Abstract
In order to gain a better understanding of philosophical dialogues as critical discussions, this paper focuses on the evaluative strategies that philosophers use in their argumentation, and especially in the charge of committing a fallacy. In order to illustrate some problems with the evaluation of philosophical arguments, the charge of committing a genetic fallacy is analyzed. It is argued that the charge of committing such fallacy could be better understood as a case of strategic maneuvering. Some historical evidence is presented in favor of this grasp by revisiting the controversy given rise to over the genetic fallacy around the nineteen fifties and sixties. An account of charging the other party of committing a genetic fallacy as strategic maneuvering is presented, and some ways in which such maneuver could derail are analyzed. To conclude, some general remarks are made regarding the use of (certain) fallacies in philosophical controversies and some valuable consequences of considering philosophical arguments as strategic maneuvering are stated.
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Notes
- 1.
In 1912, speaking about Wittgenstein, Russell writes: “I told him he ought not simply to state what he thinks true, but to give arguments for it, but he said arguments spoil its beauty, and that he would feel as if he was dirtying a flower with muddy hands. … I told him I hadn’t the heart to say anything against that, and that he had better acquire a slave to state the arguments” (Monk, 1996, p. 264).
- 2.
In the history of philosophical ethics, another possibility was considered, namely, the consequences. However, the consideration of consequences as a relevant item in assessing moral principles was also dismissed as a fallacy, as an ad consequentiam fallacy (see Walton, 1999).
- 3.
The idea of effectiveness is however broader than the idea of persuasiveness: “the term effectiveness is not exclusively applicable to argumentative moves made in the argumentation stage (as at least the term persuasiveness is), but also to argumentative moves made in the other dialectical discussion stages (which are not aimed directly at gaining acceptance of a standpoint)” (van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2012, pp. 51–52)
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López, F.E. (2020). Argument Evaluation in Philosophy: Fallacies as Strategic Maneuvering. In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) From Argument Schemes to Argumentative Relations in the Wild. Argumentation Library, vol 35. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28367-4_5
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