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Monotone and Online Fair Division

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KI 2019: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (KI 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 11793))

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Abstract

We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. We prove a number of impossibility results that justify why we consider relaxations of the properties, as well as why we consider restricted preference domains on which good axiomatic properties can be achieved. We propose two mechanisms that have good axiomatic fairness properties on restricted but common preference domains.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Martin Aleksandrov & Toby Walsh

Authors
  1. Martin Aleksandrov
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  2. Toby Walsh
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Correspondence to Martin Aleksandrov .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Christoph Benzmüller

  2. Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    Heiner Stuckenschmidt

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Aleksandrov, M., Walsh, T. (2019). Monotone and Online Fair Division. In: Benzmüller, C., Stuckenschmidt, H. (eds) KI 2019: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. KI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11793. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30179-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30179-8_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-30178-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-30179-8

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