Abstract
This chapter comprises the empirical core of “Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs,” zooming in on the arms control policies of Iran. While most scholars dismiss Iranian arms control policy as political maneuvering and propaganda instrument, Wunderlich shows that it is also norm-driven and fits the theoretical concept of norm entrepreneurship. Based on a detailed process-tracing, Wunderlich reconstructs three different instances of Iranian norm advocacy with regard to the control of weapons of mass destruction: Iran’s commitment to nuclear disarmament, its advocacy for a right to uranium enrichment as well as Iranian engagement for assistance and protection for the victims of chemical weapons. Based on a set of criteria distilled from the literature on norms, Wunderlich explores the strategies and means through which Iranian norm entrepreneurship unfolds and discusses the extent to which it differs from prototypical norm advocacy.
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Notes
- 1.
Information on decision-making and implementation procedures is scarce (Pirseyedi 2013: 4). The Iranian Foreign Ministry maintains a number of political research institutes which, inter alia, discuss arms control policy issues (Posch 2013: 9–11) and prepare information for an English-speaking audience. Yet, most arms control guidelines or position papers exist in Farsi only (but see Shababi 1994).
- 2.
As provided for in the NPT, Iran concluded a “Safeguards Agreement” with the IAEA in 1973 to ensure that the declared nuclear activities served peaceful purposes. There is a controversy as to whether the Shah, despite his willingness to cooperate, nevertheless wanted to keep the option of a military nuclear program open (see Patrikarakos 2012: 96–103).
- 3.
Then Supreme Leader Khomeini is said to have issued a fatwa outlawing the production and use of chemical weapons already during the war with Iraq. While the fatwa has been repeatedly referred to by religious and political leaders and even put into writing (Iran 2005e; Salehi 2012), skepticism remains regarding the prohibition’s scope and legal status (Eisenstadt 2011; Tabatabai 2014).
- 4.
The data sample comprised a huge amount of statements uttered by revolutionary leaders and state representatives at various forums throughout the entire period of investigation. Reasons of space, however, allow for a selective reference to statements only.
- 5.
Representatives of the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, and conservative politicians feared that the CWC could restrict the country’s military freedom of action. In view of neighboring countries striving for WMD, such as Israel, India, or Pakistan, and due to dissatisfaction with the design and implementation of the CWC, they demanded that Iran should maintain a chemical weapons option. In addition, Iran demanded that the USA and Russia ratified the treaty first (Pirseyedi 2013: 87–91). Ultimately, the Parliament reserved the right to withdraw from the CWC under certain circumstances, i.e., if contractual obligations were implemented incompletely or discriminatively or if peaceful uses of technology was disproportionately hindered. The declaration of reservation is available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=109. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 6.
http://www.opcw.org/protection/protection-against-chemical-weapons/. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 7.
The text of the treaty is available at https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/download-convention. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 8.
This was explained to me by former and current employees of the OPCW during the background conversations conducted in May and June 2015; see Interview Khateri 12 May 2015, The Hague; Mashhadi, 9 June 2015; Trapp 31 May 2015.
- 9.
Interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015.
- 10.
Telephone interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015.
- 11.
Tehran Radio reported the dropping of chemical bombs over the city of Susangerd already in November 1980 (Robinson and Goldblat 1984). According to official sources, Iraq began building a large-scale CW program in 1982 in order to counter Iran’s conventional superiority (UN 2006). The first use of mustard gas is dated back to the summer of 1983. Beginning in 1984, Iraq carried out large-scale attacks with the nerve agent Tabun and mustard gas against Iranian positions (Karsh 1993: 37; Ali 2001: 47–48; Khateri 2010). While sources vary with regard to the exact dates, there is consensus that Saddam Hussein from 1984 to 1986 used unprecedented levels of toxic gas against both Iranian soldiers and civilians.
- 12.
By its own account, Iraq produced some 3850 tons of chemical warfare agents (mustard gas, tabun, sarin, and VX) between 1981 and 1991. Approximately, 3300 tons of agents were weaponized in different types of bombs, artillery munitions, and missile warheads. About 80 percent of these warfare agents were used from 1982 to 1990 (UN 2006).
- 13.
Interview with the former head of the Iranian disarmament delegation at the CD, 9 June 2015.
- 14.
Iraqi military dropped a total of seven mustard gas-filled bombs. According to official reports, more than half of the inhabitants of the village fell victim to the attacks; http://www.tehranpeacemuseum.org/files/pdf/Sardasht%20gas%20Attack-Foroutan.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 15.
The attack is considered the worst toxic gas attack since the First World War—5000 people died, 7000 were injured, and 75 percent of them women and children.
- 16.
In 2011, Iran’s efforts resulted in a decision of the OPCW’s Executive Council to commemorate the annual attacks on Sardasht with an official ceremony. The importance attached to symbolic gestures is also illustrated by the Iranian proposal to name part of the OPCW site after the Iranian city of Sardasht in 2008. http://news/article/opcw-director-general-meets-deputy-foreign-minister-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 17.
Iran also invested in national education campaigns that were similar in both content and nature to international efforts. Yet, these measures were not included into the analysis because they are of no relevance for assessing global norm entrepreneurship.
- 18.
An overview of Iran’s letters to the UN as well as the resolutions adopted and missions undertaken can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/studies/middle_east.shtml. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 19.
Besides on-site inspections in Iran, medical experts also conducted clinical analyses of alleged victims brought to European hospitals for treatment purposes. A summary of the results of the UN investigations from 1984 to 1988 can be found in Findlay (1991: 139–143).
- 20.
Iran had already presented a draft resolution in September 1984 in which the Iraqi use of poisonous gas was condemned as a breach of the Geneva Protocol—but due to American opposition this initiative failed (Battle 2003). Security Council resolutions adopted before 1986 contained neither references to the CW attacks nor named Iraq as the aggressor. Only in 1988, following the attacks on the Kurdish civilian population in Halabja, a UN Security Council resolution (A/RES/620) was passed that identified Iraq as aggressor.
- 21.
Fearing that the revolutionary Iranian regime would grow stronger, but also because of their trade relations with Iraq, many Western governments, particularly the USA, were reluctant to condemn Iraq or even impose sanctions. However, after public reporting had addressed the issue, some countries such as Australia, France, Japan, the UK, and later also the USA, restricted chemical trade with Iraq (Ali 2001: 49–50).
- 22.
Throughout the war, Iraq received political support and military assistance from the West. For the development of the chemical weapons program, Iraq needed foreign technologies, equipment, and raw materials, which were officially requested under the pretext of establishing a state pesticide production (UN 2006).
- 23.
Pakistan also drafted several working papers on the issue matter (Kenyon and Mashhadi 2007).
- 24.
Hassan Mashhadi, telephone interview, 9 June 2015.
- 25.
Interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague.
- 26.
By its own account, Iran had already called for establishing such a network in 2003 (Iran 2010h).
- 27.
The group of Western European and other states feared that the fund could be used politically to link the issue of the long-term consequences of chemical weapons use with possible questions about the responsibility of Western companies for chemical and technology supplies to Iraq. See Interview Mashhadi, 9 June 2015; interview with representatives of the Western group within the OPCW, May 2015. I could only find one speech in which during an Executive Council meeting South Africa on behalf of the African group expressed its support (South Africa 2011). Civil society and the OPCW welcomed the initiative and saw the establishment of the network as reasonable; see interviews with OPCW staff, arms control experts, and NGOs in The Hague in May 2015.
- 28.
So far, the financial contribution of the signatory states has been modest: Iraq has failed to keep its promise of 5000 euros for the aid fund. See interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague. The OPCW donated a share of the Nobel Peace Prize money of 20,000 euros and Dr. Robert Matthews, winner of The Hague Award 2014 donated 45,000 euros for the network. http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech562.html. Accessed 28 April 2017. Iran criticizes the reluctant financial participation and urges particularly those states to make a contribution that supplied Iraq with materials and technology (Gharib Abadi 2013).
- 29.
See https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/victims-of-chemical-weapons-network/. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 30.
In addition to Iranian experts, scientists from Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the USA were involved in the preparation of the handbook; see https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ICA/APB/Practical_Guide_for_Medical_Management_of_Chemical_Warfare_Casualties_-_web.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 31.
Interviews with members of Western countries within the OPCW, 11 and 13 May 2015 in The Hague.
- 32.
See http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 33.
A member of the Western group within the OPCW reported on the incident during my interview trip to The Hague.
- 34.
See background conversations with members of the OPCW in May 2015; telephone interview with Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015 and email conversation with Dr. Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015.
- 35.
“Genesis and Historical Development”. http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-and-historical-development/. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 36.
To date, only 45 countries have contributed to the aid fund, which has a budget of approximately EUR 1.5 million. This amount may be used by the OPCW in an emergency to assist a State Party. See Interview Khateri, OPCW employee, 12 May 2015 in The Hague.
- 37.
The text “Memorandum of Understanding between the OPCW and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Provision of Assistance” dated 02 July 1999 has been published in OPCW (2000).
- 38.
Interview with Shahriar Khateri, employee of the responsible OPCW department, 12 May 2015, The Hague.
- 39.
No further courses have been held since 2008. According to a member of the Assistance and Protection Branch, it is unclear why Iran suspended them. The OPCW had repeatedly expressed interest in resuming the courses, as Iranian expertise was irreplaceable. See interview Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague. Upon request, the head of Iran's national CWC Supervisory Authority cited as a reason the uncooperative behavior of the Director-General of the OPCW with regard to the allocation of offices within the Technical Secretariat. Apparently, there are no plans to resume the courses in the near future. To be fair, it should be noted that the OPCW has spent less money on capacity building in recent years than before, interview with a former OPCW employee, 09 June 2015.
- 40.
For ASSISTEX 1, which took place from 10 to 14 September 2002 in Zadar/Croatia, Iran provided a medical team of six and a field hospital; https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ICA/APB/ASSISTEX_I_%20Croatia_2002/ASSISTEX1_CDQ_2003_No01.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017. Iran also participated with a medical team in ASSISTEX 2, which took place from 10 to 14 September 2002 until 14 October 2005 in Lviv/Ukraine, interview Khateri, 12 May 2015. Iran did not participate in ASSISTEX 3 from 6 to 8 July 2010 in Tunisia.
- 41.
Interviews with Shahriar Khateri, 12 May 2015, The Hague; Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015.
- 42.
The OPCW Technical Secretariat regularly conducts regional assistance and protection trainings in one of the countries of the region. Iran regularly participated in such courses and provided the expertise of Iranian doctors (Chemical Disarmament Quarterly 2008: 22).
- 43.
This is also done by the Baqiyatallah Hospital in Tehran granting scientists from all over the world access to chemical weapons victims and thus contributing to the scientific development of new treatment options (Vick 2012).
- 44.
Iranian NGOs are involved in such measures. However, in a country like Iran governmental approval is necessary for international civil society exchanges. Therefore, such measures are seen as an indicator of government activities.
- 45.
Information on Iran’s practical activities stems from secondary literature, primary sources, interviews, the annual reports of the OPCW as well as information from the CBW Bulletin (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html. Accessed 28 April 2017) and the two journals Chemical Disarmament Quarterly and OPCW Today published by the OPCW.
- 46.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article VI, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html; 25 June 2018.
- 47.
Decision on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2); http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/prin_obj.htm. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 48.
This view was reinforced in 1996 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the threat and use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law and confirmed the existence of a disarmament norm. Following that decision, some observers argued that Article VI acquired the status of customary international law (e.g., Joyner 2014).
- 49.
The “13 steps” are contained in the final document of the 2000 NPV Review Conference: NPT/CONF.2000/28 (part I), para. 15, 14–15.
- 50.
Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/FinalDocument.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 51.
At present (November 2018), Iran operates a seismic monitoring station in Tehran and two further aid stations in Kerman and Shushtar. A radionuclide station and an infrasonic station are planned. See http://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station profiles/. Accessed 28 November 2018.
- 52.
For example by supporting the relevant action plan that the non-aligned countries submitted during the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NAM 2010).
- 53.
See A/Res/60/70 of 2005; A/Res/62/24 of 2007; A/Res/64/31 of 2009 and A/Res/66/28 of 2011.
- 54.
Earlier, the Shah regime had criticized the superpowers’ continuing arms race and their unwillingness to enter into serious disarmament negotiations (e.g., Hoveyda 1972: 3). Although moderate in tone and careful not to blame the superpowers all too clearly, Iran called on them to live up to their responsibility.
- 55.
An exception is the reference to Israel's suspected nuclear weapon status and the related demand that Israel should abandon its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT as NNWS. During the Iran–Iraq war, there are also repeated passages calling explicitly for Iraq to be condemned. Usually, more general terms such as “the nuclear weapon states” or “a certain nuclear weapon state” are used.
- 56.
The USA, France, and Great Britain are explicitly mentioned, whereas China and Russia are not referred to.
- 57.
For comparison, here are the quotas of some particularly disarmament friendly countries: Austria 15, Brazil 22, Egypt 20, Germany 10, Ireland 3, Mexico 23, Sweden 8, South Africa 21, New Zealand 24. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles, 28 November 2018. For the analysis, I have refrained from quantifying the proportion of text passages relating to the issue of nuclear disarmament in comparison with the total amount of text itself. Firstly, the completeness of the data basis could not be guaranteed, as not all documents were accessible (in particular for the early review conferences). Secondly, the analysis showed that Iran referred to this aspect in almost every speech or working paper, thus also placing other issues in the broader context of nuclear disarmament.
- 58.
- 59.
The (rhetorical) commitment to nuclear disarmament is evaluated in the categories “Commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons”; “Role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies”; “CTBT”; “FMCT”; “engagement in research and development for verification of measures of nuclear weapons reductions”; “irreversibility”; “disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society” (Hiroshima Report 2012, 2014). A problem is that in some cases participation in initiatives whose membership is circumscribed to an inclusive circle is also evaluated—which negatively affects the level of Iranian engagement (as well as that of other countries who are excluded from such arrangements).
- 60.
Examples for publications by governmental think tanks are Shahabi (1994); Zarif et al. (1996) or the overviews on the homepages of the Center for Strategic Research and the Institute for Political and International Studies: http://www.csr.ir/center.aspx?lng=en and http://www.ipis.ir/index.aspx?siteid=9. Accessed 28 November 2018.
- 61.
See http://cms.mfa.gov.ir/cms/cms/Tehranicd/en/ConclusionofDiscussion. Accessed 2 November 2014.
- 62.
Key topics were the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the conference in Helsinki scheduled for 2012. According to participants, the first priority for Iranian government members was to demand Israel's unconditional accession to the NPT; confidential participation report of a Western NGO representative.
- 63.
Email conversation with a participating scientist 20 July 2011; see also Press TV (2010).
- 64.
Apart from the discriminatory division into nuclear haves and have-nots, a second asymmetry of the NPT is that about three dozen states possess sophisticated nuclear capabilities, while those of the majority of treaty members are limited (Franceschini 2012: 3). This is why it is particularly important for the latter to implement the arrangements set out in Article IV, i.e., to enable cooperation. Controversies reign especially with regard to the scope of trade in civilian nuclear energy.
- 65.
Confusion results from the fact that the “inalienable right” formulated in Article IV is conditional upon the State Party behaving in conformity with the obligations set out in Articles I and II: These prohibit the parties from any activities aimed at the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons. In particular, it is contested which measures already violate the requirement laid down in Article II not to “manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
- 66.
Iran is not the only country that interprets Article IV of the NPT as entailing an inherent right to enrichment and reprocessing. Today, Brazil, Mexico, and Romania in particular share this concern. During the treaty negotiations, Western countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland had spoken out in favor of more explicit language (Shaker 1980: 293–299). Back then, Iran was not yet a member of the negotiation forum and thus did not participate.
- 67.
See http://nuclearenergy.ir/history/. Accessed 2 November 2014. Unfortunately, the web site has now been put offline, but it can be reconstructed via Internet archives such as the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/).
- 68.
- 69.
This is not illegal in itself, but falls within Article IV, which allows research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, Iran would have been obliged to inform the organization of the facility, at least 90 days before it was to be equipped with nuclear materials. After the revelation, Tehran argued that there was no such reporting obligation and that it had intended to inform the IAEA later that year (IAEA 2003).
- 70.
For an overview of IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear program see http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 71.
It took almost six months for the IAEA to gain access to the facilities in Arak and Natanz. In the years that followed, Iran withheld information and used tactical maneuvering. In the course of the attempts to clarify the situation, even more dubious activities came to light, e.g., the supply of construction plans for P-2 centrifuges by the Khan network (IAEA 2004a) or experiments with polonium-210, which can trigger a chain reaction necessary for a nuclear explosion (Patrikarakos 2012: 280–281.
- 72.
How to achieve that aim was contested. While Europe pleaded for diplomacy, Washington favored strong condemnation and a referral of the case to the UN Security Council. In the eyes of some Europeans, by resuming enrichment activities, Iran had not violated its NPT commitments but the safeguards agreement with the IAEA (El Baradei 2011: Chap. 9; Patrikarakos 2012: 255–263).
- 73.
In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear program continued to make progress. In 2005, Rouhani, the chief negotiator at the time, admitted that Iran had entered into concessions only in areas in which there were no more technical problems. The main aim had been to gain time in order to make progress in mastering the full fuel cycle and to prevent a referral to the UN Security Council (Rouhani 2005).
- 74.
A nuclear proposals timeline published on the government-related Web site http://nuclearnenergy.ir shows that "Recognition of Right to Enrichment" was a recurring element of Iran's negotiating position; http://nuclearenergy.ir/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/negotiationsfinal.jpg. Accessed 2 November 2014. Apart from agreements in October 2003, February and November 2004, however, offers from the West did not include the required recognition so that Tehran refused the proposals. In addition, the USA has long called for a ban on enrichment as a precondition for negotiations. Iran, on the other hand, was at best willing to accept a (temporary) suspension as a result of negotiations.
- 75.
Iran agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges from 190,000 to 6000 for a period of six years; to keep only 300 kg of the 12,000 kg enriched uranium in the country over a period of 15 years; to modify the heavy-water reactor Arak, so that it becomes unusable for weapons purposes; to suspend enrichment in the Fordo underground research facility for a period of 15 years and use centrifuges only for research purposes. It is allowed to retain Natanz as the only enrichment facility and to enrich uranium to only 3.67% over a period of 15 years. The agreement also provides for comprehensive IAEA verification measures. In addition, Iran agrees to allow inspections of military installations, subject to certain conditions. In the preamble, Tehran also renounces forever the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This obligation is unprecedented and goes beyond the provisions of the NPT, which in Article X contains a withdrawal clause (Müller 2015).
- 76.
While Iran was initially open to the possibility of multilateral fuel arrangements (e.g., Amrollahi 1986), it became increasingly skeptical about such considerations. Even against the background of its own experience, Tehran argues that one cannot rely on international promises. In 2010, then Iranian IAEA ambassador Soltanieh described plans to establish fuel banks as “nuclear apartheid” (quoted in CNN 2010) which would further exacerbate already existing discrimination.
- 77.
This figure does not claim to be complete, as I did not have access to all statements/documents issued by Iran. For the analysis, I drew on verbatim records provided by Iran where possible. In some cases, especially for the early NPT documents, only summary records were available.
- 78.
The coding scheme is available upon request.
- 79.
The figure shows this trend over time. The comparability of the primary data is only limited: During the NPT Review Conferences, which are held periodically every five years, a large number of speeches and working papers are presented, resulting in an accumulation of nominations in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (no references could be found in 1975, 1980, and 1990). In contrast, IAEA General Assemblies are held annually and only last a few days. Here, it was only in 1985 that Iran first referred to its “inalienable right”. At the time of the evaluation, no statements were available for the most recent NPT Review Conference 2015. Politicians involved in the negotiations explained the decline in the framing of “inalienable rights” from 2005 to 2010 with the fact that Iran has put all available diplomatic resources into resolving the nuclear conflict and has thus made fewer statements in both forums in purely quantitative terms during this period. See interviews with Soltanieh, 25 April 2012, Vienna; Mousavian, 3 May 2012, Vienna.
- 80.
See also interviews with Soltanieh, 25 April 2012, Vienna; Mousavian, 3 May 2012, Vienna.
- 81.
From 1977 to 1980, a UN resolution on “Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development” was put to the vote (A/RES/32/50 of 1977; A/RES/33/4 of 1978; A/RES/34/63 of 1979; A/RES/35/112 of 1980). From 1981 to 1997 there was a resolution on “United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” (A/RES/36/78 of 1981; A/RES/37/167 of 1982; A/RES/38/60 of 1983; A/RES/39/74 of 1984; A/RES/40/95 of 1985; A/RES/41/21/212B of 1986; A/RES/42/24 of 1987).
- 82.
In May 1977, a follow-up event entitled “Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle” took place in Salzburg. Another follow-up conference that Iran had agreed to host in 1981 fell victim to the Islamic Revolution and was instead held in Geneva without Iranian participation.
- 83.
See a compilation “The Supreme Leader's view on nuclear energy”, available at http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=101,442. Accessed 28 April 2017.
- 84.
See http://nuclearenergy.ir. Accessed 2 November 2014.
- 85.
This is the title of the opening banner on the web site http://nuclearenergy.ir. Accessed 2 November 2014.
- 86.
Hassan Rouhani, 25.2.2014 (11:34 a.m.) tweet: “To dear ppl of #Hormozgan: Gov will not retreat one iota from protecting rights of Iranian nation incl. right to peaceful nuclear technology”. Similarly Rouhani, Hassan (Hassan Rouhani). “As NPT signatory, what we pursue in the final#nuclear agreement is for #Iranian nation to exercise all its rights under international law.”, February 23, 2014, 9:15 a.m. Tweet.
- 87.
http://www.youtube.com/watcz?v=Ao2WH6GDWz4. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 88.
The conference program, a list of participants, and individual speeches can be found on the homepage of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://cms.mfa.gov.ir/cms/cms/Tehranicd/en. Accessed 28 August 2015.
- 89.
The list of participants circulating on the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not correspond to the actual composition. While Tehran had not even invited the USA because of the lack of diplomatic relations, the EU refused to participate, as Iran apparently wanted to deny it an active role that went beyond being present at the opening ceremony (Westberg 2010). According to participating NGO members, Western countries would have participated in the 2011 follow-up conference, but only “incognito,” email conversation with a participating scientist 20 July 2011.
- 90.
Unfortunately, I could not find speeches or press releases for the follow-up conference. The information cited here is based on background discussions with participating civil society representatives, e.g., email conversation with a participating scientist on 20 July 2011 and conversations during the preparatory commission for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2012.
- 91.
Due to the scope of the topic, it was not possible to search all potential sources for indications of Iranian activities regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The information listed here is based on interviews, evaluated primary sources within the IAEA and the NPT Review Conferences, IAEA annual reports, and a literature analysis. Iran also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund through voluntary financial contributions (Ameri 1975; Etemad 1974). In cooperation with the IAEA, the country also organized a series of technical workshops and training courses, in particular on medical nuclear research. In addition, Iranian delegates reaffirmed their willingness to make their nuclear expertise available to other states (Salehi 2009, 2010). The annual reports give an overview of each country’s activities within the IAEA in the area of technical cooperation. See https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub/Ann-Reports/index.html. Accessed 28 April 2017. Since these activities did not serve directly to advocate the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, they are not listed in Table 7.4.
- 92.
The following information is based on conversations with Ralf Trapp, 31 May 2015, and Hassan Mashhadi, 9 June 2015.
- 93.
See interview Trapp, 31 May 2015.
- 94.
See http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/profiles. Accessed 28 April 2017 and talks with observers of the negotiations during field research at the OPCW in The Hague in May 2015.
- 95.
For example, Iran assumed the role of “friends of the chair/president” during the 1978 special session on disarmament or in the NPT negotiations in 1995 or 2010, interviews with Soltanieh on 25 April 2012; Kmentt 24 April 2012; Mousavian 18 March 2015.
- 96.
Interviews with various IAEA staff members who had been involved in the negotiations with Iran (14 March 2012, 16 and 17 April 2012, Vienna) and various arms control officials who participated in CWC and NPT negotiations.
- 97.
Interview Trapp, 31 May 2015.
- 98.
Statement of then spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Ramin Mehmanparast, during an interview with the Iranian state television station PressTV on the sidelines of the “Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 2010” on April 28, 2010 (quoted from Press TV 2010).
- 99.
This was also confirmed by former Iranian IAEA Ambassador, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, in an interview with the author on 25 April 2012 in Vienna. In both cases, a compromise solution was found at the last minute: In 1985, the Australian delegation persuaded Iran to add the reference to an appendix to the final document; in 2010, the non-aligned under the leadership of Egypt succeeded in persuading Iran to compromise. In 2010, Iran was also concerned with preventing condemnation or criticism of its nuclear programme (Müller 2010: 8). Rebecca Johnson therefore ascribes to Tehran a strategy of “block[ing] without being blamed” (Johnson 2010: 4).
- 100.
So far, however, no such statements have been made in government circles. On the contrary, Tehran was keen to reject concerns and underline its commitment to the NPT (Shirazi 2013).
- 101.
In interviews when I asked about Iran’s “destructive strategies,” I was repeatedly reminded by arms control experts and IAEA representatives that a distinction must be made between Tehran’s behavior in the nuclear negotiations and its arms control diplomacy. What Tanya Ogilvie-White calls “belligerent approach to nuclear diplomacy” (Ogilvie-White 2012: 149), i.e., “making and breaking commitments, playing cat and mouse with the IAEA and international negotiators, periodically appearing to climb down, and all the while pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent” (Ogilvie-White 2010: 120), applies exclusively to the former. An IAEA staff member who was involved in the Iran negotiations said: “Iran is only obstructionist, where the military dimension of its program is concerned, and by the way, which party would not?” On the multilateral level, by contrast, Iran has presented itself as a skilled and sometimes difficult negotiating partner, but by no means exclusively acts as a troublemaker. Background talks with IAEA staff and representatives of various groups of States, 14 and 16 March 2012, 16 and 17 April 2012 in Vienna.
- 102.
Background conversation with a member of the EU3 negotiating team.
- 103.
The compromise of the first review conference was negotiated by the USA, the UK, Iran, and India. The agreements reached at the second conference were agreed by a group of 23 states in which Iran and India played key roles. See interview Soltanieh 25 April 2012; Trapp 31 May 2015.
- 104.
Indeed, Iran’s nuclear rights narrative is not novel: India took this position during the treaty negotiations. New Delhi finally refrained from membership of the NPT because it feared that the treaty could establish a kind of new “nuclear apartheid regime”. Other non-aligned states were also actively involved in the wording of Article IV during the treaty negotiations, such as Romania.
- 105.
Interview Mashhadi 9 June 2015; also background conversation with a member of Western Group to OPCW, 11 May 2015 and Trapp 31 May 2015. During the CWC treaty negotiations, Iran cooperated mainly with Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan, in recent years particularly closely with Syria and—with the exception of India—with the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).
- 106.
For example, interviews with members of Western delegations to the OPCW conducted in May 2015.
References
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Wunderlich, C. (2020). Iran as a Norm Entrepreneur. In: Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs. Norm Research in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5_7
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