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Budgets: Process, Rights, and Institutions

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Fiscal Sociology at the Centenary

Part of the book series: Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies ((PSLS))

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Abstract

From the Sinking Fund, to the Office for Budget Responsibility—this chapter considers UK budgeting in the twenty-first century. As Chapter 3 established that the process of budgeting is itself a British innovation, this review of the legislation and processes surrounding UK budgeting in the modern era may be of interest to fiscal sociological scholars outside of the UK. This chapter considers the ‘budget controlling’ legislation introduced in the wake of the financial crash of 2008, the introduction of the Office of Budget Responsibility, and the key targets of this office: transparency, and sustainability. The context of EU legislation also is considered. The chapter concludes with a comparative consideration of budgeting in the USA. How does executive control over budgeting work in a constitutional democracy, with a presidential executive branch? To what extent have the (largely American) concepts of “tax expenditures” and “fiscal federalism” proved influential in the UK?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In November 2018, the possibility of a Eurozone budget within the framework of the European Union was explored, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37011/proposal-on-the-architecture-of-a-eurozone-budget.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2019). The legal bases for the proposal were Articles 175(3), 173, and 136 TFEU.

  2. 2.

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8401517.stm (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    Id.

  5. 5.

    http://taxsimplificationblog.wordpress.com/about/ (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  6. 6.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/12/portugal-spain-excessive-deficit/ (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  7. 7.

    https://portuguese-american-journal.com/portuguese-lawmakers-approved-government-budget-for-2012-portugal/ (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/12-portugal-spain-excessive-deficit/ (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  10. 10.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2625_en.htm (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  11. 11.

    https://waysandmeans.house.gov/about (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  12. 12.

    On this act: Finley wrote that “[t]he procedure to insure a comparison of revenues and planned spending for an overall fiscal position can become, as it is intended to be, a means of a coordinated approach to national spending priorities. But there is no guarantee that this will happen. Rules can be waived and deadlines missed as time passes. The Act does not bind Congress to any position that cannot be changed by a majority” (1975: 277).

  13. 13.

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ (last accessed 28 April 2019).

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    https://data.gov.uk/dataset/aa524493-4c60-4ea0-b116-afd9bb24e9f1/revenue-based-taxes-and-benefits-tax-expenditures-and-ready-reckoners (last accessed 30 April 2019).

  16. 16.

    This is found throughout the legislative process. As Naumann observed, ‘[i]t is harder to mobilize support for complex policy reforms than for single issues such as the right to abortion’ (2005: 49).

  17. 17.

    In particular, tackling them, he believed, could be a way of tackling deficits. According to Sugin: “[t]he approach to tax reform that repeals all (or almost all) tax expenditures in the name of budget reduction is consistent with the traditional approach to the tax expenditure budget - as a tool of budget policy. Repealing all tax expenditures helps achieve the goals of those concerned that tax expenditures are an invisible, illegitimate and unchecked haemorrhaging of federal funds. It treats tax expenditure as a source of funds to be garnered for proper federal goals. This was the way that Surrey imagined the tax expenditure budget would function when he first advocated it, and the budget itself reflects that approach. The design of the tax expenditure budget mimics that of the larger federal budget, organized by administrative function, and detailing revenue loss on account of each item” (2011: 14).

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  1. Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, London, UK

    Ann Mumford

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Mumford, A. (2019). Budgets: Process, Rights, and Institutions. In: Fiscal Sociology at the Centenary. Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27496-2_4

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