Abstract
The central goals of Neo-Confucian philosophy are explaining why and how we humans can be good—and furthermore, why we should be good. For Zhu Xi, the basic answer to these questions is “because that is what we truly are.” We are inherently good, even though we do not always act this way. Too often, we are confused or mistaken, misperceiving our world and ourselves. Sometimes our emotions guide us well, but many times we overreact or fail to be moved when we should. The theoretical challenge which Zhu Xi shoulders is explaining how it could be that unreliable creatures like ourselves really are good, deep down, and also have the capacity to realize this goodness in a much more consistent and even spontaneous way.
Much of this chapter is derived from material in Angle and Tiwald 2017, which is a general introduction to Neo-Confucian philosophy. We thank Polity Press for permission to excerpt and re-organize the material in this way. All translations are our own responsibility; wherever possible, we also cite existing translations for comparison.
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Notes
- 1.
The translation of li is rather controversial, with “principle” and “coherence” among the other choices scholars have made. We feel that “Pattern” captures the key dimensions of the meaning of li, such as coherent inter-dependence, normativity, and ultimacy, while avoiding important drawbacks of alternatives, such as the susceptibility of “principle” to being understood on the model of single, stateable moral rules. For more discussion, see Angle and Tiwald (2017), ch. 2.
- 2.
What we are translating as “cosmos” (tian) is more conventionally translated as “Heaven.” We prefer “cosmos” for reasons described in Angle (2018).
- 3.
Centrality and Commonality opens with these lines: “What the cosmos decrees is called ‘the nature’; complying with nature is called ‘the Way’; cultivating the Way is called ‘teaching.’” Zhong Yong 1; cf. (Johnston and Wang 2012: 407). We will discuss these lines further below.
- 4.
For further details, see Chap. 28, “Zhu Xi and Buddhism,” in this volume.
- 5.
- 6.
As Fuji notes, there is a degree to which one consciously takes up one’s role, but the responsibilities are there whether the minister recognizes them or not.
- 7.
- 8.
Zhu is contrasting this position with that which he finds in Buddhism, whose doctrine of emptiness he understands as implying that the nature has no structure: it is “homogenous,” providing no guidance. As a result, without a distinction between the everyday flow of desires, on the one hand, and the Way, on the other, one “falls into the Buddhists’ mistake of seeing all functioning whatsoever as the nature” (Zhu 2002d: [A] 557; cf. Araki 2008: 284). As Brook Ziporyn has emphasized, when operating within a holistic metaphysic of interdependence (as both Buddhists and Neo-Confucians are doing, in their own ways), a center provides the orientation that gives each aspect of the whole a distinct meaning. In the radical holism of at least some Buddhists, the center can be anything, making the identity of any single aspect of the whole indeterminate or, at best, provisional (Ziporyn 2000).
- 9.
Most interpreters believe that Zhu’s understanding of duan is quite different from that intended by Mencius himself. For Mencius, the duan is the beginning of something that can grow into full virtue, while for Zhu, the duan are the initially experiencable parts of our natures, which do not have to (and indeed cannot) grow; see Ivanhoe (2002): 105. We use “beginning” as a translation for duan because we believe it is suitably ambiguous between these two meanings.
- 10.
In his commentary on the assertion in Mencius 7A.4 that “The myriad things are complete in me,” Zhu Xi says that the heartmind is that “which possesses the myriad Patterns and which responds to the myriad affairs” (Zhu 2002c: [MZ13] 426–27).
- 11.
An example of an interpretation that leans in the direction of pre-existing, individual Patterns is (Fuji 2011: 133n19), where Michiaki Fuji says that what Zhu means by saying the heartmind possesses the myriad Patterns is that “the heartmind knows a priori all of the principles, essences, and truths in the world; in other words, the heartmind possess complete ‘knowledge.’”
- 12.
It may be relevant that in a famous discussion of the Tiantai Buddhist idea of “inherent possession in the nature (xing ju 性具),” the monk Guanding 灌頂 explicitly denies that this doctrine—according to which the heartmind includes all dharmas—should be understood on the model of individual grains of sand stored in a sack (Ziporyn 2000: 161–62).
- 13.
This is explicitly stated at the beginning of the same letter (Zhu 2002b: [58] 2778).
- 14.
We are influenced here by Moran’s extensive analysis (1983).
- 15.
We use the term Daoxue 道學 (“Learning of the Way”) to refer to the teachings and practices of that subset of Neo-Confucians whose views came to be closely associated with the brothers Cheng Hao or Cheng Yi, including the Cheng brothers themselves, Zhang Zai, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529).
- 16.
Zhu’s view on this issue develops over time; see Moran (1983: 273–75).
- 17.
Zhang is here alluding to Mencius 7B.24. See also the discussion at Kasoff (1984: 72–76), although Ira Kasoff accords the “nature of qi zhi” more weight, relative to qi zhi itself, than we think appropriate.
- 18.
“The nature of heaven and earth,” like “the cosmic decree is what is meant by ‘nature,’” refers to the inherent nature.
- 19.
On the problems caused by two distinct types of nature, see Angle and Tiwald (2017: ch. 3). For more on the relations between Pattern and vital stuff, see Chap. 12, “Li and Qi” in this volume, and the discussion of the asymmetrical co-dependence between Pattern and vital stuff in Angle and Tiwald (2017: ch. 2).
- 20.
- 21.
We note that the contrast between xing and qing is not simply an invention of Buddhism. See Barrett (1992: 94–98) for anticipations of the distinction in both Zhuangzi and Wang Bi.
- 22.
Already near the beginning of the adaptation and translation of Buddhism into Chinese, qing is used to express the idea of a “sense faculty,” and it is periodically used in this way thereafter. Somewhat later and more commonly, qing comes to be used to correspond to “sentience”: a sentient being is one who “has qing (you qing 有情)” (See Anderl 2004: 151–52, 159).
- 23.
From Li Tongxuan’s 李通玄 (635–730) Xin Lun 新論, T36.1739.721a6–8; cf. Koh (2011: 23).
- 24.
Barrett argues throughout his commentary for a less-negative view of emotion than has become the conventional interpretation, but we do not find this particularly convincing. Barrett also resists the idea that Li Ao was simply drawing on Buddhism; here he seems to us to be correct, but fighting an old fight. Li Ao was clearly well aware of, drawing on, and even speaking to a context shot through with Buddhist ideas and terminology.
- 25.
On the place of Zhou Dunyi within the Daoxue fellowship, see Tillman (1992: 115–16).
- 26.
Yanzi is described as “having only a single dish of rice, a single gourd of drink, and living in a narrow lane; others could not have endured this distress, but he did not allow his joy to be affected” (Analects 6.11).
- 27.
Zhou’s reference to “transform and equalize” is an obvious reference to Chapter Two of the Daoist classic Zhuangzi.
- 28.
“Duan” is used rarely, and never in its specifically Mencian sense, by figures such as Zhang Zai and Zhou Dunyi. All the uses of the term (in the Mencian sense) in the important Daoxue anthology Reflections on Things at Hand are by Cheng Yi. The same pattern can be observed in uses of the Mencius’ specific terms for the duan (like “alarm and compassion”).
- 29.
Bol (1992: 323–26) argues that Cheng Yi uses the four beginnings to flesh out his understanding of Pattern as a kind of unified, coherent organization. Much of what Peter Bol says here seems right, except that he equivocates between the beginnings themselves (as emotions) and their corresponding virtues (such as humaneness); his discussion is really about the latter.
- 30.
At one point Cheng Yi actually says that “within human nature there is only the four beginnings,” in much the same way that the nature of water is to be “still and tranquil like a mirror,” even though when stimulated from without water can form waves (Cheng and Cheng 1981: [18] 204; cf. Graham 1992: 53). This equation of the four beginnings with nature seems to us to be a mistake even by Cheng Yi’s own lights, perhaps a result of the difficulty of explaining answers to the sorts of questions we go on to discuss in the main text.
- 31.
For example, the most that the Korean Neo-Confucian Yi T’oegye says (as part of the famous Four-Seven Debate) is that “although neither [the four nor the seven] is separable from Pattern and qi, on the basis of their point of origin, each points to a predominant factor and emphasis” (Kalton 1994: 11, slightly modified).
- 32.
Many modern scholars have emphasized this theme in Zhu Xi; see, e.g., Araki (2008), Virág (2007), Fuji (2011), and Shun (2015). To be sure, Zhu is not alone in holding such a view; it seems to be a rather common feature of Southern Song Daoxue. For example, Hoyt Tillman shows that Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1180) held quite similar views—indeed, Zhang seems to have been importantly influential on Zhu in this regard. See Tillman (1992: 47–49).
- 33.
In fact, nothing—not even a rock—is simply vital stuff, since on Zhu’s view there is Pattern in everything. Our thanks to the Editors for pointing this out. For a short review of the scholars who see heartmind as vital stuff and for passages from Zhu Xi that are at odds with this view see Chen L. (2010: 117–29).
- 34.
In addition to Fuji (2011: ch. 6), we have also benefitted from Wu 2009, although we are not persuaded by Wu’s ultimate conclusion. Both scholars review the existing literature: Qian Mu 錢穆 and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 hold that according to Zhu, the heartmind is that aspect of vital stuff capable of knowing; Chen Lai 陳來 says that it is a kind of perceptual category but is not vital stuff; and scholars like Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元 and Jin Chunfeng 金春峰 maintain that Zhu’s idea of heartmind is actually closer to Wang Yangming’s idea of “inherent heartmind” (see Fuji 2011: 151–52 and Wu 2009: 112).
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
For more on this, see Angle and Tiwald (2017: ch. 4).
- 38.
Chen Lai (2000: 229) argues explicitly for this view that both daoxin and renxin are already-manifest, contrary not only to Cheng Yi but also to the Ming Neo-Confucian Luo Qinshun 羅欽順 (1465–1547). Other Ming Neo-Confucians who took themselves to be followers of Zhu Xi also misunderstood Zhu’s view and equated daoxin and nature: for example, see the discussion of Chen Jian 陳建 (1497–1567) in de Bary (1989: 101).
- 39.
For more on sincerity, see Angle and Tiwald (2017: 167–70).
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Angle, S.C., Tiwald, J. (2020). Moral Psychology: Heartmind (Xin), Nature (Xing), and Emotions (Qing). In: Ng, Kc., Huang, Y. (eds) Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_18
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