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On Rational Behavior in a Loss System with One Observable Queue and One Unobservable Queue

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Queueing Theory and Network Applications (QTNA 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 11688))

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Abstract

We examine a system with two heterogeneous servers. An arriving customer first observes the queue length at the slower server and decides whether to join it or join the unobservable queue of the faster server. Customers arrive to the system and decide which queue to join according to the reward, waiting cost, and service rates. Once a customer chooses a queue, she cannot change her decision. We analyze a special case of this model where there is no waiting space except for the customer in service. The probability for entering the observable queue (if the server idle) is denoted by p, and this is the strategy of the customers. We analyze and characterize the Nash equilibria and the socially-optimal probabilities of the system, and the relation between the two as function of the model’s parameters. We also examine throughput maximization.

This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 355/15).

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References

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Correspondence to Jonathan H. P. Milo .

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Hassin, R., Milo, J.H.P. (2019). On Rational Behavior in a Loss System with One Observable Queue and One Unobservable Queue. In: Phung-Duc, T., Kasahara, S., Wittevrongel, S. (eds) Queueing Theory and Network Applications. QTNA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11688. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27181-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27181-7_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-27180-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-27181-7

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