Abstract
An increasingly dangerous ‘second nuclear age’ is threatening the survival of humankind as geopolitical competition increases between established nuclear powers, unstable ‘rogue states’ and transnational terrorist groups seek nuclear arms, and an emerging technological arms race breaks out. In this context nuclear weapons look set to remain a permanent feature of the international strategic landscape, making it critical that developments undermining nuclear deterrence and strategic stability are interrogated. This chapter does this in four stages. First, it outlines the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War, and how changes after the Cold War led to a reconceptualization of deterrence theory and strategy by the United States. Second, it shows that a raft of emerging technologies, including ballistic missiles defenses, cyber technologies, Artificial Intelligence and social media, are undermining the foundations of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Third, it explains why contemporary international politics is not conducive to the nuclear disarmament agenda, as great power competition escalates between the U.S. and China, and U.S. and Russia. It concludes by asserting that the arms control regime must be reconfigured to address the most destabilising features of the contemporary security environment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsReferences
Allison G (1971) Essence of decision: explaining the cuban missile crisis. Little Brown, Boston
Atomic Heritage Foundation (2018) Strategic defense initiative (SDI) July 10. https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/strategic-defense-initiative-sdi. Accessed 4 Sep 2019
Altmann J, Sauer F (2017) Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability. Survival 59(5):117–142
Beres LR (October 1981) Tilting toward Thanatos: America’s ‘Countervailing’ nuclear strategy. World Polit 34(1): 25–46
Bracken P (2016) The cyber threat to nuclear stability. Orbis 60(2):188–203
Buckley N, Jones S, Russia HK (November 2016) Putting the ‘Nuclear Gun’ back on the table. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/03dfeb98-aa88-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122?mhq5j=e5. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Bush GW (2002) The National security strategy of the United States of America. September 2002 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Caldwell D, Williams RE Jr (2016) Seeking security in an insecure world. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham
Cimbala SJ, McDermott RN (2015) A new cold war? Missile defenses, nuclear arms reductions, and cyber war. Comp Strateg 34(1):95–111
Department of Defense (2018) National defense strategy of the United States of America. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed 4 Sep 2019
Department of Defense (2019) Missile defense review. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Dulles JD (January 1954) The evolution of foreign policy. 12 January, 1954, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/article-dulles-retaliation_1954-01-12.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Freedman L (2003) The evolution of nuclear strategy. Palgrave Macmillan
Futter A (2016) War games Redux? cyberthreats, US-Russian strategic stability, and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control. Eur Secur 25(2):163–180
Futter A (2018) Hacking the bomb: cyber threats and nuclear weapons. Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC
Geist E, Lohn AJ (2018) How might AI affect the risk of nuclear war? RAND Corporation: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
George AL, Smoke R (1974) Deterrence and American foreign policy: theory and practice. Columbia University Press, Columbia
Gladstone RA (July 2017) Treaty is reached to ban nuclear arms. Now comes the hard part. New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/americas/united-nations-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-destruction-global-treaty.html. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Goldfischer D (1993) The best defense: policy alternatives for US nuclear security from the 1950s to the 1960s. Cornell University Press, New York
Gray CS (1999) The second nuclear age. Lynne Rienner, Boulder
Janis IL (1972) Victims of groupthink. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston
Jervis R (1984) The illogic of American nuclear strategy. Cornell University Press, London
Keaney TA, Cohen EA (1995) Revolution in warfare? Air power in the Persian Gulf. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis
Knopf JW (August 2008) Wrestling with deterrence: Bush administration strategy after 9/11. Contemp Secur Policy, 29(2): 229–264
Knopf JW (2010) The fourth wave in deterrence research. Contemp Secur Policy 31(1):1–33
Kroenig M (2018) The logic of American nuclear strategy: why strategic superiority matters. Oxford University Press, New York
Lebow RN, Stein JG (1995) Deterrence and the cold war. Political Sci Q 110(2):157–181
Lieber KA (2005) War and the engineers: the primacy of politics over technology. Cornell UP, Ithaca
Lieber KA, Press, DG (Spring 2006a) The end of MAD? The nuclear dimension of U.S. Primacy 30(4): 7–44
Lieber KA, Press, DG (March/April 2006b) The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy. Foreign Aff: 85 42–54
Lieber KA, Press, DG (Spring 2017) The new era of counterforce: technological change and the future of nuclear deterrence. Int Secur, 41(4): 9–49
Litwak RS (2017) Recalibrating deterrence to prevent nuclear terrorism. Wash Q 40(1):55–70
MacDonald BW, Ferguson CD (2015) Chinese strategic missile defense: will it happen, and what would it mean? Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_11/Features/Chinese-Strategic-Missile-Defense-Will-It-Happen-and-What-Would-It-Mean. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Mecklin J (2015) Disarm and modernize. Foreign Policy 211:52–59
Members of the Commission (1998) Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. 15 July, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Morgan PM (1983) Deterrence: a conceptual analysis. Sage Publications, London
Morgan PM (1985) Saving face for the sake of deterrence. In: Jervis R, Lebow RN, Stein JG (eds) Psychology and deterrence. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p 125
Mowatt-Larssen R (2010) Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction: hype or reality? Belfer Center, January. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/al-qaeda-weapons-mass-destruction-threat-hype-or-reality. Accessed 4 Sep 2019
Norris R, Kristensen HM (July 2010) Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010. Bull At Sci 66(4):77–83
Nuclearfiles.org 2000 Joint Statement by the Presidents of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. 18 July, 2000. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/missile-defense/history/joint-statement-china-russia.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Payne KB (1996) Deterrence in the second nuclear age. University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky
Pilkington E, Pengelly M (2016) ‘Let it be an Arms Race’: Donald trump appears to double down on nuclear expansion. The Guardian, 24 December, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/23/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-arms-race. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Reif K (2017) Congress rewrites missile defense policy. Arms Control Association, January/February. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-01/news/congress-rewrites-missile-defense-policy. Accessed 4 Sep 2019
Saalman L (2018) Fear of false negatives: AI and China’s nuclear posture, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: https://thebulletin.org/landing_article/fear-of-false-negatives-ai-and-chinasnuclear-posture/. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Schelling T (1966) Arms and influence. Yale University Press, New Haven
Seligman L, Gramer R (2019) What does the demise of the INF treaty mean for nuclear arms control? Foreign policy, August 2. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/02/what-does-the-demise-of-the-i-n-f-treaty-mean-fornuclear-arms-control-intermediate-nuclear-forces-new-start-strategic-arms-limitation-nonproliferation-trump-russia-arms-control-explained/. Accessed 6 Sep 2019
Schelling T (1981) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Chicago
Shear MD, Glanz J (2016) Trump says the U.S. should expand its nuclear capacity. The New York Times, December 22
Snyder GH (1961) Deterrence and defense: toward a theory of national security. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Steff R (2013) Cooperative ballistic missile defense for America, China, and Russia. Contemp Secur Policy 34(1):94–119
Steff R (2016) Strategic thinking, deterrence and the US ballistic missile defense project: from Truman to Obama. Routledge, London
Steff R, Khoo N (2014) This program will not be a threat to them: ballistic missile defense and U.S. relations with Russia and China. Def Secur Anal 30(1):17–28
Steff R, Khoo N (November 2017) Security at a price: the International politics of US ballistic missile defense. Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland
Tang S (2009) The security dilemma: a conceptual analysis. Secur Stud 18(3):587–623
The White House (December 2002) NSPD-23: National policy on ballistic missile defense. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2019
Wohlstetter A (January 1959) The delicate balance of terror. Foreign Aff 37(2):211–234
York H (1970) Race to Oblivion: a participant’s view of the arms race. Simon and Schuster, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Steff, R. (2020). Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age of Disruptive Technologies and Great Power Competition. In: Filippidou, A. (eds) Deterrence. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29366-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29367-3
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)