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Corruption in Sport Governing Bodies

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An Economic Roadmap to the Dark Side of Sport

Part of the book series: Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics ((PAPISE))

Abstract

This chapter covers corruption cases where corruptors or corruptees are executive members of sport governing bodies. They emerge when awarding mega-sporting events or appointing someone to a significant position in a sport governing body. Information is covered and reminded as regard the IOC and the Olympics, FIFA and the soccer World Cup and other sport governing bodies (IAAF, CPBL). All cases reveal an issue of deficient governance which requires reforms to combat more efficiently corruption in sport.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The emergence of corruption is more or less facilitated depending on the mode of allocation (awarding) of an international mega-sporting event. Usual awarding through an auction or an auction-like process between applicant cities (countries) not only fuels a winner’s curse and subsequent cost overruns (Andreff 2012, 2014, 2016) but also opens many opportunities for bribing the votes or decisions of those in charge of awarding the event. Horne (2016) finds in sport corruption a strong sign of cronyism which is correct though a slightly narrow view of market economies evolving into a greed-led system (Andreff 2013, 2019) including the sports industry.

  2. 2.

    Zimbalist (2016) points at other opportunities of corruption such as: (a) the revenues derived by FIFA and the IOC from awarding mega-sporting events are partly used to defray high executive salaries (and emoluments); and (b) the capture of the host city by economic interests (construction and insurance companies, architectural firms, media companies, investment bankers, lawyers, hotels and restaurants) that hijack the local organising committee and divert public funding.

  3. 3.

    IOC members are recruited on a co-opting basis. They currently are 102, plus 41 honorary members and two honour members; Jacques Rogge is the honorary president. They are committed to elect the Games hosting cities. The IOC Executive Committee or Board gathers the IOC president (currently Thomas Bach), four deputy-presidents and ten other members all elected by secret ballot. The Board (EC) is in charge of the IOC administration.

  4. 4.

    An update on cost overruns witnessed in all Summer and Winter Games from 2000 to 2008 is available in Preuss et al. (2019).

  5. 5.

    Such is the solution adopted in France for the 2024 Paris Olympics: The Cour des Comptes (the public audit of all public expenditures in France) was appointed in 2018 to be in charge of auditing all expenditures and revenues associated with hosting the 2024 Games, every year until 2024.

  6. 6.

    Meanwhile Calgary resigned in December 2018.

  7. 7.

    Since then 25 criminal inquiries are conducted by the Swiss Ministry for Justice.

  8. 8.

    Platini who has been cleared meanwhile by the Swiss justice, has introduced a case against the FIFA staff at the French PNF in October 2018 for slanderous denunciation; at the time of writing Sepp Blatter, Domenico Scala, the former president of the Ethics Committee, and Marco Villiger, the former head of the FIFA judicial department are suspected of denunciation.

  9. 9.

    In January 2016, Balakhnichev was banned for life by the IAAF Ethics Committee due to his involvement in a doping scandal (Volume 3).

  10. 10.

    Even if the relationship between a strong governance structure and good management does not appear to be that straightforward when observed in team sports leagues (Andreff 2015).

  11. 11.

    Having a compatriot on the judging panel yields both a higher score from the compatriot judge and higher scores from other judges relative to the scores they give the same competitors when they do not have a compatriot judge (Zitzewitz 2006).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

    Wladimir Andreff

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  1. Wladimir Andreff
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Andreff, W. (2019). Corruption in Sport Governing Bodies. In: An Economic Roadmap to the Dark Side of Sport. Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28479-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28479-4_3

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