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Zhu Xi and Contemporary New Confucians: Reflections on Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s Interpretations

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Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy

Part of the book series: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy ((DCCP,volume 13))

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Abstract

Scholars have different views on Zhu Xi’s moral philosophy based on their own interpretive approaches. This chapter suggests one particular approach to understand and reinterpret Zhu Xi’s core concepts related to moral practice. We focus, in particular, on clarifying the relationship between mind (xin 心) and moral principle(s) (li 理) in accordance with his original texts. On the basis of our interpretations of the original texts, we will address some controversial issues derived from various modern interpretative approaches to Zhu Xi’s studies. This chapter intends to focus our research on interpretations of Zhu Xi’s moral claims made by contemporary Confucian philosophers, Mou Zhongsan and Tang Junyi. One important reason is that their interpretations are constructed on the basis of precise philosophical analyses and the study of a great deal of texts. Another factor is because of their great influence on modern scholars of Sinophone and Anglophone academia in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Mou and Tang shared some perspectives on Zhu’s philosophy. However, their understandings of the core idea in Zhu’s moral theory, “how mind and moral principle(s) are related,” are quite different. The issues concerning “how mind and moral principle(s) are related” will be addressed in this chapter. We introduce and discuss the main interpretations of Mou and Tang regarding Zhu’s moral philosophy. Then, we will also provide a brief sketch of Cheng Yi’s 程頤 moral theory because of his great influence on the development of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Based on these discussions, we offer our conclusions that (1) Zhu Xi’s moral philosophy is the “Model of Priority in Reflecting on Moral Principle(s)” (zhulixingtai 主理型態); (2) The primary purpose of investigating moral principle(s) of things (gewu zhizhi 格物致知) is to accomplish a philosophically rational understanding of morality, which means that one has to elevate the “ordinary rational understanding of morality” (changzhi 常知) to a level of a “philosophically rational understanding of morality” (zhenzhi 真知); (3) Tang’s interpretations better conform to Zhu’s original claims.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Most of Mou’s students, such as Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚, Lee Shui Chuen 李瑞全, Lee Ming-huei 李明輝, and Lin Yueh-hui 林月惠, followed his interpretations of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. As a student of Mou, I (Yang Cho-hon 楊祖漢), generally agree with Mou, but I find that clarification of the relationship between mind and moral principle is worthy of reconsideration. My coauthor and I will discuss the difference between Mou’s interpretations and ours in Sects. 3 and 4.

  2. 2.

    We can see Mou’s discussion of Zhu Xi’s philosophy in Mou (1968–1969, vol. 1 and 2) and Mou (2000). With regard to Tang Junyi’s books, see Tang (1973, 1984, 1989).

  3. 3.

    In this chapter Jujing and qiongli have the meaning of stabilizing the mind in the state of calmness, attentiveness and reasonableness and investigating moral principle(s) of things respectively.

  4. 4.

    Zhu criticizes that: “Gao Zi does not understand thoroughly. If he did, he would appeal to his inward moral principles to make moral judgments” (Zhu 1986: [52] 1236).

  5. 5.

    This essay is included in the appendix of Tang (1973: [3]). The title of this essay is changed into “On Normative Principle and the Principle of Existence: Zhuzi on the Priority of the Principle over the Vital Force.”

  6. 6.

    Tang’s “reality” (zhenshi 真實) has the same meaning as Mou’s “ontological reality” (cunyoulun de shiyou 存有論的實有). From this we can see why Tang and Mou share the perspective that the meaning of the term, priority (xian 先) is a “metaphysical priority.”

  7. 7.

    When Zhu Xi discusses the relation between “elevating one’s own moral knowledge” (zhizhi 致知) and “purifying one’s own motivation” (chengyi 誠意), his concern centers on how to respond to the question of the “natural dialectic.” More explanation in details below.

  8. 8.

    We quote the translation from Daniel K. Gardner in italic (Gardner 2007: 8).

  9. 9.

    We appreciate and adopt most of professor Huang Yong’s suggestion and advice on this translation. We also provide Daniel K. Gardner’s translation as follows: “... the first step of instruction in the Great Learning teaches students that, encountering anything at all in the world, they must build on what they already know of principle and probe still deeper, until they reach its limit. Exerting themselves in this manner for a long time, they will one day suddenly become all penetrating; this being the case, the manifest and the hidden, the subtle and the obvious qualities of all things will all be known, and the mind, in its whole substance and vast operations, will be completely illuminated” (Gardner 2007: 8).

  10. 10.

    Professor Chen Lai also claims that mind possesses inward moral principle(s) (Chen 1990: 190–91).

  11. 11.

    This is similar to the philosophical statements in the Mencius: “the distinction between righteousness and profit” (yi–li zhi bian 義利之辨) or “that moral principle is the internal standard of moral judgment” (yi-nei 義內) (Zhu 1983: 201–2, 326–27).

  12. 12.

    A possible and reasonable justification for translating mingde as “conscience” (liangxin良心) can be found in the following text: “‘[N]o child does not know how to love his/her parents; as he/she matures, none does not know how to reverence his elder siblings.’ This is conscience. Conscience is mingde” (Zhu 1986: [14] 269).

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Yang, Ch., Lai, Kc. (2020). Zhu Xi and Contemporary New Confucians: Reflections on Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s Interpretations. In: Ng, Kc., Huang, Y. (eds) Dao Companion to ZHUXi’s Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29175-4_11

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