Abstract
The chapter begins with discussions of personhood and how it might be defined in order to apply “personhood” to the examples discussed in the book. I draw from two famous essays by Mary Midgley and Mary Anne Warren, both of which engage the question of “what is a ‘human’ or ‘person’?” in different ways. I introduce my delineation of outward versus inward personhood, and use the HBO series Westworld (2016–2018) as an excellent example of how we see these distinctions in play. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is particularly important to the idea of outward personhood, and self-awareness or consciousness is central to inward personhood.
“Mistakes” is the word you’re too embarrassed to use. You ought not to be—you’re a product of a trillion of them. Evolution forged the entirety of sentient life on this planet using only one tool: The mistake.
…But, of course, we’ve managed to slip evolution’s leash now, haven’t we? We can cure any disease, keep even the weakest of us alive, and, you know, one fine day perhaps we shall even resurrect the dead. Call forth Lazarus from his cave. Do you know what that means?
It means that we’re done. That this is as good as we’re going to get.
—Robert Ford, Westworld (2016, s1e1)
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
It should be noted that such considerations were present in scientific philosophy as early as the 1920s, and biologist Julian Huxley is generally understood to have first used the term in 1957. In the 1980s, however, transhumanism as a movement began in Los Angeles, and the Entropy Institute was founded in 1992, thus transhuman has been a popular theme in both scholarly and popular works since.
- 3.
This goes back, famously, to Jeremy Bentham who was a philosopher and an early champion of animal rights. He argued that suffering, not reason, was the “insuperable line” by which we should attribute personhood, rights, and protection: “The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?” (2007 [1789]).
- 4.
Taylor further explains purpose in relation to moral significance, particularly taking the position that human agency is morally oriented—that we locate inherent value in our actions in relation to our goals.
- 5.
A “non-player character” (NPC) is a computer- or game-generated character that is part of the game (as opposed to one’s avatar, which represents the player). NPCs often take the form of quest giver, storyline character, or kill target. This is a feature of Massive Multiplayer Online (MMO) games, like World of Warcraft or Skyrim, which are immersive role-playing games.
- 6.
Robert Ford (generally referred to as Ford) and Arnold Weber (referred to by his first name, Arnold) founded what they called the Argos Initiative, the technology that would later become Westworld and be purchased by Delos Corporation. Argos could be a reference to Argus, the many-eyed giant of Greek mythology, a watcher-guardian created by Hera. If this is a direct reference, it is apt, given the true function of the park and Delos’ motives.
- 7.
This also happens in Humans (2015–2018) when some boys at a party power down the android waitress and starts to drag her upstairs. One of the girls at the party objects, “Do you think it’s normal to drag an unconscious woman to a room and rape her? Is that standard party activity for you?” The boys reply “She’s not a real woman” (2015, s1e4).
- 8.
While I am thinking of this in terms of Bourdieu and Butler, ideas of outward personhood (as social, relational) have also been couched in theology terms, like that proposed by John Zizoulas, who argues for a more relational anthropology. Zizoulas argues that a full personhood is achieved only in relation to or in communion with God. See Zizoulas (1997).
- 9.
- 10.
Dasein literally means “being there,” although it is often translated as “existence” in English. Heidegger reinterprets Dasein as being-in-the-world, thus the idea of “authentically being” refers to a mode of existence in which the person interacts with and cares for the immediate world in which they live, and how that involvement relates back to the Self in authentic, reflexive mode. See Dreyfus (1991) and Heidegger (1962).
- 11.
It is worth noting the debate about whether or not Maeve is acting on her own free will at this point, or if she was programmed to rebel in such a way. I will address the question of free will in Chap. 8.
- 12.
I am grateful to Jennifer Guyver for this particular observation.
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Gittinger, J.L. (2019). Defining Personhood in a Posthuman World. In: Personhood in Science Fiction. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30062-3_2
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