Abstract
Departing from the finding that Iran—an alleged “rogue state”—acts as a norm entrepreneur in selected policy fields, this chapter seeks to compare such unorthodox norm advocacy with cases of ideal-type norm entrepreneurship as identified by liberal norm scholars. Therefore, Wunderlich contrasts the peculiarities of Iranian norm entrepreneurship with two contrasting cases: A comparison with the prototypical good international citizen, Sweden, serves to reveal differences with regard to the strategies and means used to promote norms. The comparison with North Korea, another state typically alleged of violating global norms, is intended to allay the suspicion that the concept of norm entrepreneurship can be applied to all kinds of actors. In addition, it helps answer the question under what circumstances resistance to the ruling order might transform into activism or isolationism.
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Notes
- 1.
This does not mean, though, that Iran is not a “genuine” norm entrepreneur seeking to construct new norms. Such norm entrepreneurship can be seen in other policy areas, for example President Khatami’s initiative for a “dialogue among civilizations” in 2000 (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014). With his efforts for a “World against Violence and Violent Extremism” (WAVE) in 2013, President Rouhani tried to tie in with Khatami’s norm entrepreneurship.
- 2.
In 1974, Inga Thorsson was appointed undersecretary of state for disarmament. A few years later in 1982, Maj Britt Theorin was granted the status of disarmament ambassador. In 1991, the post was finally abolished by the Bildt government and transferred to the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. The liquidation of the post in the 1990s was accompanied by a gradual devaluation of the importance attached to nuclear disarmament. While Sweden continued its commitment to multilateral arms control, the level of activities decreased during the 1990s and shifted toward non-proliferation.
- 3.
During the Cold War, the members of the Conference on Disarmament formed three groups: the Western Group, the Eastern Group, and the Group of 21 non-aligned states (G21). Until 1995, Sweden—like Iran—was officially a member of the G21. With its accession to the EU, this was no longer possible. Since then, Sweden has been outside any group formation while maintaining close ties to the Western Group and the G21.
- 4.
The data sample comprised a huge amount of statements uttered by revolutionary leaders and state representatives at various forums throughout the entire period of investigation. Reasons of space, however, allow for a selective reference to statements only.
- 5.
Sweden’s national export control legislation even goes beyond the NSG guidelines and European legislation (van Dassen 1995: 190). Sweden is one of the few European countries to carry out end-use controls on its nuclear exports. The re-export of exported materials also requires prior government approval, including within the EU (Berkol and Moreau 2009: 15, 20).
- 6.
In 1991, Hungary joined the group, also known as White Angels. Its members meet informally in the run-up to NPT Review Conferences to coordinate their positions and prepare joint working papers on verification, export control, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- 7.
Apart from Sweden, members were Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, and Tanzania. Palme led the group until his assassination in 1986.
- 8.
From 1976 to 1996, Swedes chaired the group (1976–1982 Dr. Ulf Ericsson; 1981–1996 Dr. Ola Dahlman). The GSE was dissolved in 1996 but continued its activities in Working Group B of the Test Ban Committee of the Disarmament Conference, which Dahlman chaired until 2006. See https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/background/interview-ola-dahlmanchairman-ctbto-working-groupon-verification-wgb-1996-2006/dahlman-1/. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 9.
In its report “Our Global Neighborhood,” the Commission called on the international community to initiate a program to eliminate all nuclear weapons within ten to fifteen years (Alani 1995: 17). The report is available at http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/243. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 10.
Other founding members were Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. Slovenia left the NAC due to American pressure and its accession to NATO.
- 11.
See the final report “Weapons of Terror - Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms” published in June 2006; https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmdcomm.html. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 12.
EU membership did change the framework for action, with the result that Sweden had to coordinate its arms control policy with European partners. However, this did not lead to a limited radius of action. On the contrary, membership of the Union has even increased Sweden’s influence in promoting the non-proliferation norm, as with the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the EU has adopted a common policy in 2003. The situation is, however, different in the realm of disarmament, where the tripartite division of EU members into NWS, alliance-free non-nuclear weapon states and NATO non-nuclear weapon states has so far prevented an agreement on far-reaching disarmament steps (Müller et al. 2013: 325).
- 13.
See the press release on the web site of the Swedish Embassy in Vienna: http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Vienna/Current-affairs/News/Sweden-promotes-the-entry-into-force-of-the-CTBT/. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 14.
In their “12-point programme for disarmament” (Socialdemokraterna 2010) adopted in 2010, the Social Democrats announce, among other things, their commitment to further reducing nuclear arsenals, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, and initiating consultations with like-minded states within the UN in order to discuss the conditions for a nuclear weapons convention.
- 15.
The newly elected government immediately reversed some arms control decisions of its predecessors: For example, Sweden declared its re-entry into the so-called de-alerting group, which advocates putting nuclear weapons off high alert (Regeringskansliet 2015).
- 16.
Email conversation with Alyson Bailes, 2 October 2007.
- 17.
See also the activity profile prepared by Reaching Critical Will; http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 18.
Sweden organized various seminars in 2001 to demonstrate the reliability of the CTBT verification system (Lindh 2001). It is also active in nuclear safety measures and supports the successor states of the Soviet Union in particular through practical measures within the IAEA, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction or through disarmament assistance for chemical and nuclear weapons stocks (Blom 2001; van Dassen and Wetter 2006: 256–57).
- 19.
Inga Thorsson chaired the NPT RevCon in 1975, in 1985 (Rolf Ekéus), and in 1990 (Carl-Magnus Hyltenius) Swedes chaired the Drafting Committee. In 2002, Henrik Salander chaired the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, at which Elisabeth Borsiin-Bonnier took over the chairmanship of Main Committee III.
- 20.
Swedish delegates were often involved as friends of the chair during the CTBT negotiations (1994 Bertil Roth, 1995 and 1996 Richard Ekwall) or, based on their national expertise, headed the CTBTO GSE or Working Group B dealing with questions of verification.
- 21.
So far, two Swedes have held the post of IAEA Director-General: Sigvard Eklund from 1961 to 1981 and Hans Blix from 1981 to 1997. The latter also headed the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which was responsible for monitoring Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program.
- 22.
The establishment of SIPRI in 1966 served similar aims: As a non-governmental institution, SIPRI makes a major contribution to the international disarmament debate through its comprehensive research program and the publication of numerous publications (e.g., the SIPRI Yearbook, which provides an overview of the state of international disarmament).
- 23.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of critical comments decreased for a short time, but increased again over the years. The brief decline can be explained by the fact that Sweden did not want to nip progress in the heyday of arms control after the end of the Cold War with ongoing criticism. See interviews with Jan Prawitz, 24 October 2007; Maj Britt Theorin, 25 November 2007; Hans Blix, 11 September 2010, and Rolf Ekéus 13 September 2010.
- 24.
Sweden’s accession to the EU did not, for example, prevent Prime Minister Carlsson from strongly condemning the French nuclear tests (van Dassen and Wetter 2006: 259).
- 25.
For example during the CTBT negotiations, Swedish disarmament ambassador Theorin called on the other parties to show flexibility and to deviate from maximum demands: “Sweden has a clear position on what should ideally be the content of a mandate of an ad hoc committee. Nevertheless, in order to allow for the urgently needed multilateral consideration to start, my delegation is ready to go along with any mandate that is acceptable to other delegations” (Theorin 1988).
- 26.
See http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 27.
So the former Head of the Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Dr. Christer Ahlström, in a background conversation, 7 September 2010, Stockholm.
- 28.
The chapter also covered the arms control policies of Egypt, Iran, and South Africa. The section on the DPRK was written by Hans-Joachim Schmidt in collaboration with Andrea Hellmann. Yet, they arrive at a different assessment of the DPRK’s status as a norm entrepreneur.
- 29.
The decision-making process is in the hands of a small circle of party officials, the army, and central intelligence officials. The “Supreme Leader” is considered to be the highest authority. Especially since the transfer of power to Kim Jong-Un, it is assumed that high-ranking military and family members are significantly involved in important decisions (Niksch 2007). See Park (2010); Gause (2013) on the political decision-making process, particularly with regard to arms control.
- 30.
- 31.
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 1992; http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 32.
Article X of the NPT states that each state party has the right to withdraw from the treaty if “extraordinary circumstances” make it impossible for it to remain in the treaty regime. In such a case, however, the respective member states are obliged to announce its intention to resign three months in advance. North Korea “suspended” the withdrawal decision one day before the deadline.
- 33.
Whether the withdrawal is legally binding is subject to controversy. North Korea referred to the suspended declaration of withdrawal of 1993, justifying its action within the necessary three-month period. In addition, North Korea had informed the UN Secretary-General but not the treaty community of its intention to withdraw. Some states therefore do not recognize the withdrawal (Bunn and Timerbaev 2005; Hilpert and Meier 2013: 5).
- 34.
From the outset, US treatment of North Korea differed from the predominantly confrontational punitive measures alleged “rogue states” were subjected to. Instead of isolation and containment, a strategy of “limited engagement by necessity” was used (Litwak 2000: 198).
- 35.
Surprisingly, there are few references to Article IV in North Korean statements, although the country has a civilian nuclear program and has complained the lack of cooperation. To be sure, there are references to the need for technological support and to the view that the requirement for cooperation constitutes a sovereign right of non-nuclear weapon states which must not be restricted by unfounded and “fabricated” accusations (e.g., Choe 2009). Yet North Korea’s argumentation does not go beyond references to its own nuclear program, a missionary instinct is completely missing.
- 36.
North Korea goes even further in its argumentation by framing the development of its own nuclear capabilities as a common good: “[O]ur deterrent is no danger anyway, but rather contributes to maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in its surroundings” (Hong 2007).
- 37.
Instead, North Korean delegates claim that the nuclear weapons program does not serve as a threat, but “only” as a deterrent and to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons (e.g., DPRK 2007).
- 38.
North Korea is suspected of having repeatedly violated Article III(2) of the NPT, which prohibits the transfer of nuclear materials to countries that have not concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. These include the export of nuclear know-how and related materials to countries such as Iran and Syria (Albright 2013; or https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile. Accessed 28 April 2017). At the same time, North Korea claims to comply with the treaty. Pollack quotes a statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry in October 2009, shortly after the second nuclear test: “We will always sincerely implement our international commitment in the field of nuclear non-proliferation as a responsible nuclear[weapons] state”; quoted after Pollack (2009: 269).
- 39.
In the early years of its NAM membership (admission in 1975), North Korea tried to play an active role. Shim concludes “that it had the capacity to play an active and effective role in international diplomacy” (Shim 2014: 4). Nevertheless, already back then it was suspected to use the NAM context merely as platform rather than a forum of like-minded states (Krishnan 1981).
- 40.
This was confirmed to me by various IAEA staff and arms control officials from various states during my interviews in Vienna in spring 2012.
- 41.
See http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles#. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 42.
The establishment of a nuclear weapons capacity could be interpreted as a reaction to unjustified intervention in national sovereignty and would thus come close to the concept of norm subsidiarity. However, no such argumentation could be found in the analyzed North Korean speeches.
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Wunderlich, C. (2020). Comparing Prototypical and Unorthodox Norm Advocacy. In: Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs. Norm Research in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5_8
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