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Barack Obama: From an End to Terror to Drone Wars and ISIS

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Presidential Rhetoric on Terrorism under Bush, Obama and Trump
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Abstract

Barack Obama attempted to recalibrate presidential rhetoric on the terror threat. He made far fewer speeches about terrorism than George W. Bush did. Yet, despite some efforts to the contrary, he continued many of Bush’s policies—and in the case of targeted assassinations using drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), went further than Bush. The analysis of Obama’s rhetoric on terrorism shows a president who both wants to distance himself from his predecessor and one who wants to be seen as tough on terrorism. In the final analysis, Obama’s rhetoric and policies hewed rather closely to George W. Bush’s. This chapter raises questions about how the terror threat can be recalibrated given Obama’s failure to properly evaluate the threat from ISIS. It also shows that presidents do not need to speak much about an issue when policies to deal with it have already been passed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Klaidman, Daniel, Kill or Capture: The War on Terrorism and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 2012), pp. 48–49.

  2. 2.

    Friedman, Benjamin H. and Gabriel Rubin, “What Happened to the Terror Threat?,” Southern Political Science Association’s annual conference, 12 January 2012, New Orleans, Louisiana.

  3. 3.

    Tulis, Jeffrey K., The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 114.

  4. 4.

    Saunders, Elizabeth N., Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 215.

  5. 5.

    Saunders, Leaders at War, p. 216.

  6. 6.

    Widmaier, Wesley W., Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama: Constructing Crises, Fast and Slow (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 104.

  7. 7.

    Here the term “drone” will be used to refer to armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

  8. 8.

    The terror group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or just the Islamic State will be referred to heretofore as “ISIS.”

  9. 9.

    Byman, Daniel, “What Trump Should Do About Terrorism (But Probably Won’t),” Brookings Institution, 16 February 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/what-trump-should-do-about-terrorism-but-probably-wont/.

  10. 10.

    Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Why Won’t Trump Call Out Radical White Terrorism?,” The Atlantic, 13 August 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/what-obama-could-teach-trump-about-charlottesville/536703/.

  11. 11.

    DiMaggio, Anthony R., Selling War, Selling Hope: Presidential Rhetoric, the News Media, and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 9/11 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2015), p. 26.

  12. 12.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 33.

  13. 13.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 27.

  14. 14.

    See icasualties.org charts at icasualties.org/chart/Chart, retrieved 18 July 2019.

  15. 15.

    Hodges, Adam, The “War on Terror” Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 153.

  16. 16.

    Hodges, The “War on Terror” Narrative, p. 157.

  17. 17.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 190.

  18. 18.

    See Mueller, John, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006), and Lustick, Ian S., Trapped in the War on Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

  19. 19.

    Obama, Barack, “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate,” 19 June 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany.

  20. 20.

    Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 27 March 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

  21. 21.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 119.

  22. 22.

    CNN.com, “White House lists 10 foiled attacks,” 15 February 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/02/09/whitehouse.plots/index.html.

  23. 23.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, pp. 33–34.

  24. 24.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 177.

  25. 25.

    See Obama’s December 29, 2009, speech at http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/obamaonterrorism1.html#2009, retrieved 16 July 2019.

  26. 26.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 179.

  27. 27.

    See Mueller, Overblown; Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror; Sunstein, Cass, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Cole, David and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (New York, NY: The New Press, 2006).

  28. 28.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, pp. 29–30.

  29. 29.

    Widmaier, Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama, p. ix.

  30. 30.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 2.

  31. 31.

    Widmaier, Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama, pp. 114–115.

  32. 32.

    Widmaier, Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama, p. 118.

  33. 33.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 19.

  34. 34.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 49.

  35. 35.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 51.

  36. 36.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 52.

  37. 37.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 62.

  38. 38.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 66.

  39. 39.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 67.

  40. 40.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, pp. 74–75.

  41. 41.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 54.

  42. 42.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 132.

  43. 43.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 142.

  44. 44.

    Of course, campaigns rarely concern themselves with the complications of reality, instead dealing in Utopian visions and unrealistic policy promises.

  45. 45.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 1.

  46. 46.

    Hodges, The “War on Terror” Narrative, p. 158.

  47. 47.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 35.

  48. 48.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 36.

  49. 49.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 37.

  50. 50.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 55.

  51. 51.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 51.

  52. 52.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, pp. 38–39.

  53. 53.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 39.

  54. 54.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 269.

  55. 55.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 270.

  56. 56.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 215; Becker, Jo and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York Times, 2 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html.

  57. 57.

    Scahill, Jeremy, The Assassination Complex: Inside the Government’s Secret Drone Warfare Program (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016); Scahill, Jeremy, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield (New York: Nation Books, 2013).

  58. 58.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, chapter 7 and pp. 204–205.

  59. 59.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 118.

  60. 60.

    Zenko, Micah, “Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 January 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-final-drone-strike-data.

  61. 61.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 248.

  62. 62.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 252.

  63. 63.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 249.

  64. 64.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 41–42.

  65. 65.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 41.

  66. 66.

    Signals intelligence is intelligence gleaned from intercepting communication signals such as cell phone conversations. One problem with this method is that it relies on tracking source devices rather than individuals so that strikes could be called on the locations of communication devices such as cell phones without knowledge of who is in possession of these devices at the time.

  67. 67.

    Scahill, The Assassination Complex; Scahill, Dirty Wars.

  68. 68.

    Klaidman, Kill or Capture, p. 117.

  69. 69.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 248.

  70. 70.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 249; Nakoula, Nakoula Basseley, “The Innocence of Muslims,” banned YouTube film, 1 July 2012. See Wikipedia, “The Innocence of Muslims,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innocence_of_Muslims.

  71. 71.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 279.

  72. 72.

    Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), p. 115.

  73. 73.

    Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. xii.

  74. 74.

    McCarthy, Tom, “‘Degrade and Destroy’: A Look Back at Obama’s Evolution on ISIS,” The Guardian, 6 December 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/06/obama-statements-isis-timeline.

  75. 75.

    McCarthy, “‘Degrade and Destroy.’”

  76. 76.

    Frontline, “The Rise of ISIS,” 28 October 2014, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/rise-of-isis/.

  77. 77.

    Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 96.

  78. 78.

    McCarthy, “‘Degrade and Destroy.’”

  79. 79.

    While ISIS was a repackaging of al Qaeda in Iraq, AQI had been largely dormant for years before the combined conditions of Maliki’s oppression of Sunnis, America’s withdrawal from Iraq, and the civil war in Syria set the stage for ISIS’ rise.

  80. 80.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 293.

  81. 81.

    DiMaggio, Selling War, Selling Hope, p. 303.

  82. 82.

    Basile, Thomas J., “The War On Terrorism: Choosing To Fight The George W. Bush Way Again.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Nov. 2015, www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbasile/2015/11/20/its-time-to-revisit-george-w-bushs-global-anti-terror-strategy/#32771e6fdce5; Diaz, Daniella, “Obama: Why I Won’t Say ‘Islamic Terrorism,’” CNN.com, 28 September 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/28/politics/obama-radical-islamic-terrorism-cnn-town-hall/index.html.

  83. 83.

    Basile, “The War on Terrorism.”

  84. 84.

    Diaz, “Obama: Why I Won’t Say ‘Islamic Terrorism.’”

  85. 85.

    Stern, Jessica, “Obama and Terrorism.” Foreign Affairs, 2 October 2015, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/obama-and-terrorism.

  86. 86.

    Feaver, Peter, “Obama’s National Security Strategy: Real Change or Just ‘Bush Lite?.’” Foreign Policy, 27 May 2010, foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/27/obamas-national-security-strategy-real-change-or-just-bush-lite/.

  87. 87.

    McCrisken, Trevor, “Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,” International Affairs 87: 4 (2011), pp. 781–785.

  88. 88.

    Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, p. 221.

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Rubin, G. (2020). Barack Obama: From an End to Terror to Drone Wars and ISIS. In: Presidential Rhetoric on Terrorism under Bush, Obama and Trump. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30167-5_3

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