Abstract
Standard economics of crime is at bay in the face of such a phenomenon as criminal networks operating in online sports betting-related match-fixing. Another economic model is elaborated on which proceeds with inter-acting the downstream sports betting market with an upstream illegal match-fixing market which emerges under given preconditions. In the light of this more complex model are discussed different tools to combat online sports betting-related match-fixing: surveillance and monitoring of online sports betting, international initiatives to save sport integrity, public regulation of domestic online sports betting (prohibition, state monopoly, criminalisation, legalisation, and liberalisation), property rights and privatisation of sporting outcomes, and international taxation of online sports betting (a Sportbet-Tobin tax).
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- 1.
We are thankful to the journal Systems for the permission to re-publish the model here.
- 2.
However in the current state of market surveillance, bookmakers and betting operators do not know exactly either ex ante or ex post if a match is fixed in the upstream market, except if they participate themselves into the fix, an assumption which is not retained here.
- 3.
Indeed, some non-involved punters can, just by chance but not very often, bet on the fixed outcome but they are very few and this would not change the whole model.
- 4.
Which does not necessarily reach a simultaneous equilibrium on both markets when there are fixes (F > 0).
- 5.
With reasoning which de facto is in tune with the above model (in 2.1.2).
- 6.
Americans wager $150 billion annually in the black market, as estimated by the American Gaming Association, and it may largely remain in the dark in a foreseeable future.
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Andreff, W. (2019). Challenging Standard Economics and Policies. In: An Economic Roadmap to the Dark Side of Sport. Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28615-6_2
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