Abstract
The finding that “rogue states” can be norm entrepreneurs has consequences for theorizing about norms as well as practical implications for dealing with supposed normative deviants. With regard to the further development of norms research, Wunderlich suggests to analytically distinguish between different forms of norm entrepreneurship, depending on the scope of proactivism. She also suggests to differentiate between reformist and revolutionary norm entrepreneurs, depending on how the respective actor and its normative objectives relate to the prevailing normative order (maintenance, overthrow, or subversion). Regarding the policy toward alleged “rogue states,” Wunderlich warns against sticking to the stigmatizing label. Instead, it might be fruitful to recognize norm-promoting activities by these states and seek out possibilities for common normative ground. The chapter concludes by outlining avenues for further research.
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Notes
- 1.
Iran pursues discursive anchoring by constantly activating its interpretation of norms in the discourse, i.e., the debates of the respective disarmament forums. In addition, Iran seeks to institutionalize its norm interpretation, for example by anchoring it into politically binding final documents of the NPT Review Conferences. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which while not referring to it in wording, implicitly confirms the right to uranium enrichment, constitutes an example of a legally binding anchoring of Iran’s norm interpretation.
- 2.
These patterns of behavior represent ideal types that can hardly be found in pure form in reality. As already discussed, an actor can assume different roles simultaneously in relation to different norms or across policy fields.
- 3.
In a similar way, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff distinguish oppositional and dissident forms of resistance. Both formulate political alternatives, but differ in whether they accept the ruling order and its participatory rules, as in the case of opposition, or whether they reject or deliberately exceed these rules, as in the case of dissidence (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014).
- 4.
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) use a similar distinction. In their explanation of institutional change, they distinguish between different types of actors (so-called “change agents”) according to whether they basically want to preserve the existing institutions and adhere to the applicable rules. They differentiate between “insurrectionaries,” “parasitic and mutualistic symbionts,” “subversives” and “opportunists.” However, since the present study was not about the explanation of institutional change, it does not make use of this distinction.
- 5.
In addition, countries of the global South or “failed states” have so far not sufficiently been considered as state norm entrepreneurs.
- 6.
One could object that, according to the criteria for norm entrepreneurship, there must always be a common good orientation. However, what constitutes the common good is in itself a highly subjective question and up to the perspective of the respective norm entrepreneur.
- 7.
Some authors argue that scholars should adopt an explicit normative attitude to ethical and moral questions. For example, Price (2008), calls on his colleagues to be transparent on what they understand by “morally desirable progress” and provide normative recommendations for action based on their research findings. Above all, he calls on them to disclose their evaluation criteria (Price 2008: 3, 49). I take the view that norm entrepreneurship that serves to be supported stops where the implementation of the propagated norms can only be achieved through massive bloodshed. Such actors in my opinion forfeit any moral authority and thus legitimacy.
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Wunderlich, C. (2020). Conclusion: Revisiting Norm Entrepreneurship. In: Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs. Norm Research in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5_9
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