Abstract
This chapter is divided into two parts: Environmental “Takings” of Private Water Rights and The Case for Water Privatization. In “Takings” we make the following points: Government regulation of private property for a public purpose like protection of species under the Endangered Species Act raises important constitutional questions concerning whether a compensable “taking” of private property has resulted. This section discusses the property and liberty interests that arise when the Endangered Species Act is used as a reason for the government to breach a contract to provide water to farmers. It concludes by suggesting that the Fifth Amendment “Takings Clause” mandates that we should all share in the costs associated with a taking of private water rights for environmental purposes by the government. The case for Water Privatization makes the more general philosophical point that the public interest and the cause of justice would be enhanced if all bodies of water were transferred from the public to the private sector. Then, among other benefits, there would be no need for all of to share in the costs associated with a taking of private water rights for environmental purposes by the government; there would be no need for such takings in the first place.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See generally, Mort Rosenbum, As All Eyes Turn to the Power Crunch, a Worse Crises Looms: Water, www.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGA4ZWIKNMC.html (Last visited Jan. 21, 2002). Rosenbum contends that the planet has no more water than it did a millennia ago. But with today’s rocketing growth, conflicting needs of farms, cities, industry, recreation, and government wetlands protection, there exists the potential for bitter water wars. But where have these wars happened? Nowhere, according to Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist, 149 (2001). He says the water problem is logistical rather than a shortage.
- 2.
See, Michael Kelly, Evicted by Environmentalists, Washington Post, July 11, 2001, at A19, Col. 1. Mr. Kelly points out that all the battles over the Endangered Species Act are episodes in a continuing war of values fundamental to the nation. This war is best understood as taking place between increasingly poor and powerless rural voters and those voters in increasingly rich and powerful urban-suburban areas. Because few people are still in direct contact, and competition with nature, and directly affected by environmental decisions, the balance of power has shifted away from the rural residents who are today’s stewards of the land, to the urban voters.
- 3.
See, Kimberley L. Strassel, Thoreau the Bums Out: Oregon’s Farmers Embrace Civil Disobedience, Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2001, at A21, Col. 4.
- 4.
It has come to the point in the west where “endangered species protection is the most significant factor in water shortages,” says Janet Raloff, Endangered Species Are Keeping Some Landowners Thirsty, Science News, Vol. 160, No. 22, Dec. 1, 2001, p. 344.
- 5.
The leftists want capitalists and the rich to suffer for the sake of the poor and the greens want property owners to suffer, “for the sake of lower animals and inanimate nature,” states George Reisman, Capitalism: a treatise on economics, 102, Jameson Books, 1996.
- 6.
For this proposition, See generally, the editorial, Taking Lake Tahoe, Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2002, at p. B6, where the editors articulate the constitutionally suspect position that the determination to compensate landowners should be a policy judgment, not a constitutional command. But when does a policy judgment made by a government agency trump the Constitution? The Post’s proposition is nonsense on stilts and the answer is easy; never.
- 7.
49 Fed.Cl. 313 (2001).
- 8.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. states, “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” See, generally, Epstein, Richard A., Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1985.
- 9.
Tulare Lake Basin Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
- 10.
The National Academy of Sciences has concluded that federal biologists had “no substantial scientific foundation” for their efforts to protect endangered fish by withholding water in the Klamath Basin. See Michael Grunwald, Scientific Report Roils a Salmon War, Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2002, A1, Col. 1. The Academy concluded that the data “has not shown a clear connection between the water level in upper Klamath Lake and conditions adverse to the welfare of the suckers.” It noted that “the best year ever recorded for sucker survival was a low-water year.” Chuck Cushman of the American Land Rights Association is quoted as saying of the Fish and Wildlife biologists, “You can’t trust the science, because you can’t trust the scientists. They’ve got a biased point of view, and there is no way to fight back.”
- 11.
But faith in the ethics of government agencies has been destroyed in the West by instances of “bio-fraud” on the part of government employees in cases involving the alleged planting of lynx and grizzly fur in an attempt to establish evidence of a habit under the Endangered Species Act. See, Valerie Richardson, ‘Biofraud’ Angers West, Taints Federal Stewards, The Washington Times, Jan. 21, 2002. She relates that many Westerners view the Endangered Species Act as a device to move people off the land they developed and love.
- 12.
49 Fed. Cl. at 314.
- 13.
Id.
- 14.
Id. at 315.
- 15.
Id. at 315.
- 16.
Id.
- 17.
Id.
- 18.
Id.
- 19.
16 U.S.C., sections 1531–1544 (1994).
- 20.
437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). Here the court considered the famous snail darter case and decided to allow enforcement of the Act whatever the cost. Whatever the cost seems a bit extreme. Should there not be some balancing of the opposing interests? Some consideration, for example, of the interests of creatures with opposable thumbs who happen to be the stewards of private property. Some consideration of the millions of taxpayer dollars spent on a nearly completed dam? This is exactly what Justice Powell advocated in his dissent. He wrote, “This decision casts a long shadow over even the most important projects, serving vital needs of society and national defense, whenever it is determined that continued operation would threaten extinction of an endangered species or its habitat” 437 U.S. 195–196. He continued, “I view it as the duty of this court to adopt a permissible construction that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public weal” 437 U.S. 196.
- 21.
437 U.S. at 183.
- 22.
Id at 181.
- 23.
This consultation is to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species…” 16 U.S.C. section 1536(a)(2) (1994).
- 24.
49 Fed.Cl. at 315.
- 25.
Where activities of a federal agency are seen to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or cause the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitats, the Act directs the secretary to suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to avoid such harms; see 16 U.S.C. section 1536 (b) (3) (A) (1994).
- 26.
49 Fed.Cl. at 315.
- 27.
Id.
- 28.
Id. at 315.
- 29.
An acre-foot of water is the amount necessary to raise the level of water of a pond with the area of an acre by one foot. It is equal to 43,560 cubic feet or 325,851 gallons or 1233 cubic meters.
- 30.
Id.
- 31.
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Here, a contractor had a state lien on an uncompleted vessel and the material furnished for its construction. The builder of the vessel had a contract that allowed the United States to require the builder to transfer title to the government on default. The United States contended that after default it was immune from paying the contractor’s liens. Justice Black wrote, “[T]he total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute compensable property, has every element of a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’ and is not a mere ‘consequential’ taking” 364 U.S. at 48.
- 32.
A similar issue arises with regard to rent control. Given, arguendo, that it is a governmental responsibility to guarantee the poor, cheap rental accommodation, it by no means logically follows that the entire expense of this program be the responsibility of landlords alone, as opposed to the general taxpayer. After all, we have similar policies concerning feeding the poor, and manage to acquit this “responsibility” without saddling grocers and restaurateurs, alone, with the entire expense. For the general case against rent control, see: Arnott, Richard J., and Mintz, Jack M., Rent Control: The International Experience, Kingston Ontario: John Deutsch Institute, 1987; Baird, Charles, Rent Control: The Perennial Folly, Washington D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1980; Block, Walter, and Edgar Olsen, eds., Rent Control: Myths and Realities, Vancouver, The Fraser Institute, 1981; Block, Walter, “A critique of the legal and philosophical case for rent control,” Journal of Business Ethics; Block, Walter, “Rent Control: A Tale of Two Canadian Cities,” Mid Atlantic Journal of Business, Vol. 25, No. 7, 1989, pp. 85–88; Block, Walter, “An Analysis and Evaluation of Rental Housing in the City of New York: Supply and Conditions 1975–1978 by Peter Marcuse,” International Journal for Housing Science, Vol. 4, Number 4, Fall 1980, pp. 343–359; Block, Walter, “The Negative Impact of Government Policies on the Built Environment,” International Journal of Housing Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 131–140; Block, Walter, “Rent Control: A Case Study of British Columbia,” Mid Atlantic Journal of Business, Vol. 30, No. 3, December 1994, pp. 299–304; Block, Walter, “Housing is Not a basic human right,” Canadian Housing, Vol. 6, No. 1. Spring 1989, pp. 30–31; Block, Walter, “Rent Controls – Who Benefits and Who Is Hurt,” Housing in Canada: A Continuing Challenge, Paul Cosgrove and Raymond V. Hession, eds., Don Mills, Ontario: The Canadian Real Estate Association, 1982, pp. 197–209; Block, Walter,” On Rent Control,” David Henderson, ed., The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics, New York: Warner Books, 1993, pp. 421–425; Block, Walter, Horton, Joseph, and Shorter, Ethan “Rent Control: An Economic Abomination,” International Journal of Value Based Management, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1998, pp. 253–263; Downs, Anthony, Residential Rent Controls: An Evaluation, Washington: The Urban Land Institute, 1988; Grant, R.W., Rent Control and the War Against the Poor, Manhattan Beach: Quandary House, 1989; Johnson, M. Bruce, ed., Resolving the Housing Crisis: Government Policy, Decontrol, and the Public Interest, San Francisco: The Pacific Institute, 1982; Salins, Peter D., The Ecology of Housing Destruction: Economic Effects of Public Intervention in the Housing Market, New York: New York University Press, 1980; Tucker, William, The Excluded Americans: Homelessness and Housing Policies, Washington D.C., Regnery Gateway, 1990.
- 33.
For a comment on the makeup of some activist environmental groups see generally, Frank Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 Duke Envl L. & Policy Forum 151 (1997). Also, see generally, Block, Walter, ed., Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1990; Block, Walter, “Environmentalism and Freedom: The Case for Private Property Rights,” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, No. 6, December 1998, pp. 1887–1899; Block, Walter and Roy Whitehead, “The Unintended Consequences of Environmental Justice,” Forensic Science International, Vol. 100, Nos. 1 and 2, March 1999, pp. 57–67; DiLorenzo, Thomas, “Does Capitalism Cause Pollution?,” St. Louis, Washington University: Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues Series 38, 1990; Hill, Peter J., and Meiners, Roger E., eds., Who Owns the Environment?, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998; McGee, Robert, and Block, Walter, “Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of Market Socialism, and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution,” Fordham University Law and Environmental Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1, Fall 1994, pp. 51–77; Rothbard, Murray N., “Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution,” Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation, Walter Block, ed., Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1990; Stroup, Richard L., and John C. Goodman, et al., (1991) Progressive Environmentalism: A Pro-Human, Pro-Science, Pro-Free Enterprise Agenda for Change, Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, Task Force Report.
- 34.
49 Fed.Cl. at 314.
- 35.
Id. at 317.
- 36.
Id.
- 37.
Id.
- 38.
Id.
- 39.
48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There, the lessor claimed reimbursement from the U.S. government for leases breached by a foreign government (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) after the foreign government’s offices were ordered closed and its assets frozen. The court said, “[L]essor had no compensable investment backed expectation to be free from government interference, within the meaning of the just compensation clause, regarding its rights under lease with entities of foreign government, since lessor leased office space to foreign government entities with notice that the United States was statutorily and constitutionally authorized to take action against foreign government by closing its offices and blocking its assets, and the United States had done so in the past.”
- 40.
49 Fed.Cl. at 317.
- 41.
261 U.S. 502 (1923).
- 42.
Id. At 507.
- 43.
Id.
- 44.
Id. At 510. The high court said, “[T]hat provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.” Obviously, the power was used to prosecute the war.
- 45.
49 Fed.Cl. at 317.
- 46.
Id. at 318.
- 47.
Id.
- 48.
Id.
- 49.
Id.
- 50.
458 U.S. 419 (1982). Here, the high court decided that a New York law requiring landlords to allow cable television wires and facilities on their property was a “taking” of property compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Justice Marshal wrote, “[W]e affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical invasion of property is a taking” 458 U.S. at 441.
- 51.
438 U.S. 104, 124–125 (1978).
- 52.
Here, the city of New York’s Landmarks Law prevented the owner from using air space above Grand Central Terminal for an office building of over 50 stories because the city considered they would adversely affect the architectural features of the landmark building. The high court decided that the Landmarks Law did not effect a taking of private property because “[w]here (1) the law does not interfere with the owner’s present use of the building, (2) the law does not necessarily prohibit occupancy of any of the airspace above the landmark building, and (3) the law does not deny all use of the air rights above the landmark,” a taking does not follow. 438 U.S. at 115. The court continued that a taking also had not occurred because, “[T]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities to enhance not only the terminal site proper but also other properties.” 438 U.S. at 139.
- 53.
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
- 54.
Id. at 1020. There is always a risk that regulations, by requiring private property to be left substantially in its natural state, as in Lucas, carry a risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service “under the guise of mitigating public harm” 505 U.S. 1018. Here, the court foresaw the situation discussed in footnote 89 Infra, where the Fish and Wildlife Service used the “guise” of Incidental Take Statements to prohibit the grazing of cattle where there was no evidence of the presence of endangered species on the land.
- 55.
Id. at 1019.
- 56.
Id.
- 57.
328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
- 58.
Id. at 261.
- 59.
3 Cal. 249, 252–253 (1853).
- 60.
Id. at 253.
- 61.
49 Fed.Cl. at 319.
- 62.
Id.
- 63.
282 U.S. 399, 407 (1931). There, in determining whether the government’s acquisition of a corporation’s entire right to use water power constituted a taking, the court noted that the “petitioner’s right was to the use of water; and when all the water that it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s mill and turned elsewhere by government requisition for the production of power it is hard to see what more the government could do to take that use.” See, also Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 285 (1958), where the court said of an interference with water rights, “depriving the owner of its profitable use was the imposition of such servitude as would constitute an appropriation of property for which compensation should be made.”
- 64.
49 Fed.Cl. at 320.
- 65.
Id.
- 66.
Id.
- 67.
Id. at 321.
- 68.
44 Fed.Cl. 108 (1999), aff’d 247 F.3d 1355 (Fed.Cir 2001). There, the court rejected the takings claim of a surface miner when it was determined that the mining operation did violence to the state’s citizens by polluting the state’s groundwater.
- 69.
49 Fed.Cl. at 323. Growing food and fiber appears to fit into those activities that should be supported as contributing to the public good.
- 70.
Id.
- 71.
Id.
- 72.
Id.
- 73.
See generally, Frank Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 Duke Envl L. & Policy forum 151 (1997), for the idea that many staunch environmentalists are middle-class urban dwellers. See Kelly, footnote 3, Supra, for support of the proposition that environmental regulations are increasingly reflective of the values of urban dwellers who have little connection with the land or nature. Why should they care about the cost of protecting fish and fuzzy creatures? They have nothing to lose and don’t have to pay. And it makes them feel good.
- 74.
See, Chris Solomon, Why Thirty Mile Fire Raged Without Water, Seattle Times, August 1, 2001, at A 7, Col. 3.
- 75.
See, Walter Block, Four Firemen Perish, www.lewrockwell.com/orgin.block2.html (Last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
- 76.
And when we realize that human life hangs in the balance, it is not clear that there is any justification for this policy at all.
- 77.
See, “What the claims court has potentially done is to set the stage for a new era of environmental responsibility. The key problem in America’s environmental debate is that most people have no concept of how much it costs to protect natural resources, and feel there is nothing to lose from more regulations,” editorial, The Earth Rebalanced, The Wall Street Journal, Jul. 10, 2001, at A18.
- 78.
346 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). One purpose of the Fifth Amendment is “to bar the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
- 79.
For the case that private property rights are a far more reliable means toward this end, as well as being more in accord with our traditions of relying upon this institution, see footnote 33, supra.
- 80.
That is exactly the issue awaiting resolution before the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. 99-15614 (9th Cir. June 2000), where the landowners were prevented from developing their lots for several years to protect against runoff into the lake. The 9th Circuit reversed the trial court’s holding that the temporary deprivation of a beneficial use of the property was compensable. But why should it make any difference if the taking has not been finalized because of the idle meanderings of an administrative agency of the city, state, or federal government? This delay provides an incentive for the administrative agency to postpone, sometimes for decades as in the Tahoe case, a final decision. Meanwhile, the owner has been deprived of the use of his property. And the courts can use this delay to “play the owner like a yo-yo and never give him his day in court,” Timothy Sandefur, The Obstacle of the Takings Clause, Ideas on Liberty, Vol. 52, No. 1, Jan. 2002, p. 45–46.
- 81.
See generally, Lanton Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 Harvard Envl. L. Review 203, 203–209 (1998), about how to provide early opportunities for resolution of disputes and building community support by using the productive harmony provisions of section 101 of the Act.
- 82.
See, Kevin Preister and Jim Kent, Using Social Ecology to Meet the Productive Harmony Intent of the National Environmental Policy Act, 7 Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 235, 239–241 (2001), for a detailed discussion of the use of section 101 of The National Environmental Policy Act to achieve productive harmony with the impacted community.
- 83.
Roy Whitehead and Walter Block, Environmental Justice Risks in the Petroleum Industry, 24 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 67, 81 (2000).
- 84.
See generally, Richard Merritt and Roy Whitehead, Including the Excluded Population in Marine Corps Environmental Decisions, The Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 2000, pp. 42–44. In the Louisiana Shintech case, for example, over 70% of the black elected community representatives favored the plastics plant location. White, middle-class, urban environmentalists, paternalistic members of congress, and the EPA objected to the location and drove the plant elsewhere without regard to community economic needs and wishes.
- 85.
For the contention that private property rights and a system of private causes of action are preferable to government regulation in preventing violence against the environment, See, Walter Block, Environmentalism and Economic Freedom: The Case For Private Property Rights, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, No. 6, Dec. 1998, pp. 1887–1899.
- 86.
“The concept of private property rights, although much reviled by self styled defenders of the environment, is the key to its protection. “When people are allowed full title to property, they treat it as if they own it; that is, they tend to protect it. When property rights are unprotected, allowing others to violate them with impunity, they tend to do so. Spoiling the environment is the result,” See, Walter Block, Economics and the Environment: a Reconciliation, 284, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1990.
- 87.
Just as private “entrepreneurs in the marketplace recognize and fill demands for goods and services, politicians and bureaucrats discover opportunities to meet the demands of their constituencies,” Terry Anderson, The Market Process and Environmental Amenities, Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation 141, The Fraser Institute, 1990. Bureaucrats, like the officials involved in the Tulare case who provide services to environmental interest groups, do not have to pay the opportunity costs of expended resources. “They can increase their own utility by increasing budgetary discretion, power, and wealth” at the expense of hayseed, private property owning farmers. See, Anderson, p. 141.
- 88.
The aforementioned bio-fraud article, Supra, footnote 11, alleged the planting of lynx fur. “The lynx fur scandal underscores everything that’s wrong with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service. It shows how the agencies succumbed to the Clinton-era ideology ahead of science. It demonstrates the undue influence environmental groups have over the departments,” says Kimberley Strassell, The Missing Lynx, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 24, 2002, at A18, Col. 4. She quotes Jim Beers, a 30-year veteran of the Fish and Wildlife Service: “In recent years the agency eliminated all the real requirements, pushed out people that didn’t fit the anti-hunting, anti-fishing, anti-land- management profile. They’ve got to get back to science.” She relates that anti-development environmental groups that have captured a government agency, “quickly realized how easy it is to exploit the law. Getting a plant or animal listed meant putting large areas of rural America off limits.” Finally, the article reveals that the former director of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service “have gone to work for the left-wing, activist National Wildlife Federation.”
- 89.
The use of the term “guise” is not a misnomer. The Lucas court, footnote 54, Supra, expressed a concern that private property might be pressed into some form of public service “under the guise of mitigating public harm.” Recently, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a situation where the Fish and Wildlife Service used Incidental Take Statements to prohibit the grazing of cattle where there was absolutely no evidence that endangered species existed on the land. The court found that the Service acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by imposing terms and conditions on the land without evidence of the existence of an endangered species. See generally, Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, 273 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). This sort of “guise” practice hardly contributes to the public trust in government agencies.
- 90.
Bethell, Tom, The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity Through the Ages, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998; Pipes, Richard, Property and Freedom: The story of how through the centuries private ownership has promoted liberty and the rule of law, New York: Knopf, 2000.
- 91.
F.A. Hayek, “Socialist Calculation I, II, & III,” Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Boston, Kluwer, 1989; Mises, Ludwig, Socialism, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981 (1969); Block, Walter, “Socialist Psychology: Values and Motivations,” Cultural Dynamics, Vol. V, No. 3, 1992, pp. 260–286; Boettke, Peter J., Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Transformation, London: Routledge, 1993; Boettke, Peter J., ed., The Collapse of Development Planning, New York: New York University Press, 1994; Boettke, Peter J., and Anderson, Gary, “Perestroika and Public Choice: the economics of autocratic succession in a rent seeking society,” Public Choice, 75, no. 2, February 1993, 101–118; Boettke, Peter J., and Anderson Gary, “Soviet Venality: The USSR as a Mercantilist State, Public Choice, 1997.
- 92.
Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson and Walter Block, Economic Freedom of the World, 1975–1995, Vancouver, B.C. Canada: the Fraser Institute, 1996.
- 93.
States The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., [1998 rev.], Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, c1998, volume 4, page 320, Article Title: “Earth”: “The planet’s total surface area is roughly 509,600,000 square km (197,000,000 square miles), of which about 29 percent, or 148,000,000 square km (57,000,000 square miles), is land. The balance of the surface is covered by the oceans and smaller seas.”
- 94.
Dowling, Mike, “Interactive Table of World Nations Sorted by Gross Domestic Product,” available from http://www.mrdowling.com/800gdp.html; Internet; updated Tuesday, September 5, 2000.
- 95.
See Hutt, William H., “The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty,” Economic Journal, March, 1940, pp. 66–77 on this. For the related concept, individual sovereignty, which is even more in accord with libertarian free enterprise principles, see Rothbard, Murray N., Man, Economy and State, Auburn AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, [1962] 1993, pp. 560–566.
- 96.
Hazlitt, Henry, Economics in One Lesson, Arlington House Publishers, New York, 1979.
- 97.
Block, Walter, “Earning Happiness Through Homesteading Unowned Land: a comment on ‘Buying Misery with Federal Land’ by Richard Stroup,” Journal of Social Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 237–253; Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, Boston: Kluwer, 1993; Locke, John, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government, V. 27–28, in Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 17–18; Locke, John, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955; Rothbard, Murray N., Power and Market: Government and the Economy, Menlo Park Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970; Rothbard, Murray N., For a New Liberty, Macmillan, New York, 1978; Rothbard, Murray N., The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998 (1982).
- 98.
Anderson, Terry and Hill, P.J., “An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: the not so Wild, Wild West,” Journal of Libertarian Studies Vol. 3, No. 1, 1979, pp. 9–29; Barnett, Randy E., The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998; Benson, Bruce L., 1989, Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without Government,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter, pp. 1–26; Cuzán, Alfred G., “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer, 1979); De Jasay, Anthony, Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, London, Routledge, 1997; Friedman, David, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2nd ed., 1989; Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, Democracy, the God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order, New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Publishers, 2001; Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers, National Goods Versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders, 4 Rev. Austrian Econ. 88 (1990); Kinsella, Stephan, “Estoppel: A New Justification for Individual Rights,” Reason Papers No. 17 (Fall 1992), p. 61; Morriss, Andrew P., “Miners, Vigilantes and Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law,” Land and Water Law Review, Vol. XXXIII, No, 2, 1998, pp. 581–696; Oppenheimer, Franz, The State, New York: Free Life Editions, (1914), 1975; Rothbard, Murray N., The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982; Skoble, Aeon J. “The Anarchism Controversy,” in Liberty for the 21st Century: Essays in Contemporary Libertarian Thought, eds. Tibor Machan and Douglas Rasmussen, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995, pp. 77–96; Sechrest, Larry J., “Rand, Anarchy, and Taxes,” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 87–105; Spooner, Lysander, No Treason, Larkspur, Colorado, (1870) 1966; Stringham, Edward, “Justice Without Government,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1998–1999, pp. 53–77; Tinsley, Patrick, “With Liberty and Justice for All: A Case for Private Police,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1998–1999, pp. 95–100; Tannehill, Morris and Linda, The Market for Liberty, New York: Laissez Faire Books, 1984; Woolridge, William C., Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970.
- 99.
For an articulation of the minarchist free market philosophy, see Machan, Tibor, 1978, “Against non-libertarian natural rights,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall, pp. 233–238; Murray, Charles, What It Means to be a Libertarian, New York: Broadway Books, 1997; Read, Leonard, E. Anything That’s Peaceful, Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1964.
- 100.
Jacobs, Jane (1989), The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York: Vintage.
- 101.
Hanke, Steve H., ed., 1987, Privatization and Development, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies; Walker, Michael A., ed., Privatization: Tactics and Techniques, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B.C., 1988; Ohashi. T.M., T.P. Roth, Z.A. Spindler, M.L. McMillan, & K.H. Norrie, Privatization Theory & Practice, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B.C., 1980; Pirie, Madson, 1986, Privatization in Theory and Practice, London: Adam Smith Institute; Benson, Bruce L., To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice, New York, N.Y.: University Press, 1998; Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill, “Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement,” 50 S. Econ. J. 438 (1983); Butler, Eamonn, ed., 1988, The Mechanics of Privatization, London: Adam Smith Institute.
- 102.
Boettke, Peter J. “The Austrian Critique and the Demise of Socialism: The Soviet Case,” in Austrian Economics: Perspectives on the Past and Prospects for the Future. Vol. 17, Richard M. Ebeling, ed., Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press, 1991, pp. 181–232; Conway, David. A Farewell to Marx: An Outline and Appraisal of His Theories, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1987; Cubeddu, Raimondo. The Philosophy of the Austrian School. New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 109–158; Dorn, James, “Markets True and False in Yugoslavia,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, Fall 1978, 2(3), pp. 243–268; Ebeling, Richard M. “Economic Calculation Under Socialism: Ludwig von Mises and His Predecessors,” in Jeffrey Herbener, ed., The Meaning of Ludwig von Mises, Norwell, MA: Klewer Academic Press, 1993, pp. 56–101; Foss, Nicolai Juul, “Information and the Market Economy: A Note on a Common Marxist Fallacy,” Review of Austrian Economics, 1995, 8(2), pp. 127–136; Gordon, David. Resurrecting Marx: The Analytical Marxists on Freedom, Exploitation, and Justice, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990; Hayek, Friedrich A. “Socialism and War: Essays, Documents, Reviews,” The Collected works of F. A. Hayek, vol.10, B. Caldwell, ed., 1997; Heilbroner, Robert. “Analysis and Vision in the History of Monetary Economic Thought,” Journal of Economic Literature, September 1990, 28, pp. 1097–1114; Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, “De-Socialization in a United Germany,” Review of Austrian Economics, 1991, 5(2), pp. 77–106; Horwitz, Steven. “Money, Money Prices, and the Socialist Calculation Debates,” Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 3, 1996, pp. 59–77; Keizer, Willem. 1997. “Schumpeter’s Walrasian Stand in the Socialist Calculation Debate.” In Austrian Economics in Debate, edited by Willem Keizer, Bert Riben and Rudy Van Zijp. London: Routledge; Klein, Peter G. “Economic Calculation and the Limits of Organization” Review of Austrian Economics, 1996 9(2), pp. 3–28; Lavoie, Don. Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Lewin, Peter. “The Firm, Money and Economic Calculation,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, October 1998; Maltsev, Yuri N. Requiem for Marx. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1993; Mises, Ludwig von. Socialism, Indianapolis: LibertyPress/LibertyClassics, 1981; O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr. Economics as a Coordination Problem, Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977, pp. 1–15; Reisman, George. Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics, Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996, pp. 135–139, 267–282; Reynolds, Morgan O. “The Impossibility of Socialist Economy,” The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Summer 1998, 1.2, pp. 29–43; Rothbard, Murray N. “How and How Not to Desocialize,” Review of Austrian Economics, 1992, 6(1) pp. 65–78; Salerno, Joseph T. “Ludwig von Mises as a Social Rationalist,” Review of Austrian Economics, 1990, 4, pp. 26–54; Steele, David Ramsey, From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992; Vaughn, Karen I. “Economic Calculation Under Socialism: the Austrian Contribution,” Economic Inquiry, June 1980, 18 (20), pp. 535–554.
- 103.
Adie, Douglas K., “Why Marginal Reform of the U.S. Postal Service Won’t Succeed,” in Free the Mail: Ending the Postal Monopoly, Peter J. Ferrara, ed., Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1990; Moore, Thomas Gale, “The Federal Postal Monopoly: History, Rationale and Future,” in Free the Mail: Ending the Postal Monopoly, Peter J. Ferrara, ed., Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1990; Priest, George, “The History of the Postal Monopoly in the United States,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18, no. 33, 1975; Butler, Stuart M., “Privatizing Bulk Mail,” Management, 6, No. 1, 1986; Moore, Stephen, “Privatizing the U.S. Postal Service,” in Stephen Moore and Stuart Butler, eds., Privatization, Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1987.
- 104.
Beito, David T. and Linda Royster Beito, “Rival Road Builders: Private Toll Roads in Nevada, 1852–1880,” Nevada Historical Society Quarterly 41 (Summer 1998), 71–91; Block, Walter, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads,” Journal of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. III, No. 2, Summer 1979, pp. 209–238; Block, Walter, “Congestion and Road Pricing,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. IV, No. 3, Fall 1980, pp. 299–330; Block, Walter, “Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 1–34; Block, Walter, “Theories of Highway Safety,” Transportation Research Record, #912, 1983, pp. 7–10; Block, Walter “Road Socialism,” International Journal of Value-Based Management, 1996, Vol. 9, pp. 195–207; Block, Walter and Block, Matthew, “Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property Rights,” Journal Des Economistes Et Des Etudes Humaines, Vol. VII, No. 2/3, June-September 1996, pp. 351–362; Block, Walter, “Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property: Reply to Gordon Tullock,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, June-September 1998, pp. 315–326; Foldvary, Fred, Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services (Edward Elgar, 1994); Cadin, Michelle, and Block, Walter, (1997), “Privatize the Public Highway System,” The Freeman, February, Vol. 47, No. 2., pp. 96–97; Cobin, John, M. (1999), Market Provisions of Highways: Lessons from Costanera Norte. Planning and Markets, Volume 2, Number 1; Klein, Dan, Majewski, J., and Baer, C., “From Trunk to Branch: Toll Roads in New York, 1800–1860,” Essays in Economic and Business History, 1993, pp. 191–209; Klein, Dan and Fielding, G.J., “Private Toll Roads: Learning from the Nineteenth Century,” Transportation Quarterly, July 1992, pp. 321–341; Lemennicier, Bertrand, “La Privatisation des rues,” Journal Des Economistes Et Des Etudes Humaines, Vol. VII, No. 2/3, June-September 1996, pp. 363–376; Semmens, John, “The Privatization of Highway Facilities,” Transportation Research Forum, (November, 1983); Semmens, John, “Why We Need Highway Privatization,” Laissez Faire Institute (March 1991); Semmens, John, “Privatizing Vehicle Registrations, Driver’s Licenses and Auto Insurance,” Transportation Quarterly (Fall 1995).
- 105.
However, it must be underscored that only scarce resources are candidates for property ownership. On this see, Callahan, Gene, “Rethinking Patent Law,” Mises Institute, July 18, 2000, http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=468&FS=Rethinking+Patent+Law; Cole, Julio H., “Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?,” http://www.economia.ufm.edu.gt/Catedraticos/jhcole/Cole%20_MPS_.pdf; Kinsella, N. Stephan, “Against Intellectual Property,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, forthcoming; Kinsella, N. Stephan, “Is IP property or not?,” National Post, February 22, 2001; Kinsella, N. Stephan, “In Defense of Napster and Against the Second Homesteading Rule,” LewRockwell.com, September 4, 2000, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/kinsella2.html; McElroy, Wendy, http://www.zetetics.com/mac/intpro1.htm; http://www.zetetics.com/mac/intpro2.htm; Mercer, Ilana, “How Things Would Work in a Copyright-free Universe,” National Post, Jan. 26. 2001; Moore D. Adam, “A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property,” Fall, 1977, 21 Hamline Law Review 65.
- 106.
The head police character in the movie the “Fugitive” demanded of his minions that they search every “house, barn, shed, palace, outhouse, doghouse, etc….” Our goal is to be as exhaustive as he was.
- 107.
We here abstract from such things as backyard swimming pools, jacuzis, bath tubs, showers, water faucets, cesspools, water fountains, septic tanks, and so on, which already fall under private control.
- 108.
Similarly for the boundaries between radio and TV stations on the electromagnetic spectrum. For the case in favor of privatization in this regard, see Coase, Ronald H., “The Federal Communications Commission,” 2 Journal of Law and Economics, 1, 1959.
- 109.
Anderson and Leal, op. cit., report on the function of cowboys as “human fences.”
- 110.
For the argument that elephants, rhinos, and other endangered species would benefit from being barnyardized, for example, fenced in with electrically charged wires, see Anderson and Leal, op. cit., Simmons, Randy, and Kreuter, Urs, “Herd Mentality: Banning Ivory Sales is No Way to Save the Elephant,” Policy Review, Fall 1989, pp. 46–49; Block, Walter, “Environmental Problems, Private Property Rights Solutions,” Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1990, pp. 281–332; Block, Walter, “Environmentalism and Freedom: The Case for Private Property Rights,” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, No. 6, December 1998, pp. 1887–1899.
- 111.
For the argument that this is symbiotic, for example, beneficial to both mankind and animal and fish species, see Heffner, Henry E., “The Symbiotic Nature of Animal Research,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 43. No. 1, Autumn 1999.
- 112.
It is time, too, to jettison such socialist and profoundly anti-private property rights songs as “Home, home on the range,” and “Where the deer and the antelope play.”
- 113.
We owe this objection to Marybeth Block.
- 114.
See also Aristophanes’ theory of love.
- 115.
This applies only to unwelcome flooding and course changes. But railroads and highways (see footnote 13 supra) sometimes change their location. If there is an economic need for this in the case of a river, and it is accomplished at minimal cost, then this constitutes an exception to the claim made in the text.
- 116.
We assume, for the moment, that the level of technology, or of the law, is such that the clouds themselves are not owned, and that thus no one is liable for their excessive and unwarranted rain on the river. For some people, to blame rain or storm on the state is only a joke. This is not the case at present. Had the government not taken as much of the GDP as it has, to fritter it away on warfare and welfare state considerations (and for numbered bank accounts in Switzerland), there would have been just that much more available to address private needs. Some of this, undoubtedly, would have been spent in an effort to domesticate weather conditions.
- 117.
- 118.
See on this, Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson and Walter Block, Economic Freedom of the World, 1975–1995 Vancouver, B.C. Canada: the Fraser Institute, 1996.
- 119.
This is by definition.
- 120.
A similar objection with regard to private roads and streets has been dealt with in Block, Walter, “Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads,” Journal of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. III, No. 2, Summer 1979, pp. 209–238, see footnote 13, supra.
- 121.
This of course invites discussion of ownership of the relevant air travel rights, a topic we address below.
- 122.
There are several publications whose titles indicate they are compatible with this very radical enterprise, but they are misnomers. For example, Anderson, Terry L., and Leal, Donald R., Free Market Environmentalism, San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, 1991 call their chapter 9 “Homesteading the Oceans,” a policy taken seriously in the present paper, but these authors discuss only schemes to quasi-privatize fish; similarly the title employed by Runoflsson, Birgir, “Fencing the Oceans,” Regulation, Summer 1997. pp. 57–62 is misleading in that it also advocates only individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fish, as its subtitle (“A Rights-Based Approach to Privatizing Fisheries”) makes clear. A similar analysis applies to Eckert, Ross D., The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979. For a critique of tradeable emissions rights (TERs), the air analogue of ITQs in the water, see McGee, Robert W. and Walter Block, “Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of Market Socialism, and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution,” Fordham University Law and Environmental Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1, Fall 1994, pp. 51–77. Jeffreys, Kent, “Who Should Own the Ocean,” Competitive Enterprise Institute Update, No. 8, August 1991, pp. 1–2, perhaps comes the closest of the material cited in this footnote to my own vision of full water privatization, but even it focuses mainly on the problem of over fishing, and contemplates “permitting … outright ownership of limited ocean areas. For example, offshore rigs…” But why not outright ownership of all as opposed to “limited” ocean areas? Private ownership of offshore rigs, moreover, is already a staple of present sea law.
- 123.
See footnote 13, supra.
- 124.
Actually, these are particularly inept examples, in that land in none of these three places is fully open for private holdings.
- 125.
Apart from those areas of the seas which are located near population centers. There is no doubt that did the law but allow it, for example, private individuals would be willing, and more than willing, to own the Hudson River.
- 126.
See text accompanying footnote 93.
- 127.
See on this the large “tragedy of the commons” literature. Indeed, one could expand this so as to include the literature on the failure of socialism, “water socialism” in this case.
- 128.
See footnotes 110 and 122, supra.
- 129.
And other previously endangered species also, such as the elephant, the rhinoceros, and the alligator.
- 130.
It is on this point that the Chicago School analysis of property rights goes wrong. In that perspective, private property rights only arise when technology, an exogenous force, makes them economically practicable. There can be no private property rights in the ocean unless and until electric sea fences are invented. Science is the dog; the law is the tail that is wagged. In contrast, in the libertarian vision that underlies the present paper, technology is endogenous. It is the tail that is wagged by the legal dog. Private property rights to anything will always be recognized in law, as a matter of course, stemming from homesteading: when and if ocean owners stake claims, based on mixing their labor with this element, for which new presently non-existing technology is available, then it will be recognized. The difference in this case is a subtle one: in the libertarian legal code, the law gives incentives for such innovations, by guaranteeing recognition of such property titles when they are achieved; in the Chicagoite tradition, the law does not. For the Chicago view of property rights, see Posner, Richard A., “Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest,” 14 Journal of Law & Economics 201 (1971); Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed., Aspen Law & Business, 1998); Coase, Ronald, H., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, October 1960, Vol. 3, pp. 1–44; Demsetz, Harold, “Some Aspects of Property Rights,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. IX, October 1966; Demsetz, Harold, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” American Economic Review, 57: 347–359, 1967. For the libertarian critique, see Block, Walter, “O.J.’s Defense: A Reductio Ad Absurdum of the Economics of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 1996, Vol. 3, pp. 265–286; Cordato, Roy, E., “Knowledge Problems and the Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 14 Fall 1992a; Cordato, Roy E., “Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of Harmful Effects,” Hamline Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 229–244; Cordato, Roy E., Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective, Boston: Kluwer, 1992b; Krecke, Elisabeth, “Law and the Market Order: An Austrian Critique of the Economic Analysis of Law,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 7(1), March 1996, pp. 19–37; Commentaries on Law & Economics, 1997 Yearbook, ed., Robert W. McGee, pp. 86–109; North, Gary, Tools of Dominion: The Case Laws of Exodus, Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1990; North, Gary, The Coase Theorem, Tyler, TX: The Institute for Christian Economics, 1992. For the debate between Block and Demsetz on these matters see Block, Walter, “Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies: An Interdisciplinary Review, Vol. I, No. 2, Spring 1977, pp. 111–115; Demsetz, Harold, “Ethics and Efficiency in Property Rights Systems,” in Time, Uncertainty and Disequilibrium: Explorations of Austrian Themes, Mario Rizzo, ed., Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1979; Block, Walter, “Ethics, Efficiency, Coasean Property Rights and Psychic Income: A Reply to Demsetz,” Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 61–125; Demsetz, Harold, “Block’s Erroneous Interpretations,” The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, pp. 101–109; Block, Walter, “Private Property Rights, Erroneous Interpretations, Morality and Economics: Reply to Demsetz,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 63–78.
- 131.
“The Model Water Code, The Wise Administrator and the Goddam (sic!) Bureaucrat,” 14 Nat. Resources J. 207 (1974) [this can also be found in Trelease, Frank J., Water Law, Cases and Materials, third ed., American Casebook Series, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1979, p. 9].
- 132.
Trelease himself, ibid., makes several concessions as regards land ownership for “zoning, land use planning laws,” and condemnation for “a public purpose.” This would be incompatible with the libertarian legal code, whether on land or in water.
- 133.
Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law, third ed., Boston: Little Brown, 1986, pp. 34–35.
- 134.
Trelease, Frank J., Water Law, Cases and Materials, third ed., American Casebook Series, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1979, pp. 10–11.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Block, W.E., Whitehead, R. (2019). Environmental Takings: The Case for Full Water Privatization. In: Philosophy of Law. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28360-5_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28360-5_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-28359-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28360-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)