Abstract
This chapter gives a brief account of the formation and some basic features of the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, i.e., the hetuvidyā/yin ming tradition. This tradition is mainly established by Xuanzang (602–664 CE) and his disciples through the translation of the Nyāyapraveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500–560 CE) and the translation of the Nyāyamukha of Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE). It is later spread to Korea and Japan and flourished there. As a working hypothesis, the hetuvidyā tradition can be regarded as mainly a tradition following the Indian interpretation of Dignāga before Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 CE). Argument constitutes the foremost concern of the hetuvidyā tradition. According to this tradition, the basic idea of a three-membered argument is that arguments should be based on what both sides in debate have already agreed. One arrives at a piece of new knowledge through inference actually by means of extending what has already been known to him. It is deemed that one cannot argue in a vacuum.
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Notes
- 1.
As a convention of this chapter, Sanskrit terms are given in brackets and followed by their usual Chinese translation in hetuvidyā literature. Sanskrit words hypothetically restored from Chinese begin with an asterisk (∗).
- 2.
The definition of hetuvidyā in YBh is: hetuvidyā katamā. parīkṣārthena yad vidyamānaṃ vastu. (Yaita 2005: 98, HV 0) 云何因明處?謂於觀察義中諸所有事 (T30, no. 1579, 356a11–12) “What is hetuvidyā? [It treats] whatever existent factors related to the aim of [critical] examination.” The definition of hetuvidyā/yin ming in Chinese literature is more complicated, see Tang 2015: 260–273.
- 3.
Chen na 陳那 is the shortened form of chen na jia 陳那迦 (ZYS 4.27a), the latter being a transcription of the Sanskrit diṅ-nā-ga (another pronunciation of dignāga according to Sanskrit internal Sandhi rules). The ideogram 陳, pronounced chén in modern Mandarin, was pronounced /ȡ’i̭ěn / around 600 CE in Chang’an 長安 (Karlgren 1957: 106–107, 陳 373a). The current Min-nan dialect 閩南語 in southern Fujian province of China and in Taiwan still preserves a similar pronunciation of 陳, which also begins with a voiced dental. I owe this footnote to Dr. Kejun Yu.
- 4.
For Dignāga’s career and the sequence of his works, see Frauwallner 1959.
- 5.
They were translated in 472 and 550 respectively, see Lü 1980: 84.
- 6.
Luo 1981 argues that the date of Xuanzang’s translation of NMu should be 655 but not 649. We await further study on this issue.
- 7.
See Song gao seng zhuan 宋高僧傳, T50, no. 2061, 725c24–726a1; cf. Zheng 2007: 156–159, 2010: 4–7.
- 8.
However, YMDS was not completed during Kuiji’s lifetime. The remaining part, about one sixth, was written by his disciple Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714 CE) after his death.
- 9.
A summary of different views between these two traditions on Yogācāra philosophy and hetuvidyā is the Hossō tōmyō ki 法相燈明記, T71, no. 2310.
- 10.
All the above calculations are based on the list in Takemura 2011: 356–346.
- 11.
- 12.
By inference we mean nowadays “a process of linking propositions by affirming one proposition on the basis of one or more other propositions.” By argument we mean “a structured group of propositions, reflecting an inference” (Copi and Cohen 2005: 7). The working of an inference does not necessitate the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An inference is only a process of pure thinking, regardless of whether or not it is expressed linguistically. However, the working of an argument necessitates the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An argument should spell out an inference in certain linguistic forms which are suitable to be understood by others.
- 13.
The same idea has already been expressed by Dignāga in PS, see Potter 2003: 343. Thanks to Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans for explaining this idea to me.
- 14.
Yi 義 in this sense, translated as “attribute,” is in contrast with ti 體 “entity.” The ti 體/yi 義 distinction, as well as the distinction between property-possessor (dharmin, you fa 有法) and property (dharma, fa 法), corresponds to the subject/predicate distinction today. In addition, yi 義, as well as the corresponding Sanskrit artha, has many other meanings like “meaning,” “goal” and “object” etc.
- 15.
In the Sanskrit original and its Chinese counterpart, the reason-statement is expressed only by means of an ablative form of the reason-property. The subject of the reason-statement is always omitted. Therefore we have “because of being produced” instead of “because sound is produced” in Fig. 22.1.
- 16.
See NP 3.2.1(4): dravyam ākāśaṃ guṇāśrayatvād ity ākāśāsattvavādinaṃ praty āśrayāsiddhaḥ || 虚空實有, 德所依故, 對無空論, 所依不成。“Ether is a substance because [ether] is a substratum of qualities. [When the argument is spoken] to an upholder of the non-existence of ether, the substratum (āśraya, i.e., subject) is not established.” And NP 3.2.1(1): śabdānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ || 如成立聲為無常等, 若言是眼所見性故, 兩俱不成。“When [one] is to prove that sound is impermanent, [the reason] ‘because [sound] is visible’ is not established for both (ubhayāsiddha).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 123–124. See also NMu 2.3; Tucci 1930: 14. NP 3.2.1(4) demands that (∃x)Px should be in place for the reason-statement to hold. Namely, there should be something which instantiates the subject (P) of the reason-statement so as to ensure the “substratum” to be “established.” NP 3.2.1(1) demands that (∃x)(Px ∧ Hx) should be in place for the reason-statement to hold. Namely, there should be something which instantiates not only the subject (P) but also the predicate (H) of the reason-statement. I owe this clarification to discussion with Prof. Yiu-ming Fung.
- 17.
ZYS 1.15b:「所作」兩處俱成就…「無常」瓶成、聲不成。“Producedness is established with regard to both loci [i.e., the sound and a pot]. … Impermanence is established with regard to a pot while not established with regard to sound.” YMDS 129; 100a6–7 ad NMu 2.2: 故知因、喻必須極成。“Hence, we know the reason and the example should be well established.”
- 18.
This is the case even for those who do not recognize the existence of ether, since in Buddhist logic, a non-existent entity is regarded as devoid of any property, let alone producedness or impermanence. See NMu 5.1.
- 19.
- 20.
This can be seen when we take into consideration the NP list of faults in violation of the trairūpya formulae, esp. NP 3.2.1 and 3.2.2(6).
- 21.
In what follows we make reference to the argument that “sound is impermanent because of being produced” as a paradigm (see Fig. 22.1), when there is no special indication.
- 22.
NMu 3.3: 若爾, 同品應亦名宗。不然, 別處說所成故。因必無異, 方成比量, 故不相似。“[Objection:] If so, sapakṣa should be also called pakṣa. [Reply:] This is incorrect, because [a property] is said to be what is to be established/proved (sādhya, suo cheng 所成) with regard to cases other than [sapakṣa, while with regard to sapakṣa, the same property is said to be what has already been established]. [In comparison,] for an inference to be possible, there cannot be any difference of a [logical] reason [when it resides in pakṣa and when it resides in sapakṣa]. Therefore, there is no resemblance [between the property which is to be proved and the property which is used to be a logical reason].” Cf. Tucci 1930: 26; Katsura [2]: 126–128; and Katsura 2004: 122–123. YZMS 2.18b on this passage: 謂聲望瓶是瓶家別處, 於此別處成立無常。其聲上無常, 由敵論人不許是無常, 今以因成立, 即說聲上無常為所成立。…其瓶上無常, 立、敵先成共許, 不須成立。既不須成立, 何名所成?“That is to say, sound is a case other than a pot when it is compared with a pot. One is to establish impermanence in this other case. As to the impermanence of sound, since the opponent does not accept that [sound] is impermanent, now [the proponent] is to establish it by means of a [logical] reason. In this sense we say that the impermanence of sound is what is to be established (sādhya). … As to the impermanence of a pot, since both the proponent and the opponent have already accepted [that a pot is impermanent], there is no need to establish [it again]. Since there is no need to establish [it again], how can it [i.e., the impermanence of a pot] be called what is to be established?” Cf. YMDS 200; 104b6–13.
- 23.
For the “tripartitionism” of the universe of discourse in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist logic, see Hayes 1988: 113–118; Tillemans 1990, 2004; Oetke 1994: 33–51; Katsura 2004; and Hugon 2004. For the “tripartitionism” in Chinese Buddhist logic, see Chen 1997: 70–76; Zheng 1996: 48–50; Franco 2004: 207–211; and Zheng 2015: 155–163. In addition, although qualifications like “well established,” “accepted” and the like are of an epistemic nature, I avoid using epistemic logic throughout this chapter, for this kind of treatment will invite more problems. For pioneering studies in this direction, see Oetke 1994: 77–113.
- 24.
Here, being a pervading one means pervading the pakṣa. There are four possible combinations of zong fa and bian, i.e., 有宗法而非遍, 有是遍亦宗法, 有非遍非宗法, and 是遍非宗法 (being a pervading one but not a property of the subject). The last one does not exist according to Kuiji. For Kuiji’s complete discussion, see YMDS 186–193; 103a28–c10. For similar discussions, see ZYS 1.14a–15a, and IRMS 264a29–265a19.
- 25.
Not surprisingly, about Dignāga’s pakṣadharma (zong fa) without qualifications like pervasively, a logician may arrive at the same conclusion as what is expounded in the Chinese tradition. See Hayes 1988: 122, “PH>0 & P~H=0.”
- 26.
See NB 2.5: liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva, “The [inferential] sign (liṅga = hetu) is universally (eva) present in the subject of inference.”
- 27.
This proposition should be also restricted to the realm of all the things outside of the pakṣa, and implies an existential claim. We skip all these restrictions here in order to make the point clear.
- 28.
See YMDS 205; 104c19–21: 「同品有、異品非有」, 如勝論師立「聲無常, 所作性故, 喻如瓶等」。無常之宗, 空為異品。所作性因, 於同品有, 於異品無。“With regard to [the reason’s being] present in [all the] similar instances and absent from [all the] dissimilar instances, [an argument, as an example for this scenario, is] like: A Vaiśeṣika (sheng lun shi 勝論師) sets forth that sound is impermanent, because of being produced, for example, like a pot, etc. [Here,] the subject (zong 宗 = pakṣa), [which is now claimed to be] impermanent, has ether as a dissimilar instance. The reason, i.e., ‘being produced,’ is present in [all the] similar instances and absent from [all the] dissimilar instances.” And YMDS 207; 105a10–14: 「同品有非有、異品非有」, 如勝論師立「内聲無常, 勤勇無間所發性故, 喻若電、瓶」。此無常宗, 空為異喻。勤勇之因, 於同品瓶等上有、電等上無, 異品空中一向非有。“With regard to [the reason’s being] present in [some of the similar instances] and absent from [the other] similar instances and [being] absent from [all the] dissimilar instances, [an argument, as an example for this scenario, is] like: A Vaiśeṣika sets forth that the internal sound (nei sheng 内聲, i.e., the sound of living creature) is impermanent, because of resulting immediately from effort, for example, like lightning and a pot. [Here,] the subject, [which is now claimed to be] impermanent, has ether as a negative example [i.e., dissimilar instance]. The reason, i.e., ‘[resulting immediately from] effort,’ is present in [some of the] similar instances [like] a pot, etc., and absent from [the other similar instances like] lightning, etc., and is absolutely absent from [all the] dissimilar instances [like] ether.” Cf. NP 2.2 and Tang 2015: 311–319.
- 29.
See YMDS 207; 105a7–10: 「同品有非有、異品有」, 如聲論師立「聲非勤勇無間所發, 無常性故, 喻若電、空」。此非勤宗, 瓶為異喻。無常性因, 於同品電上有, 空上非有, 異品瓶中一向是有。“With regard to [the reason’s being] present in [some of the similar instances] and absent from [the other] similar instances and [being] present in [all the] dissimilar instances, [an argument, as an example for this scenario, is] like: A Śābdika (sheng lun shi 聲論師, i.e., a propounder of the permanence of sound) sets forth that sound does not result immediately from effort, because of being impermanent, for example, like lightning and ether. [Here,] the subject, [which is now claimed to] not [result immediately from] effort, has a pot as a negative example [i.e., dissimilar instance]. The reason, i.e., “being impermanent,” is present in [some of the] similar instances [like] lightning, and absent from [the other similar instances like] ether, and is absolutely present in [all the] dissimilar instances [like] a pot.” And YMDS 207; 105a14–18: 「同品有非有、異品有非有」, 如聲論師對勝論師立「聲為常, 無質礙故, 喻若極微及大虚空」。此中常宗, 以瓶、樂等而為異喻。無質礙因, 於其同品虚空上有、極微上無, 亦於異品瓶等上無、樂受等有。“With regard to [the reason’s being] present in [some of the similar instances] and absent from [the other] similar instances, and [being] present in [some of the dissimilar instances] and absent from [the other] dissimilar instances, [an argument, as an example for this scenario, is] like: A Śābdika, against a Vaiśeṣika, sets forth that sound is permanent, because of being incorporeal (amūrta, wu zhi ai 無質礙), for example, like atom and ether. Here, the subject, [which is now claimed to be] permanent, has a pot, [the feeling of] happiness, etc. as negative examples [i.e., dissimilar instances]. The reason, “being incorporeal,” is present in [some of] its similar instances [like] ether, and absent from [the other similar instances like] atom, and is absent from [some of its] dissimilar instances [like] a pot, etc., and present in [the other dissimilar instances like] the feeling of happiness, etc.” Cf. NP 3.2.2(3), NP 3.2.2(5) and Tang 2015: 311–319.
- 30.
For similar discussion, see ZYS 1.16a: 初相為主, 正為能立。藉伴助成, 故須第二。雖有主伴, 其濫未除, 故須第三異品無相。“The first characteristic is the chief one [among the three characteristics, because it corresponds to the expression of the reason. The reason] is the major means of proof. [However, the reason cannot complete the argument only by means of itself. Some evidence other than the subject, showing the co-occurrence of the reason and the inferable, should be] used to accompany [with the reason]. Therefore, the second [characteristic] is necessary so far as helping [the reason] complete the argument. [Furthermore,] although the chief and the accompanying [characteristics] are [fulfilled], the overflow [of the reason from the sapakṣa realm] has not been eliminated. Therefore, the third characteristic, i.e., [the reason’s] absence from vipakṣa, is necessary.” Cf. Tang 2015: 323–336, where the same conclusion is obtained from a different angle. However, what is exactly meant by Dignāga himself with regard to the second condition, esp. whether the S2(1) version or the S2(2) version was actually meant by him, is still a difficult problem. See Oetke 1994: 55–73, Katsura 2000 and Lasic 2009. My conclusion about the second condition, therefore, concerns only what was thought by hetuvidyā scholars, and is valid only to this extent.
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Tang, M. (2020). Yin Ming 因明 in Chinese Buddhism. In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_22
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