii/. Accessed June 28, 2019; Polska dostała 100 mld euro z UE. I to na czysto. Forbes, August 2, 2018. https://www.forbes.pl/gospodarka/bilans-wplat-i-wyplat-polska-budzet-ue-od-2004-roku/qqnvmf6. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  12. 12.

    Foreign direct investments in Poland. Polish Investment and Trade Agency, April 2018. https://www.paih.gov.pl/poland_in_figures/foreign_direct_investment. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  13. 13.

    On January 17, 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution announcing that in the next budgetary perspective (2021–2027) the transfer of EU funds would be conditional on respect of the rule of law by Member States.

  14. 14.

    Podstawowe informacje o budżecie resortu obrony narodowej na 2018 r. https://archiwum2019.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2018/02/budzet2018.pdf. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  15. 15.

    Prezydent: Polska mogłaby wydawać na wojsko 2,5 proc. PKB już w 2024 roku. PAP. August 15, 2018. https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/prezydent-andrzej-duda-25-proc-pkb-na-obronnosc-w-2024-r/2n9ztq4. Accessed June 28, 2019. Those are enormous expenditures of about 115 billion PLN (31 billion USD) a year, and could be used to address many other issues, like the underfunded health care and education systems, research and development, etc.

  16. 16.

    National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.

  17. 17.

    Interestingly, at the end of the eighteenth Century, Poland as a state was wiped off the map by three European powers—Prussia, Russia and Austria. During the partition period, Poles were treated most generously by this third power, which did not subject them to the brutal policy of de-polonization. This probably meant that Austria (from 1867 Austro-Hungary) was not seen by the Polish elite as Poland’s third enemy. In any case, the greatest harm done to Poles was that done during World War II by Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union.

  18. 18.

    In light of the fact that during the first 15 years of Poland’s EU membership (2004–2019) Poland received from the EU the sum of about 108 billion EUR, many times greater than the entire Marshall Plan (12.7 billion USD at the time, or about 100 billion in today’s money) minister Trzeciakowski’s statement sounds quite amusing today.

  19. 19.

    In September 2017, Polish parliamentary legal experts ruled that Warsaw had the right to demand reparations from Germany. Two months later, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński justified Poland’s reparation claims as follows: “The French were paid, Jews were paid, many other nations were paid for the losses they suffered during World War II. Poles were not. It is not only about material funds, it is about our status, our honor.” See German war reparations “matter of honor” for Poland. Reuters, November 11, 2017. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-germany-reparations/german-war-reparations-matter-of-honour-for-poland-idUKKBN1DB0RI. Accessed June 28, 2019.

  20. 20.

    Sykulski, L. (2018). Geopolityka a bezpieczeństwo Polski, Warsaw, Zona Zero, pp. 165–166. For more on geopolitical determinism in Polish political thinking, see Bieleń, S. (2011). Poland between Germany and Russia: Determinism or Geopolitical Pluralism? In S. Bieleń (Ed.). Poland’s Foreign Policy in the twenty-first Century (pp. 272–291). Warsaw: Difin.

  21. 21.

    Davies, N. (1984). Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 342–344. This author even writes “Poland’s Westernism, therefore, is fundamental and compulsive. It differs both in kind and degree from the Westernizing trends, which most other East European countries have experienced. […] For the Poles, the West is a dream, a land beyond the rainbow, the lost paradise. The Poles are more Western in their outlook than the inhabitants of most Western countries.” (p. 345).

  22. 22.

    Snyder, T. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 115.

  23. 23.

    Dziewanowski, M.K. (1979). Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 1918–1922, Stanford: Hoover Institution.

  24. 24.

    For more see Mikulicz, S. (1971). Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.

  25. 25.

    Osińska, L. (2009). Miejsce Ukrainy w koncepcjach polityki wschodniej RP. Dialogi Polityczne III RP, II, 129–149; Urbańczyk, M. (2015). Idea ULB (Ukraina-Litwa-Białoruś) w myśli Jerzego Giedroycia i Juliusza Mieroszewskiego. In “Rodzinna Europa”. Europejska myśl polityczno-prawna u progu XXI wieku (pp. 309–322). Wrocław: E-Wydawnictwo. Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa. Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego; Waingertner, P. (2015). Jerzego Giedroycia idea ULB—geneza, założenia, próby realizacji. Zarys problematyki. Studia z Historii Społeczno-Gospodarczej, (Uniwersytet Łódzki), Tom XV, 143–159.

  26. 26.

    Zięba, R. (2002). The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and Ukraine. The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2(3) (4), 217–224.

  27. 27.

    For more see Zięba, R. (2017). Promocja demokracji przez Zachód we wschodniej części Europy w XXI wieku. Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej, (Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza), No. 11, pp. 75 et seq.

  28. 28.

    For more, see Wierzbicki, A. (2018). Polish-Belarusian Relations: Between a Common Past and the Future. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 100–133.

  29. 29.

    An American expert and high official of the Department of Defense viewed it as Poland’s mistake, because in his opinion democratic institutions should have been supported also in Russia. See Garnett, Sh. W. (1996). Poland: Bulwark or Bridge? Foreign Policy, No. 102, pp. 66–82.

  30. 30.

    See Russett, B. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ullman, R.H. (1990). Enlarging the Zone of Peace, Foreign Policy, No. 80, pp. 102–120.

  31. 31.

    Wiśniewski, B. (2015). Teoria demokratycznego pokoju. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych (pp. 47–66). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.

  32. 32.

    Comp. Waltz, K.N. (1979) p. 131.

  33. 33.

    See Kaczmarski, M. (2015). Realizm neoklasyczny. In R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, & J. Zając (Eds.), Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych (pp. 13–27). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW; Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M., Taliaferro, J. W. (Eds.) (2009). Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press.

  34. 34.

    Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe: In a Letter Intended to have been sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw. New York: Times Books.

  35. 35.

    Grudziński, P. (2008). Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli. Toruń: Adam Marszałek, pp. 120–132. For more, see Kaczyński, P. M. (2008). Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 2005–2007: co po konsensusie? Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.

  36. 36.

    Also, PiS wishes to destroy the private media, especially the opposition Gazeta Wyborcza, and eliminate of any opposition voices in the press. See Eyre, M., Goillandeau, M. (2019, May 31). Poland’s Government Is Systematically Silencing Opposition Voices. Foreign Policy.

  37. 37.

    In its propaganda campaign, the Law and Justice party only spares Jan Olszewski’s right-wing government, which was in power in 1991–92. It does so despite the criticism that its actions had met with from former Jan Olszewski himself.

  38. 38.

    In these elections, 15.5 million, that is 50.92% of eligible voters, participated. It was the highest voter turnout after 1989. A total of 5.7 million eligible voters (less than 19%) voted for PiS. In this situation, invoking the Sovereign Will is questionable.

  39. 39.

    On October 19, 2018, the CJEU issued a provisional ruling binding Poland to reinstate Supreme Court judges who had been removed using the unconstitutional law.

  40. 40.

    Prezydent dostał w Watykanie lekcję praworządności. Newsweek, October 17, 2018. https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/prezydent-dostal-w-watykanie-lekcje-praworzadnosci/g668pke, Accessed June 28, 2019; Na mszy w Watykanie zbesztali Dudę jak „ostatniego frajera”! Wierni aż zaniemówili. https://pikio.pl/andrzej-duda-skrytykowany-w-watykanie/, Accessed June 28, 2019; Prezydent przy grobie Jana Pawła II, TVN24, October 16, 2018. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/msza-przy-grobie-jana-pawla-ii-slowa-arcybiskupa-do-prezydenta-dudy,876578.html, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  41. 41.

    The European Commission has referred Hungary to the EU Court of Justice on December 7, 2017 on several issues. They concern higher education regulations, the financing of NGOs and, as in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, the failure to implement decisions to relocate refugees. The infringement procedure in relation to Hungarian asylum legislation has also been tightened up. Subsequently, on September 12, 2018, The European Parliament voted to initiate the procedure provided by Article 7 of the EU Treaty against Hungary.

  42. 42.

    Sejm Exposé by the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki/Excerpts Concerning Foreign Aid and International Relations, Warsaw, September 12, 1989. Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de Documents, 1990, XLVI(3), (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 28–29.

  43. 43.

    For more, see Zięba, R. (2013). Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 133–149.

  44. 44.

    Joshua Spero attributed the bridging strategy conducted in 1989–1991 to Poland, but he did not explain why this policy turned out to be ineffective in practice. See. Spero, J. B (2009), Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging, Contemporary Security Policy, 30(1), 152. Comp. Spero, J. B. (2019), Middle Powers and Regional Influence: Critical Foreign Policy Junctures for Poland, South Korea, and Bolivia. London: Rowman& Littlefield International, pp. 1–33; Zając, J. (2016). Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. XVII.

  45. 45.

    These misunderstandings, especially the memory of the annexation of the capital Vilnius by Poland in 1922, delayed the conclusion of the Treaty of friendship and cooperation between Poland and Lithuania, which was not signed until April 26, 1994.

  46. 46.

    For more, see Chap. 8.

  47. 47.

    Ghebali, V.-I. (1994). Vers un pacte de stabilité en Europe. Défense nationale, 10, 67–77; Gallis, P.E. (1994). European Security Conference: The Balladur Plan. CRS Report for Congress, No. 94–335 F; Drain, M., Lescot, Ch., Vieillefosse, B. (1995). La sécurité en Europe. Regards sur l’actualité, (La documentation française), no 213, pp. 20–21.

  48. 48.

    How did this happen, see Zięba, R. (2019). The 20th Anniversary of Poland’s Accession to NATO. In D. S. Hamilton, K. Spohr. (Eds.) Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War (pp. 197–214). Washington, DC: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University 2019.

  49. 49.

    In his 1997 New Year’s Address, President Aleksander Kwasniewski said that it opens up a historic opportunity for Poland to overcome a fatal dilemma that in the past has led it to choose between ensuring security and obtaining opportunities for unhindered economic development; he stated that the country’s security can be ensured without sacrificing economic development, and that democracy and development can be achieved in parallel and will even be mutually supportive. See Television Address to the Nation by Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of the Republic of Poland on the occasion of the New Year, Warsaw, December 31, 1996, Materials and Documents, Vol. 5, No. 12/1996, pp. 1333–1335.

  50. 50.

    American scholars admit this. See Itzkowitz Shifrinson, J. R. (2016). Deal or no Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion. International Security, 40(4), p. 16 et seq.; Walt, S. M. (2018). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 32; Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union: The U.S. and NATO Are Provoking the Ukrainian Crisis, Centre for Research on Globalization, September 5, 2014. https://www.globalresearch.ca/former-u-s-ambassador-to-the-soviet-union-the-u-s-and-nato-are-provoking-the-ukrainian-crisis/5399602, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  51. 51.

    Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(2), 30.

  52. 52.

    Kagan, R. (2007). End of Dreams, Return of History. Policy Review, 144, 18–19.

  53. 53.

    Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 25 and 37; Zakaria, F. (2008). The Post-American World, New York: Norton, p. 218.

  54. 54.

    Kupchan, Ch. A. (2012). No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5. Zbigniew Brzezinski formulated a similar thesis, that the future world will be increasingly chaotic, not dominated by any hegemon or even global hierarchy. Brzezinski, Z. (2012). Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. New York: Basic Books, p. 76 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Kupchan, Ch. A. (2012), p. 5.

  56. 56.

    Ibidem, pp. 7–8.

  57. 57.

    Many scholars worry about the future of the liberal order, and even American democracy, see Galston, W. A. (2018). Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press; Levitsky, S., Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown; Sunstein, C. R. Eds. (2018). Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America. New York: Dey Street; Oliker, O. (2017) Putinism, Populism and the Defence of Liberal Democracy. Survival, 59(1), pp. 7–24; Boyle, M. J. (2016). The Coming Illiberal Order. Survival, 58(2), 35–66. Comp. a different view Nau, H. R. (2017). America’s International Nationalism. The American Interest, XII(3), 18–28.

  58. 58.

    Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. International Security, 43(4), 7–50. Comp. Glaser, C. L. (2019). The Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided. International Security, 43(4), 51 et seq.; Tsygankov, A. P. (2019), From Global Order to Global Transition: Russia and the Future of International Relations. Russia in Global Affairs, 17(1), 52 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Pant, H.V., Super, J.M. (2015). India’s ‘Non-Alignment’ Conundrum: A Twentieth-Century Policy in a Changing World. International Affairs, 91(4), 687–931; Hakim, P. (2014). The future of US–Brazil relations: confrontation, cooperation or detachment? International Affairs, 90(5), 1161–1180. See also the view that assumes that the USA will seek to come to an understanding with India, in order to counter China’s growing position, and that India will lean toward the USA and its allies of its own free will. Sridharan, E. (2017). Where is India Headed? Possible Future Directions in Indian Foreign Policy. International Affairs, 93(1), 68.

  60. 60.

    Stuenkel, O. (2016). Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order. Malden, MA: Polity Press, pp. 66–96; Cottey, A. (2013). Security in twenty-first Century Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37–44.

  61. 61.

    Lukin, A. (2019. The US-China Trade War and China’s Strategic Future. Survival, 61(1), 23–50.

  62. 62.

    Jones B., Wright, Th., with J. Shapiro and R. Keane (2014, February). The State of International Order, Brookings Institution, Policy Paper, No. 33.

  63. 63.

    Despite the USA’s withdrawal from that agreement in May 2018.

  64. 64.

    Duchâtel, M., Godement, F. (Eds.) (2016, November 4). China and Russia: Gaming the West?, (“China Analysis”), European Council on Foreign Relations. See Charap, S., Drennan, J., Noël, P. (2017). Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations. Survival, 59(1), 25–42; E. Meick, E. (2017, March 20). China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report.

  65. 65.

    Russia, China Reached Important Bilateral Agreements during Xi’s Visit to Moscow. Sputnik International, July 5, 2017. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201707051055232446-xi-visitmoscow-agreements/, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  66. 66.

    Wostok 2018. Wielkie manewry na wschodzie Rosji, Wirtualna Polska (wp.pl), 11.09.2018, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wostok-2018-wielkie-manewry-na-wschodzie-rosji-6294115273418369a, Accessed June 28, 2019; Mikhail Bushuev, Vostok 2018: Russia Lets the War Games with China Begin, October 9, 2018, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/vostok-2018-russia-lets-the-war-games-with-china-begin/ar-BBN9qWs, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  67. 67.

    Gressel, G. (2018, September 25). Russian Maneuvers with Chinese Characteristics, European Council on Foreign Relations.

    https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russian_manoeuvres_with_chinese_characteristics, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  68. 68.

    In conclusion, he said “[W]e would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.” Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Washington Post, February 12, 2007.

  69. 69.

    Kortunov, S. V. (Ed.). (2010). Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh krizisa. Moscow: Aspekt Press, pp. 241–267; Karaganov, S. (2010, June 9). Soyuz Yevropy: posledniy shans? Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Federalnyy vypusk, No. 5229 (150).

  70. 70.

    Clinton, H. (2011, October 21). America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/, Accessed June 28, 2019; Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House Canberra, Australia, The White House, November 17, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament, Accessed June 28, 2019.

  71. 71.

    Brands, H. (2017/2018). The Unexceptional Superpower: American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump. Survival, 59(6), 7 et seq.; Popescu, I. (2018). Conservative internationalism and the Trump administration? Orbis, 62(1), 91 et seq.; Nau, H. R. (2017, August 28). Trump’s conservative internationalism. National Review; Waśko-Owsiejczuk, E. (2018). The Tenets of Trumpism – from Political Realism to Populism. Przegląd Politologiczny, 3, 83 et seq. For more, see Walt, S. M. (2018). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

  72. 72.

    Stuenkel, O. (2016), pp. 156–161; Brooks, S. G., Wohlforth, W.C. (2015). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position. International Security, 40(3), 7 et seq.; Hofmann, S.C., Bravo De Moraes Mendes, B. (2016). Investing in International Security: Rising Powers and Organizational Choices. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 831 et seq.

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Zięba, R. (2020). The Main Determinants of Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy in the Twenty-First Century. In: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_2

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