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Responses to the Crisis: The Evolution of the Financial System and Its Regulation

  • Alessandro VercelliEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

The measures implemented after the Great Recession to reform the financial system remained within the scope of market-based regulation. The foundations of these reforms proved fragile and their implementation ineffective. Since this approach to regulation is by definition not hostile to regulated subjects, to be justified and effective any new measure looks for a broad consensus agreed within the financial system. Taking into account the different interests and views conflicting within the financial system, the most significant measures were discarded at an early stage of their elaboration, or weakened before their approval, or paralysed by the delay of required application rules. This confirms that an effective regulation of the financial system requires a resolute independence not only from day-by-day politics but also from financial lobbying. On the other hand, the author argues that it is unacceptable that the regulation of the financial system be independent of the strategic directives of democratic institutions.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SienaSienaItaly

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