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Strategy-Proofness, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive Utilities

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PRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI 2019)

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Abstract

We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one by one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this online setting. In addition, many existing axiomatic results often do not transfer from the offline to the online setting. For this reason, we propose here three new online mechanisms, as well as consider the axiomatic properties of three previously proposed online mechanisms. In this paper, we use these mechanisms and characterize classes of online mechanisms that are strategy-proof, and return envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations, as well as combinations of these properties. Finally, we identify an important impossibility result.

Funded by the European Research Council under the Horizon 2020 Programme via AMPLify 670077.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Martin Aleksandrov & Toby Walsh

Authors
  1. Martin Aleksandrov
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  2. Toby Walsh
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Correspondence to Martin Aleksandrov .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Abhaya C. Nayak

  2. RIKEN Center for Integrative Medical Sciences, Yokohama, Japan

    Alok Sharma

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Aleksandrov, M., Walsh, T. (2019). Strategy-Proofness, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive Utilities. In: Nayak, A., Sharma, A. (eds) PRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11670. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_42

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_42

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29907-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29908-8

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