Abstract
As Chan Buddhism, with the popularist Pure Land School aside, was the dominant version of Buddhism in Song dynasty (Ch’en 1964: 389, 398), Zhu Xi’s understanding and critique of Buddhism was mainly directed toward Chan Buddhism (Lao 1980, vol. 3B: 326). Though Zhu Xi had been attracted to Buddhism and had studied Buddhism seriously during his early years, his knowledge of Buddhism was mainly confined to the dominant school of Buddhism in his time, i.e., Chan Buddhism, and with the leading monk-scholar Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲 (1089–1163) as his major imagined opponent (Ariki 2008: 203). The works of Dahui Zonggao had been very close to the heart of Zhu Xi when he was young, and he had been a student of the Buddhist monk Daoqian 道謙 (c. 1093–1185), who was the dharma heir of Dahui Zonggao (Ariki 2008: 204). Dahui Zonggao belongs to the Linji 臨濟 house of Chan Buddhism, which is one of five houses of Chan Buddhism and the most influential one in the time of Zhu Xi. Hence Zhu Xi’s comments on the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism are basically on the differences between Confucianism and Chan Buddhism (or a leading school in Chan Buddhism), and his comments are very influential on later Neo-Confucians, whose comments on this topic are basically taken over from Zhu Xi (Qian 2011, vol. 1: 27; Ding 2011: 544–48).
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Notes
- 1.
Of the five houses of Chan Buddhism, namely, Linji 臨濟, Caodong 曹洞, Guiyang 潙仰, Yunmen 雲門, and Fayen 法眼, “the first two were the most important, while the remaining three never enjoyed a large following and soon disappeared from the scene” (Ch’en 1964: 357).
- 2.
The Confucians can accept the second claim but not the first claim. For the Confucians, the nature is real and is not just the same as function, which has no substance. But they do accept the view that nature and function cannot be separated, and nature can be known via function. For example, ren or humanity is the substance, and compassion is the function. Cheng Yi holds that humanity can be known via compassion, and Zhu Xi speaks very highly of this view of Cheng Yi. For the Buddhists, the two claims are the same. But for the Confucians, the two claims cannot be the same, as function is just the manifestation of nature, which is substantive and real. I thank the editors for pointing out the difference between these two claims to me.
- 3.
Zhu Xi, “Discerning the Impure Doctrines” (Zaxue Bian 雜學辨), in vol. 42 of The Complete Works of Master Zhu (Zhuzi Quanshu 朱子全書; Zhu 2010: 3460–68). This piece of writing was taken in entirety by Quan Zuwang 全祖望 in his review of Su Shi in the chapter he added for Scholarly Records of the Song and Yuan Dynasties (Song Yuan Xue’an 宋元學案), Huang Zongxi’s 黃宗羲 definitive work on Neo-Confucianism.
- 4.
This is called shuaixing 率性 (complying with nature) in Zhongyong. In Zhongyong, it is explicitly and unambiguously stated in the opening remarks that “Complying with nature is called the ‘Way’” (Johnston and Wang 2012: 215). One cannot be too wrong by following nature, what one needs in addition is just some adjustment or rectification (xiu 修).
- 5.
It is true that even in Mencius, when the heart/mind is lost, seeking the lost heart/mind is also an uphill battle (in such bad condition it is rare that the battle can be won, and the winning would be a remarkable moral achievement). However, this is the exception that proves the rule. For the people who have already lost their heart/mind, it is indeed difficult to gain it back. But this is not the normal situation for everyone, not the common human condition, and definitely not the situation we are born into. I thank the editors for raising the query, which gives me an opportunity to further clarify my views.
- 6.
Zhu Xi regards his one-many doctrine as a criticism of the one-many doctrine in Hua-yan school, which takes all phenomena as merely manifestations of the mind (Huang 1999: 134–35). Nevertheless, Zhu still shares the view that the many are but the manifestations of the same One.
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Yu, Kp. (2020). Zhu Xi and Buddhism. In: Ng, Kc., Huang, Y. (eds) Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_28
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