Abstract
In the literature of Chinese philosophical logic, there are at least four representative interpretations and analyses of the logical and philosophical thinking in the Gongsun Longzi. These four different interpretations are: Hu Shih’s 胡適 “description-theoretical interpretation,” Fung Yu-lan’s 馮友蘭 “Platonic realistic interpretation,” Janusz Chmielewski’s “set-theoretical interpretation,” and Chad Hansen’s “nominalistic interpretation” which is based on his mass-noun hypothesis. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that all these interpretations are not in accordance with the text and also not coherent and comprehensive in interpretation. Moreover, I will use the first-order predicate logic to analyse the logical structure of the philosophical thinking in the text, especially in the Discourse on White-Horse, and explain its philosophical implication.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Why the parallelism in “A thief is a man; to kill a thief is not to kill a man” cannot be subsumed under the same argument form (“A is B; CA is CB”) as that in “A white horse is a horse; to ride a white horse is to ride a horse”? Hansen’s answer is that: the consequent of the former example should be interpreted as conveying different i [yi 意] intentions and, thus, as used in an intensional or opaque context. He thinks this difference demonstrates that Later Mohists reject the inference rule. (Hansen 1983: 132–3 and 1992: 250–1) I don’t think Hansen is right to identify the sentence “A thief is a man” as an equation or identity sentence (Hansen 1983: 187 and 1992: 256) and to treat the former example as a counterexample of the parallel reasoning. I think there is no real problem about the failure of substitution between “to kill a thief” and “to killing a man” in the so-called intensional context and no real problem of referential opacity. Because the relevant sentence is not an equation. Besides, as we know, a sentence puts a predicate or other term in an intensional context if any other predicate or term with the same extension cannot be substituted without the possibility of changing the truth value. However, a sentence used in an (s-) intensional context is not necessarily related to (t-) intention. As indicated by John Searle, “These are often confused, even by professional philosophers.” (Searle 2004: 174–5) So the above “thief” example is not a real counterexample of the parallel reasoning. My argument against Hansen’s view can be found in (Fung 2012: § II: 334–41).
- 2.
The theoretical characteristics of the descriptional theory of reference and those of the direct theory of reference are discussed in detail in (Salmon 1982: 9–22).
- 3.
Here, “one” and “two” are used as symbols to signify a name of universal or single (non-fixing) entity and a name of particular or compound (fixing) entity, respectively. For example, “white” and “horse” are used by Gongsun Long as single names for different single (non-fixing) entities while “white-horse” and “white-stone” are used as compound names for different compound (fixing) entities.
- 4.
To avoid confusion, I suggest to formulate (6) as (X̂)Φ′X . (Ŷ)Φ Y = 0 rather than (X̂)Φ′X . (X̂)Φ X = 0.
- 5.
Again, to avoid confusion, I suggest to formulate (3) as (X̂)Ψ X . (Ŷ)Φ Y = 0 rather than (X̂)Ψ X . (X̂)Φ X = 0.
- 6.
It can be simplified as: \( \left(\forall \mathrm{x}\right)\left(\forall \mathrm{y}\right)\left[\sim \left(\mathrm{Fx}\to \mathrm{Gy}\right)\bullet \sim \left(\mathrm{Gy}\to \mathrm{Fx}\right)\right]\ \mathrm{or}\ \left(\forall \mathrm{x}\right)\left(\forall \mathrm{y}\right)\left[\left(\mathrm{Fx}\bullet \sim \mathrm{Gy}\right)\bullet \left(\mathrm{Gy}\bullet \sim \mathrm{Fx}\right)\right] \).
- 7.
According to the text, if we follow Hansen’s formulation, (3) should be formulated as “C is ~B,” not “B is ~C” as made by Hansen.
- 8.
Hansen treats all sentences of the form “XY yeh [ye 也]” as equations. He says, “I use equation as a grammatical form. But it could be argued that sentences of this type are indeed equations and not classic subject-predicate assertions. The second term would be regarded as implicitly quantified existentially so that the logical form would be ‘horse is identical with some animal.’ Or, to capture the part-whole structure of the mass-stuff ontology, ‘horse is identical with part of animal.’ I suspect that, contrary to Frege, English nominal predications are also equations.” (Hansen 1983: 187). In dealing with Gongsun Long’s argument of “searching horse” (qiu ma 求馬), Hansen also treats the sentences of the argument as equations. He regards the formal structure of the argument (∗ A is B; A is not-C; therefore B is not-C) (∗ Yellow horse is [identical with part of] horse; yellow horse is not [identical with part of] white horse; therefore white horse is not [identical with part of] horse.) as “a simple and common deductive fallacy.” (Hansen 1983: 161) I think this treatment is not right. Let’s put aside his inaccurate translation, Hansen’s treatment is certainly inconsistent with other places in the text. For example, Gongsun Long asserts that, “if white horse is horse, the search for both should be the same.” If we follow Hansen to treat the antecedent as “∗ white horse = (part of) horse,” the consequent cannot be obtained. But if we treat the antecedent as “white horse is identical with horse,” the consequent can be maintained with a good sense. In other words, if we treat the sentence “baima nai ma ye” (白馬乃馬也) as an identity statement (not as “∗ white horse = (part of) horse,” but as “white horse is identical with horse”) and treat the sentence about “qiu ma” as predicating expressions, we can interpret it as a sound argument with an application of Leibniz’s law. (求馬, 黃、黑馬皆可致。求白馬, 黃、黑馬不可致。使白馬乃馬也, 是所求一也, 所求一者, 白者不異馬也。) Besides, if we follow Hansen to treat the sentence “someone who searches horse will be just as satisfied with yellow-horse (or black-horse)” as the equation of terms – “yellow horse (or black horse) is [identical with part of] horse,” it would have the following troubles: (1) If Gongsun Long uses the so-called “one-name-one-thing” principle as assigned to him by Hansen, he should not assume this equation. (2) If Gongsun Long treats yellow horse, white horse, black horse, etc., like ox-horse, as mass-sum rather than mass product, as interpreted by Hansen, he has no point to conclude that “therefore white horse is not [identical with part of] horse.”
- 9.
Here, premise (1’) is an instance of Leibniz’s Law: (∀x)(∀y)[(x = y) → (Fx↔Fy)].
- 10.
Yiu-ming Fung, Language, Truth and Logic in Ancient China, chapter seven (forthcoming).
- 11.
Yiu-ming Fung, Language, Truth and Logic in Ancient China, chapter seven (forthcoming).
References
Chmielewski, Janusz. 2009. Language and Logic in Ancient China. Warszawa: Komitet Nauk Orientalistycznych PAN.
Fung, Yiu-ming. 2009. “School of Names.” In Bo Mou, ed., History of Chinese Philosophy (164–188). London and New York: Routledge.
Fung, Yiu-ming. 2012. “A Logical Perspective on the Parallelism in Later Moism.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39.3: 333–50.
Fung, Yiu-ming. forthcoming. Language, Truth and Logic in Ancient China, chapter seven.
Fung, Yulan. 1948. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. London: Collier-Macmillan Publisher.
Fung, Yulan. 1961. A History of Chinese Philosophy (中國哲學史). Hong Kong: Pacific Book Company.
Hansen, Chad. 1983. Language and Logic in Ancient China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hansen, Chad. 1992. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hearne, J. W. 1980. Classical Chinese as an Instrument of Deduction (Dissertation). University of California Riverside.
Hu, Shih. 1922. The Development of the Logical Thought in Ancient China. Shanghai: The Oriental Book Company.
Hu, Shih. 1997. An Outline History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. I (中國哲學史大綱卷). Shanghai: Ancient Books Publishing House.
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Needham, Joseph. 1956. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salmon, Nathan. 1982. Reference and Essence. Basil Blackwell: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John. 2004. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wang, Rongpei and Hong, Wang (translation). 2006. Mozi. Hunan People’s Publishing House.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fung, Ym. (2020). Logical Thinking in the Gongsun Longzi. In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_17
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29031-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29033-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)