Abstract
Inequality is considered one of the drivers for the emergence of collective action, but conventional wisdom suggests that it is equality among the stakeholders that helps sustain it. Nonetheless, more controversial findings in the collective action literature suggest that inequality can in fact be beneficial for the sustainability of collective action beyond its emergence. In this research, we use simulation to gain more insights into the relationship between inequality and collective action. We simulate an abstract common-pool resource system to model collective action and consider different types of inequality (e.g., wealth, social influence) to study its correlation with the sustainability of the system in terms of resource well-being, wealth levels and distribution. Preliminary results suggest that equality promotes sustained collective action, but also highlight that factors such as social influence and individual behavioural characteristics may be more decisive in determining the overall well-being.
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- 1.
A convincing account for the case of Rwanda is provided by André and Platteau (1998), who suggest that regional redistribution problems ignited the nation-wide ethnic conflict.
- 2.
We chose Spearman’s ρ due to its rank-based operation that offers a robust analysis of normal vs. non-parametric distributions as well as tolerance against outliers.
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For the sake of brevity, social influence is referred to as influence in the table.
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Frantz, C.K., Ghorbani, A. (2019). Inequality: Driver or Inhibitor of Collective Action?. In: Payne, D., et al. Social Simulation for a Digital Society. SSC 2017. Springer Proceedings in Complexity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30298-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30298-6_7
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