The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit at Seoul

Abstract

A follow-on Summit to the Washington NSS was essential for both the institutionalisation and the extension of nuclear security learning captured in April 2010. In the two years to Seoul, challenges to progress came from within—for example from those who felt that the Washington outcome should suffice for the foreseeable time or from those who wanted to extend it in directions not imagined by the founders or other participants. The challenge also came from outside—in the form of the Fukushima nuclear accident that catapulted nuclear safety into the first rank of nuclear issues. High-level political attention on the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism was sustained despite the diversion of public attention to nuclear safety after the Fukushima disaster. In terms of process, Seoul followed the template set at Washington but there was an important innovation in the form of collective ‘gift baskets’ agreed by like-minded countries outside of the Summit Communiqué discussions. Additionally, a soft voluntary implementation reporting mechanism in the form of ‘National Progress Reports’ was set. There was a modest expansion of the forum’s geographical footprint from 47 to 53 countries and its linkages with industry and academia. Significantly, the threat spectrum that the NSS addressed expanded from nuclear material and facilities to radioactive sources. This was an evolution from Washington and brought the U.S. into sync with its major G7 partners such as Germany and France.