Abstract
This chapter is about issues in ethics and moral psychology that have been little explored by contemporary philosophers, ones that concern the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds of empathy. Roughly, first type is what is sometimes called “other-focused” empathy, in which one reconstructs the thoughts and feelings that someone else has or would have. The second type, “self-focused” empathy, is the sort of emotional attitude someone adopts when she imagines how she would think or feel were she in the other person’s place. Both are variants of empathy, for both have to do with having thoughts and feelings that are more apt, in the relevant senses, for someone else’s circumstances than one’s own. But they differ with respect to how much one makes substantial reference to oneself in order to elicit those thoughts and feelings. In cases of self-focused empathy, we imagine ourselves facing predicaments relevantly similar to those of the person with whom we sympathize, and we achieve our empathetic response by doing things like recalling equivalent experiences or noting similar interests and desires that may bear on the situation. A little reflection on this distinction shows that it can in fact have profound implications for care, compassion, love, human motivation, and the sense of oneness or unity with others that matters so much for ethics and the well-rounded human life, but there is not yet a body of literature in contemporary moral psychology or western philosophy that really wrestles with these implications. Some influential philosophers and psychologists have taken note of the distinction, but none have engaged the issues as thoroughly as did Zhu Xi and his students in twelfth century, largely in a series of commentaries and conversations that have yet to be translated into Western languages.
Portions of this essay are derived from two earlier papers, “Sympathy and Perspective-Taking in Confucian Ethics” (Tiwald 2011) and “Two Notions of Empathy and Oneness” (Tiwald 2018b), reproduced here in compliance with the permissions policies of the publishers of both works. I am indebted to Huang Yong and Ng Kai-chiu for their insightful comments on an earlier draft, and to the John Templeton Foundation, St. Louis University, and The Happiness and Well-Being Project for supporting the research that was the basis of this paper.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
One final clarification. We do not always need to reconstruct someone’s actual psychological state in order to have adequate empathetic concern for her. It is often more appropriate to imagine successfully how she would feel under certain circumstances, and sometimes the best way to empathize with someone is by imagining a somewhat better informed or idealized version of her. If Zhang goes about his days blissfully ignorant about the nasty and unfounded rumors circulating about him, there is not much empathetic concern in vicariously experiencing his blissful ignorance. An empathetic person feels sorrow and embarrassment for Zhang instead. For a brief review of contemporary philosophers on the use of empathy to construct counterfactual psychological states see Huang (2016: 226–227).
- 3.
Zhu Xi’s most explicit accounts of these two types of perspective-taking appear in fascicles (juan 卷) 27 and 33 of the Classified Sayings of Master Zhu (Zhuzi Yulei 朱子語類; Zhu 1986). His use of the terms “inferring from the self” (tui ji) and “by means of the self” (yi ji) is self-consciously adopted from the recorded lessons of the Cheng brothers. Zhu suspects that Cheng Hao was the brother who used the terms to distinguish between shu and ren (Zhu 1986: [27] 691).
- 4.
- 5.
A reference to the “Great Appendix (Xici 繫辭)” commentary on the Classic of Changes (Yijing 易經), B.2.
- 6.
Zhu takes this “relational” version of inference extension from the Confucian classic, the Great Learning (Daxue 大學), part 10, paragraph 2.
- 7.
Some might take issue with the suggestion that Zhu can sidestep the problem of egoism so easily, for it could be the case that Zhu (like many ethical thinkers who see virtue as central to both morality and personal well-being) builds his egoism into the doctrinal foundations of his philosophy. For a persuasive response to this objection, see Huang (2010).
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Zhu’s Neo-Confucian predecessor Hu Hong 胡宏 (1105–1161) raises doubts about the stronger, more mystical reading of “being one” in a passage that Zhu discusses in his “Misgivings about Master Hu’s Understanding of Words (Huzi zhiyan yiyi 胡子知言疑義).” See Zhu (2002: 3560–3561).
- 11.
Huang Yong has made the interesting point that self-focused empathy might lend itself to paternalistic ways of thinking, causing empathizers to want for others things which others may not want for themselves. He offers a creative solution to the problem of empathetic paternalism in the context of Wang Yangming’s thought (Huang 2016: 227–230). On my reading of Zhu, he is not particularly concerned about empathetic paternalism. He thinks that both shu and ren, when used rightly, draw on feelings and desires that are basic, potentially widely shared, and correct. No doubt there will be variations in proclivity and preference—e.g., some people may like the taste of wine more than others—but we can empathize with people whose proclivities and preferences differ from ours by drawing on certain basic ones that we should have in common—e.g., the strong, natural preference for liquids that are not repugnant in flavor or texture. In point of fact, I think, empathetic paternalism is a thornier problem than Zhu assumes.
- 12.
In an earlier paper I discuss two additional arguments by Zhu against inference extension, the “defective desires problem” and the “deficiency of care problem” (Tiwald 2011: 667–670). I pass over the first problem because it is not clearly linked with self-focus and pass over the second because it overlaps substantially with the problem of continence and internal conflict.
References
Angle, Stephen C., and Justin Tiwald. 2017. Neo-Confucianism: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Polity Press.
Aristotle. 1998. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Batson, C. Daniel. 2009. “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena.” In Jean Decety and William Ickes, eds., The Social Neuroscience of Empathy (3–16). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Batson, C. Daniel, Shannon Early, and Giovanni Salvarani. 1997. “Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus Imaging How You Would Feel.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23 (7): 751–758. (A more recent study of the differences in psychological effect of self-focused and other-focused empathy.)
Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cheng, Hao 程顥, and Cheng Yi 程頤. 1981. “The Extant Works of the Chengs of Henan 河南程氏遺書.” In The Collected Works of the Cheng Brothers 二程集, vol. 1 (1-349). Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Coplan, Amy. 2011. “Understanding Empathy: Its Features and Effects.” In Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie, eds., Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (3–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dai, Zhen 戴震. 1996. “Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms of the Mencius 孟子字義疏證.” In the Appendix to Hu Shi’s 胡適 The Philosophy of DaiZhen 戴東原的哲學 (237–338). Taipei 臺北: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館.
Darwall, Stephen. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton.: Princeton University Press.
Ewell, John W. 1990. “Reinventing the Way: Dai Zhen’s Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in Mencius (1777).” Ph.D. Diss., University of California Berkeley.
Hoffman, Martin L. 2000. Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Hoffman is a prominent expert on the psychology of empathy. This book touches upon the differences between self-focused and other-focused empathy.)
Huang, Yong. 2010. “The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics: Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian Response.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4): 651–692.
———. 2016. “Empathy with Devils.” In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa, eds., Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue (214–234). New York.: Routledge.
Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2017. Oneness: East Asian Conceptions of Virtue, Happiness, and How We Are All Connected. New York.: Oxford University Press.
Mou, Zongsan 牟宗三. 1969. Heartmind and Nature 心體與性體, vol. 3. Taipei 臺北: Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局.
Nivison, David S. 1996. The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2001. Upheavals of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Adam. 2009. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by Ryan Patrick Hanley. New York: Penguin Classics.
Stotland, Ezra. 1969. “Exploratory Investigations in Empathy.” In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 4 (271–313). New York: Academic Press. (An important early empirical study of empathy that calls attention to differences between the effects of self-focused and other-focused variants.)
Tiwald, Justin. 2010. “Dai Zhen on Human Nature and Moral Cultivation.” In John Makeham, ed., Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy (399–422). Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2011. “Sympathy and Perspective-Taking in Confucian Ethics.” Philosophy Compass 6 (10): 663–674. (A more comprehensive historical study of empathy in the Confucian tradition, with a special emphasis on the debate about direct extension and inference extension.)
———. 2018a. “Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism.” In Nancy E. Snow, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Virtue (171–189). New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2018b. “Two Notions of Empathy and Oneness.” In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen J. Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian, and Eric Schwitzgebel, eds., The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self (371–387). New York: Columbia University Press. (An examination of how Zhu Xi and Dai Zhen link self- and other-focused empathy to the experience of “being one” or “forming one body” with others.)
Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1983. Collected Commentaries on the Four Books 四書章句集注. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
———. 1986. The Classified Sayings of Master Zhu 朱子語類. Edited by Li Jingde 黎靖德. Beijing 北京: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局. (The primary source for Zhu’s views on the differences between inference extension and direct extension, which he clarified in response to student queries. See especially juan 27 and juan 33.)
———. 1996. “Treatise on Humaneness 仁說.” In Guo Qi 郭齊 and Yin Bo 尹波, eds., The Collected Works of ZhuXi 朱熹集, juan 67 (3542–3544). Chengdu 成都: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe 四川教育出版社.
———. 2002. “Misgivings about Master Hu’s Understanding of Words 胡子知言疑義.” In Master Zhu’s Complete Works 朱子全書, vol. 24, juan 73 (3555–3564). Shanghai 上海: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, and Hefei 合肥: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe 安徽教育出版社.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tiwald, J. (2020). Zhu Xi on Self-Focused vs. Other-Focused Empathy. In: Ng, Kc., Huang, Y. (eds) Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_40
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_40
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29174-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29175-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)