Abstract
The chapter presents the research design guiding the empirical analysis that lies at the heart of “Rogue states as norm entrepreneurs.” Addressing analytical limitations of liberal norm studies and building on a thorough literature review, Wunderlich offers a useful set of criteria to identify and assess norm entrepreneurship. Recourse to this analytical framework will not only help scholars to properly apply the concept in future research but also allow for analytically and sound comparisons of different types of norm advocates. The chapter also discusses theory-based alternative explanations for the behavior of “rogue states” and norms that either depict them as norm breakers or as advocates of subsidiary norms. Furthermore, Wunderlich provides detailed coding schemes and process-tracing procedures for conducting empirical analyses.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Checkel criticizes this bias and calls on scholars to also analyze failed cases, “where an entrepreneur works his/her magic and nothing happens” (Checkel 2012: 5). In addition, he complains that most scholars are rather intransparent about their methodological approach and often fail to make it clear that they use process tracing.
- 3.
Cuba was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and no longer referred to as a “rogue” when the USA restarted diplomatic relations with the Cuban government in 2015.
- 4.
In addition to the first-ever Iranian speech to the United Nations (1946), these were: The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951), the coup against Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh (1953), and the year before the revolution (1978). If the salient events did occur after the general debate for the respective year, the speeches of the following year or the next participation were also taken into account. The general debates of 1987 (Khamenei), 2001 (Khatami), 2007 and 2012 (Ahmadinejad), 2014 (Rouhani) with presidential representation are particularly referred to in the text.
- 5.
Iran was admitted to the then conference on the Committee on Disarmament, as the CD was called back in 1975. For the period from 1968 to 1975, I therefore drew on Iranian speeches given in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.
- 6.
All speeches given within UN bodies were collected from relevant UN websites. See http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick and http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=speech&menu=search. National statements by Khamenei can be found on his homepage: http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?page=2&p=bayanatArchive&year=2015; 28.04.2017 and http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=archivesection&id=2&Itemid=31; 28.04.2017. Collected speeches by Khomeini are compiled in Algar (1981) and the International Affairs Department (1995).
- 7.
Among others, these included Acronym Institute (http://www.acronym.org.uk; 28.04.2017), Reaching Critical Will (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org) and the journals Arms Control Reporter and Disarmament Diplomacy.
- 8.
The Conference on Disarmament dates back to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), founded in 1962, which was expanded to 30 members in 1969 and renamed the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament. In 1975, it added a further five members (including Iran). In 1979, it was restructured and renamed Conference on Disarmament (CD). Today, the CD has 65 members.
- 9.
IAEA debates can be found at https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/Documents/; BWC and CWC documents at http://www.opbw.org/ and https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-states-parties/; for the NPT at http://unbisnet.un.org; reachingcriticalwill.org; or http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_Conferences.shtml. Documents older than 1993 were not available online and were therefore obtained from the UN Depositary Library in Heidelberg. Relevant Swedish documents were collected during a field research stay in autumn 2010 in the library of the Foreign Ministry and the Anna Lindh Library.
- 10.
See interview with Klaus Scharioth, a former German diplomat with long-standing expertise in the field of arms control, July 16, 2012, Berlin.
- 11.
In total, I conducted about 30 personal interviews and three telephone conversations during field research stays in the Hague, Germany, Sweden, and the USA. In some cases, I received written answers to my questions (by email). Some persons agreed to the interview only on condition of anonymity, so that they are referred to only with a generalized description of their function (e.g., “member of the Non-Aligned Movement within the UN”). A detailed list of all interview partners is available on request.
- 12.
That the question concerned sensitive areas of Iranian national interest complicated issues further. It must also be born in mind that on both sides—Iran and the West, above all the USA—there is sometimes a mutual demonization, marked by propaganda and decades of misperception, which makes objective information more difficult. Especially at the beginning of field research, it was quite a challenge to maneuver through this “propaganda jungle.”
- 13.
Norm entrepreneurship tends rather to be policy-specific than across the board. Often, activism centers on a special theme, yet it may well be motivated by a fundamental opposition to the current normative order. In addition, limited resources make cross-political norm entrepreneurship unlikely. However, some studies indicate that certain national identities and role models increase the probability that actors will become norm entrepreneurs (e.g., Björkdahl 2002; Becker et al. 2008; Müller and Wunderlich 2013).
- 14.
Usually, the internalization of a norm—i.e., its being taken-for-grantedness—is regarded as the highest level of successful norm diffusion. However, this can hardly be proven empirically because an internalized norm is no longer reflected by the actors using it and thus leaves no empirical trail.
- 15.
This also corresponds to a logical chronological sequence, i.e., if an actor has succeeded in putting a topic on the political agenda; she will try to codify it and, if successful, will then work for its preservation.
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Wunderlich, C. (2020). Researching and Operationalizing Prototypical and Unconventional Norm Entrepreneurship. In: Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs. Norm Research in International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5_5
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