Abstract
The problems of tong 同 (sameness or similarity) and yi 異 (difference or dissimilarity) between things or events, names or terms, are one of the main concerns in ancient Chinese philosophy of language and logic. Among the different uses and senses of these two notions, one of them used in a logical context plays an important role in argumentation. That is related to the sameness and difference of lei 類 (class or kind). In this chapter, I will argue that, ancient Chinese thinkers did use lei in a logical context as a concept of class rather than kind if the latter is defined by similarity only. I will also argue that, even though lei can be interpreted as kind, the notion of kind is defined or explained by most influential Western philosophers as class.
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Notes
- 1.
Most of the Chinese quotations from ancient texts can be found in http://ctext.org of Chinese Text Project, edited by Dr. Donald Sturgeon. Here, most of the English quotations of the Mozi are based on my own translation. Other translations can be found in Ian Johnston 2010 and A. C. Graham 1978.
- 2.
In the chapter “Da-qu” 大取 (Choosing the Greater) of the Mozi, there are similar distinctions with minor difference about the conceptions of tong and yi. It says that:
智與意異。重同, 具[俱]同, 連同, 同類之同, 同名之同; 丘[區]同, 鮒[附]同, 是之同, 然之同, 同根之同。有非之異, 有不然之異。有其異也, 為其同也, 為其同也異。(大取:22) (Refer to http://ctext.org/mozi/daqu)
[Objective] knowing and [subjective] speculating are different. [In regard to tong, there are:] the sameness in terms of duplication [identity or equivalence], the sameness in terms of joining together, the sameness in terms of connecting units of a whole, the sameness in terms of [two things belonging to] the same class, the sameness in terms of [two things with] the same name, the sameness in terms of the same region, the sameness in terms of [two things with] the same attribute, the sameness in terms of [two sentences of] the same assertive value, the sameness in terms of [two descriptions of] the same case, and the sameness in terms of [two things of] the same root. [In regard to yi,] there is the difference in terms of [different senses of] negation, there is the difference in terms of [different senses of] being not the case, there is difference in terms of [two things] being the same but their sameness is different. [For example, two things can be identified as the same in terms of their being an animal but they are different animals, say, a dog and a cat.]” (My translation and explication)
- 3.
Some of the emendations of this passage are based on Wu Feibai 伍非百, 1983: 175-6. See also Ian Johnston 2010: 550-1.
- 4.
Parallel inference is a kind of reasoning with the form “A is B; CA is CB.” In Later Mohism, it is called “mou” 侔, meaning parallelism. Detailed discussion can be found in Chaps. 8, 14 and 16 of this volume.
- 5.
Some concrete examples of this kind are: “Which is longer, a piece of wood or a night? Which do you have more of, knowledge or grain? Which is the most valuable, aristocratic rank, one’s own parents, right conduct, a price? ….” (木與夜孰長?智與粟孰多?爵、親、行、賈四者孰貴?…) (Explanation B6) (Johnston 2010: 474-5 or Graham 1978: 357) Other incomparable examples can be found in Canon and Explanation B2. (Johnston 2010: 476-7 or Graham 1978: 349)
- 6.
It is similar to the Western logicians in the Medieval Age: some of them use numbers as propositional variables (“the first,” “the second,” …), some others replace numbers with demonstratives (“this” and “that) as a kind of symbols. See Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods1984: 4.
- 7.
The explanation of the ideas of “zhi” and “non-fixing white” can be found in Fung 2020.
- 8.
Here Gongsun Long’s example of “by saying” and “by counting” is used to illustrate that some features or characteristics are known in a subjective way and some other are known in an objective way.
- 9.
For example, the argument: “A thief is a man; to love a thief is not to love a man.” (Mozi, Xiao-qu (Choosing the Lesser) 6) (盜[人], 人也; 愛盜, 非愛人也。) (墨子:小取) is one of the anomalies of parallelism [Form II] which is discussed in Chap. 18 of this book.
- 10.
In philosophy of language, a linguistic context in which a sub-sentential expression e appears is called extensional if and only if e can be replaced by an expression with the same referent and necessarily preserve truth-value. In opposition to extensional contexts are intensional contexts, where synonymous terms cannot be substituted in without potentially compromising the truth-value. Sentences with “believe-that” or “know-that” clause are typically regarded as in the intensional context. For example, although Clark is the superman, the sentence “Mary believes that the superman is strong” can be true while the sentence “Mary believes that Clark is strong” can be false. Here, “Clark” and “the superman” are co-extensive; but the rule of substitution applied to these two terms cannot preserve truth-value.
- 11.
Quine does not accept intensionalist entities and thus does not treat properties or attributes as abstract entities or universals, but he doesn’t refute that, in some cases, the words of properties or attributes in a sentence can be used as being “true of” individuals. See Quine1953:10.
- 12.
Goodman has argued that in order to formulate an adequate theory about inductive inferences one must distinguish between projectible predicates like “raven” and “green,” which are well suited for these inferences, and non-projectible predicates like “non-raven”, “raven or fire” and “grue” which do not have this property (Goodman 1946, 1983). This raises the problem of characterizing “generally and rigorously” the difference between these predicates (Goodman 1946: 383).
- 13.
Quine thinks that in order to account for our inductive inferences we need the concept of kind, because we have to distinguish between inductive inferences about classes such as “raven,” which are supposed to be kinds, and inductive inferences about classes such as “non-raven,” which are not.
- 14.
The distinction between open sentence and closed sentence is that: at least one variable in the former is free, that is, without being constrained by a quantifier while all the variables in the latter are bound, that is, with a quantifier to constrain each variable.
- 15.
A similar example is: “The ghost-soul of a man is not a man; the ghost-soul of your elder brother is your elder brother.” (Mozi, Xiao-qu 9) (人之鬼, 非人也; 兄之鬼, 兄也。) (墨子:小取 9)
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Fung, Ym. (2020). Sameness (Tong 同) and Difference (Yi 異). In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_13
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