Abstract
In liberal democratic societies, there is broad agreement that human persons are of equal moral worth and that we should treat one another as equals. Bromell notes that we do not agree, however, on what it means to treat one another equally, above all in the distribution of social goods. This chapter reflects on what equality means; the basis of human equality; why equality matters; what it means to treat one another equally; and equality between persons and groups, including the place of special measures (affirmative action) and measures to redress historical injustices. The proposed resolution for public leadership is to be impartial. This implies equal concern and respect for persons as persons, including the very young, the very old and the profoundly disabled; blocking hegemonic attempts to secure unequal advantage; and open rather than closed impartiality.
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Notes
- 1.
Jan Scown, in a private communication (May 31, 2019), commented that during negotiations on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, recognising that “equal” does not mean “the same” simplified things considerably. Discussion could acknowledge people in all our diversity as well as imperatives for public policy that follow from our basic human equality.
- 2.
Waldron (2017, pp. 19–35) explicitly addresses the philosophical racism of Hastings Rashdall (1907), who argued that there are objective and important differences of kind between human beings, and that “sooner or later, the lower Well-being—it may be ultimately the very existence—of countless Chinamen or negroes must be sacrificed that a higher life may be possible for a much smaller number of white men” (cited by Waldron, 2017, p. 22).
- 3.
This idea links to the “best judge” principle discussed in Sect. 4.2.1.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
On the relationship between facts and normative principles, see Cohen (2008, Chap. 6). Cohen argues that “if any facts support any principles, then there are fact-insensitive principles that account for that relationship of support (and, by the same token, if we have any principles at all, then we have fact-insensitive principles)” (pp. 247–248). He clarifies this: “My view that all fact-sensitive principles presuppose fact-insensitive principles doesn’t, then, require that an ‘ought’ can’t follow from an ‘is’. My position is neutral with respect to that dispute…” (p. 249).
- 7.
Metaphysics is logical analysis of unconditionally necessary (a priori) truths. Waldron (2017) himself does not go this far. He does discuss and commend a religious (Anglican Christian) basis for equality (pp. 175–214) and states that human worth and dignity have to be rooted in something like a theological anthropology. His line of argument is important because it hints at the sort of metaphysics we need to complete it, without falling back on the affirmation of beliefs and commitments that not everyone shares. His account of the basis of human equality could, I think, be completed by a transcendental metaphysics of the neoclassical sort capable of distinguishing existence and actuality. See, for example, Whitehead (1978); Hartshorne (1934, 1953, 1962, 1987a, 1987b); Ogden (2018, pp. 141–222); and Gamwell (1990, 2000, 2012). A neoclassical metaphysics has the further advantage of being able to address continuities and discontinuities between humans and the other creatures who share our planet—Waldron’s (2017) principles of continuous and distinctive equality (pp. 30–31). See, for example, Hartshorne (1962, 1968); and Birch (1990, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1999).
- 8.
- 9.
Waldron (2017, p. 112) explains that while there is some consonance between his emphasis on capabilities as the properties that ground human equality and the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, he is not invoking capabilities as a currency of justice. Rather, he is singling out a smaller set of capabilities as a basis for our equal worth. See further Nussbaum (2006).
- 10.
Waldron here explicitly addresses (pp. 237–247) Peter Singer’s rejection of a principle of distinctive equality that places a different (and higher) moral value on human beings than non-human animals.
- 11.
Raz (1986) explains: “… what makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality but the concern identified by the underlying principle. It is the hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy, the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are worse off in the relevant respect than their neighbours is relevant. But it is relevant not as an independent evil of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their need more pressing, their suffering more hurtful, and therefore our concern for the hungry, the needy, the suffering, and not our concern for equality, makes us give them the priority” (p. 240).
- 12.
Dworkin (2000) reminds us that in totalitarian dictatorships private citizens have equal political power (none), and authoritarian governments and pseudo-democracies may scrupulously ensure one person, one vote (but only for a single party). He argues that “any adequate theory of political equality must compare political power along two dimensions: not only horizontally, by comparing the power of different private citizens or groups of citizens, but also vertically, by comparing the power of private citizens with individual officials” (pp. 190–191).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
My discussion in this section is concerned with identity politics within the nation state. Citizenship is also a form of group identity that a state may use to differentiate access to certain rights and privileges within its borders; for example, access to state-funded services and the right to vote.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
Sometimes we talk about this as the difference between equality and equity, where equity has the sense of proportional equality in the distribution of costs and benefits, taking account of factors such as age, needs, luck, agreements (for example, treaties), merit, effort and contribution (Bromell, 2017, p. 106; Duclos, 2006). See further Sect. 6.2.3.2.
- 19.
An exception to this might be special measures to compensate for permanent impairment that persistently and demonstrably compromises social equality, equal basic liberties and equality before the law.
- 20.
Lindsey MacDonald (2016) comments, contra Waldron: “In 20 years of researching indigenous claims, and in a very thorough study of a database of minorities across the world with claims against states [the Minorities at Risk Data Set, Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland], I have never found a statement by an indigenous political actor that they wish for everything to be returned to how it was before colonisation” (pp. 120–121).
- 21.
Arrian of Nicomedia, The Anabasis of Alexander; or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great (Book VII, Chap. I), written in the second century CE. See also Sen (2005, p. 15).
- 22.
Open impartiality implies evaluative pluralism—our rational judgments will not necessarily converge and “yield a single, uniquely rational, determinate answer”. Attempting to show that the moral demands we make on others are uniquely rational (closed impartiality) may in fact “be just a way of pushing others around” (Gaus, 2010, p. 64).
- 23.
On impartiality as a requirement of fairness, see further Sect. 6.2.2.1.
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Bromell, D. (2019). Equality, Identity and Impartiality. In: Ethical Competencies for Public Leadership. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27943-1_5
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