Abstract
Over the last years with the fast technology enhancement, integrated circuit (IC) companies tend to outsource phases of their production chains in order to reduce time-to-market and development costs. Despite the outsourcing benefits through the world, serious security concerns today affect all phases of IC-design flows. Malicious third-party suppliers may, for instance, intentionally cause operational disturbances, disable functions, alter layout masks, and even leak sensitive information from original circuits, all by including mechanisms defined as hardware Trojans (HT). This chapter classifies state-of-the-art testing techniques that analyze side-channel signals for detecting HT. In the following, a body built-in sensor-based technique for detection of HT is detailed by highlighting its three main innovative contributions: (1) current pulses are injected into body terminals of IC system subcircuits; (2) built-in current sensors are connected to body terminals for identifying (or not) the injected currents, providing digital signatures of the subcircuit substrates; (3) resulting digital signatures allow indirect analysis of the impedance of subcircuit substrate, which is modified with the presence of HT, opening a new category of side-channel analysis-based techniques.
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Bastos, R.P., Torres, F.S. (2020). Body Built-In Sensors for Testing Integrated Circuit Systems for Hardware Trojans. In: On-Chip Current Sensors for Reliable, Secure, and Low-Power Integrated Circuits. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29353-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29353-6_8
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