Abstract
This chapter explores Unamuno’s narrative fictions as thought experiments regarding the self and the emotions. It begins by developing a notion of thought experiment consequent with his understanding of philosophy as a form of literature. Next, it focusses on the philosophy of the emotions implicit in his major essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida. The third section offers a case study in the form of envy in the novel Abel Sánchez. The final section addresses different forms of knowledge about the emotions conveyed by Unamuno’s fictional works.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Following Borzoni’s suggestion according to which we should value his work for its originality and its power to reveal aspects of human nature, and Batchelor’s recommendation to take as wide a perspective as possible, I avoid interpreting Unamuno as belonging to a specific tradition of thought; S. Borzoni, “Faith and Existence”, in: Companion to Miguel de Unamuno, ed. J. Biggane and J. Macklin (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2016), hereafter abbreviated CMU, p. 112, and R.E. Batchelor, Unamuno Novelist: A European Perspective (Oxford: Dolphin Book, 1972), p. 9. Moreover, my focus on feeling does not exclude other possible interpretations of his work. For an identification of other categories of reality present in his work, see: J. Ferrater Mora, Unamuno. Bosquejo de una filosofia (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1957), pp. 126–32.
- 2.
J. Marías, Miguel de Unamuno (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpé, 1950), p. 63. For Marías, the function of Unamuno’s novel is to show the complexities of human existence (Marías, p. 67). In my view, Marías does not reduce the cognitive value of Unamuno’s literature to the presentation of propositions, but rather recognizes also that they convey knowledge by making us acquainted with aspects of the human reality. In a different vein, Longhurst maintains that, for Marías, Unamuno’s novels may be read as philosophical statements; C.A. Longhurst, Unamuno’s Theory of the Novel (London: Legenda, 2014), hereafter abbreviated UTN, p. 151.
- 3.
Unamuno also established a distinction between “oviparous” novels written after a long process of recompilation of material, which entail previous conceptual work, and “viviparous” novels written immediately after having conceived of them. With the sole exception of Paz en Guerra (1897), Unamuno’s process of creative gestation is “viviparous”. On this distinction, see: H-P. Endress, “Fiction y realidad en ‘Niebla’ de Unamuno, con resonancias cervantinas y calderonianas”, Actas del XV Congreso de la Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas “Las dos orillas”, Monterrey, México del 19 al 24 de julio de 2004, ed. B. Mariscal and M.T. Miaja de la Peña 3 (2007): 113–22, here 115; also J.-C. Rabaté, “Unamuno before 1902: Writing Nation, History, Politics”, in: CMU, p. 25.
- 4.
With this notion of the “thought experiment” I distance myself from Catherine Elgin’s recent proposal to use this concept in a narrow sense. See C. Elgin, “Fiction as Thought Experiment”, Perspectives in Science 22(2) (2014): 221–41.
- 5.
I will follow here a line of thought inaugurated by Gottfried Gabriel for whom the main cognitive function of literature consists in conveying non-propositional forms of knowledge . For this idea see , for instance: G. Gabriel, “Fiktion, Wahrheit und Erkenntnis in der Literatur”, in: Wahrheit, Wissen und Erkenntnis in der Literatur. Philosophische Beiträge, ed. by C. Demmerling and Í. Vendrell Ferran (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 163–180. This view implies an anti-intellectualist position according to which non-propositional forms of knowledge are possible. When Mary went out of the room in which she was confined to live without colors, she experienced something new and conveyed a knowledge that cannot be achieved just by reading books about color theory.
- 6.
In the foreword to Amor y Pedagogía (1902), he explicitly claims that feelings are better expressed in poetry, drama, and novels than in philosophical systems (interestingly, he regards the philosophical works of Kant , Hegel and Spinoza as novels). This novel may also be read as a defense of this claim: In showing how Avito Carrascal’s rationalizing strategies lead him to be delusional about himself and his loved ones.
- 7.
The complementarity of poetic reason and rational argument in Unamuno was neatly stated by María Zambrano; in M. Zambrano, Unamuno (Barcelona: DeBols!llo, 2004), pp. 76–77. According to her, the progression from non-literary to literary forms takes place in order to compensate for the limitations of rational argument. She concludes that Unamuno’s thought did not develop into a philosophy (2004, p. 79). Cf. for a radically different conclusion: Ferrater Mora (p. 106); Longhurst (UTN, p. 153); and P. Ribas, Para leer a Unamuno (Madrid: Alianza Editorial 2002), p. 105.
- 8.
See Ribas (pp. 75–76 and 144); J. Biggane “Foreword”, in: CMU, p. xii; Borzoni (p. 103).
- 9.
Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and in Peoples, trans. J.E. Crawford Flitch (London: Leopold, 1921), hereafter abbreviated TSL, p. 36.
- 10.
This idea has been explored by Biggane, “Writing Vital Struggle: Unamuno’s Narrative Fiction 1902–1923”, in: CMU, p. 44, and “From Separate Spheres to Unilateral Androgyny: Gender and Sexuality in the Work of Unamuno”, in: CMU, p. 188.
- 11.
M. Scheler, “Ordo amoris”, in Selected Philosophical Essays (Evanston: Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 1973), pp. 110–11. In a similar vein, José Ortega y Gasset maintains that love is the “ratio essendi” and “ratio cognoscendi” of our existence; J. Ortega y Gasset, Sobre el amor. Antología (Madrid: Plenitud, 1963).
- 12.
Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), p. 58.
- 13.
For an overview of envy in Unamuno, see: G. Wood, “The Necessary Enemy or the Hated Friend: Self and Other in Unamuno”, in: CMU, pp. 153 and 154. Wood maintains that envy may play a negative but also a “vivifying role”, helping the individual to define herself in the context of the community, and it may give rise to compassion. By contrast, I will focus here on envy as a negative emotion . In addition to this novel, La Tía Tula (1921) also deals with envy and especially envy of others’ motherhood (see A. Sinclair, Uncovering the Mind: Unamuno, the Unknown and the Vicissitudes of Self (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 140; and Sinclair “A Question of Ethics: Exploring Issues of Right and Wrong in Unamuno”, in: CMU, p. 146, hereafter “QE”). In a short narration entitled “Artemio, heuatotimorumenos” (1918), Unamuno studies the possibility of envying oneself.
- 14.
M. de Unamuno, Abel Sánchez, trans. John Macklin (Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 2009), hereafter abbreviated AS, p 189.
- 15.
See also J. Elster, Alchemies of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 171.
- 16.
This concept of “Ressentiment ” as terminus technicus can be found in Scheler: M. Scheler, Ressentiment (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010), hereafter abbreviated R, p. 45–46
- 17.
Both aspects are central to the theories of the emotions developed in contemporary philosophy . While the so-called “feeling theories” focus on the qualitative experience of the emotions, the cognitive theories – which have dominated recent debates – underscore the cognitive bases of the emotions (perceptions , beliefs , memories , etc.), as well as their supposed cognitive function, which consists in giving us information about the world. For an overview, see: Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
- 18.
This distinction was introduced by Anthony Kenny. See A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge, 1963).
- 19.
A. Ben-ze’ev, “Envy and Inequality”, Journal of Philosophy 89(11) (1992): 551–81, here 554.
- 20.
This view differs strongly from Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytical approach to envy. According to Klein: “Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable – the envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it”; M. Klein, Envy and Gratitude (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 181. While Klein focuses on the desired object, I also take the feeling of being at a disadvantage and the feeling of powerlessness as being essential to envy.
- 21.
These motives point to four main concerns in Unamuno’s theory of personality . First, there is a preoccupation with why some persons are born with talent (natural differences). Second, there is a concern about how we perceive others and are perceived by them (social perception ). Third, the story makes clear that we need others in order to become who we are (social construction of the self). Finally, the interactions with others help us to become aware of our personality (socially mediated self-knowledge ). For Unamuno’s theory of personality, see: E. Salcedo, Vida de Don Miguel (Salamanca: Anaya, 1969), pp. 226–27, and Longhurst UTN, pp. 105 and 118.
- 22.
This idea of envy as a feeling of possibility that I put to the forefront here has been developed by Biemel and Zambrano; see W. Biemel, “Über den Neid”, Rencontre / Encounter / Begegnung (1957): 40–49, and Zambrano, El Hombre y lo Divino (Madrid: Siruela, 1991) p. 136.
- 23.
For a philosophical description of existential envy, see Scheler: “The most powerless envy is also the most terrible. Therefore existential envy which is directed against the other person’s very nature, is the strongest source of Ressentiment . It is as if it whispers continually; ‘I can forgive everything, but not that you are – that you are what you are – that I am not what you are – indeed that I am not you’”, R, p. 9.
- 24.
These three aspects have been developed by the following authors: J. Eileen, “Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical Thought in Literary Context”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56(4) (1998): 331–48; M. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 152 and 164; R.W. Beardsmore, “Learning from a Novel”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 6 (1972): 23–46.
- 25.
Even if I agree with Sinclair’s claim that Unamuno was not interested in persuading readers via specific moral statements, I cannot agree with her claim that ethical concerns are not central to him, but may emerge as a consequence of other aspects treated in his writings (“QE”, p. 137).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2019). Exploring Self and Emotion: Unamuno’s Narrative Fiction as Thought Experiment. In: Hagberg, G. (eds) Narrative and Self-Understanding. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28289-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28289-9_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-28288-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28289-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)