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Interdependence Versus Checks and Balances of Power: A Reflection on the Role of Constitutional Court in South Africa

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Governance, Human Rights, and Political Transformation in Africa

Abstract

Under the apartheid regime in South Africa, the adopted Westminster model of governance allowed for parliamentary sovereignty with no clear separation between the branches of government. With the birth of democracy, there is textual division of state power between the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive in the resultant 1996 Constitution. Whether or not the main end of this division is to achieve interdependence of the executive, legislature and judiciary that allows the branches of government to be complementary as well as serve as checks and balances on one another merits an examination. This contribution argues that there exists interdependence in the functioning of different arms of government in the democratic dispensation that allows the branches of government to be inter-reliant. While reflecting on judicial interventions by the Constitutional Court, it demonstrates that the interdependent relationship does not foreclose the arms of government from checks and balances of power in South Africa.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Danie Brand et al., eds., South African Constitutional Law in Context (Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern (Pty) Limited, 2014).

  2. 2.

    Ibid., 43.

  3. 3.

    Examples of such legislation include Native Land Act 27 of 1913, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 and Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953

  4. 4.

    Pieter Labuschagne, “The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Its Application in South Africa,” Politeia 23, no. 3 (2004): 53.

  5. 5.

    Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution 1993).

  6. 6.

    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (South African Constitution 1996); This chapter, and Chapters 5 and 8 dealing respectively with powers of the Parliament, Executive and the Judiciary in South Africa

  7. 7.

    Ibid., section 165.

  8. 8.

    Anashri Pillay, “Toward Effective Social and Economic Rights Adjudication: The Role of Meaningful Engagement,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 10, no. 3 (2012): 733

  9. 9.

    Annabelle Lever, “Is Judicial Review Democratic?” Public Law (2007): 285; Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115, no. 6, (2006): 1346

  10. 10.

    Phineas Mojapelo, “The Doctrine of Separation of Powers: A South African Perspective,” Advocate (2013): 39.

  11. 11.

    Pieter (n. 4), 34.

  12. 12.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), Chapter 4.

  13. 13.

    Sherilyn Naidoo, “Does the Lack of Sufficient Formulation and Articulation of the Principles Guiding Limits of the Constitutional Court Undermine Its Legitimacy?” (LLM dissertation, University of Cape Town, South Africa 2014), 9.

  14. 14.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 44(1).

  15. 15.

    Ibid., section 85(1).

  16. 16.

    Ibid., section 85(2)(d).

  17. 17.

    Ibid., section 79(1).

  18. 18.

    Ibid., section 92(1).

  19. 19.

    Brand et al. (n. 1), 91.

  20. 20.

    Interim Constitution 1993 (n. 5), schedule 4.

  21. 21.

    Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), paras. 108–112.

  22. 22.

    Iain Currie and Johan de Waal, The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (Cape Town: Juta, 2001), 97.

  23. 23.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 89.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., section 55(2)(b).

  25. 25.

    Ibid., section 79.

  26. 26.

    Mojapelo (n. 10), 56.

  27. 27.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 165.

  28. 28.

    Currie and De Waal (n. 22), 113.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., 117.

  30. 30.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 167(3)

  31. 31.

    Brand et al. (n. 1), 209.

  32. 32.

    Executive Council Western Cape Legislature v President of Republic of South Africa (10) BCLR 1289 (B).

  33. 33.

    Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993.

  34. 34.

    Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa, para. 57.

  35. 35.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 165.

  36. 36.

    Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille (Speaker v De Lille), 1998 (3) SA 430 (C).

  37. 37.

    Ibid., para. 20.

  38. 38.

    Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others: in re: Ex parte Application of the President of the RSA and Others 2000 (2) SA 674.

  39. 39.

    Speaker v De Lille (n. 36), para. 34.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., para. 36.

  41. 41.

    Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) (Doctors for Life).

  42. 42.

    Ibid., para. 36.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., para. 37.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., para. 38.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., para. 39.

  46. 46.

    United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly (UDM v Speaker) 2017 ZA (CC) 21

  47. 47.

    Ibid., para. 7.

  48. 48.

    Glenister v President of RSA and Others 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC) (Glenister case)

  49. 49.

    Ibid., para. 22.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., para. 33.

  52. 52.

    S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC).

  53. 53.

    Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.

  54. 54.

    S v Dodo (n. 52), para. 22.

  55. 55.

    South African Constitution 1996 (n. 6), section 164(4); see also, Sebastian Seedorf and Sanele Sibanda, “Seperation of Powers,” in Constitutional Law of South Africa, ed. Stu Woolman et al. (Cape Town: Juta, 2013), 12–26.

  56. 56.

    Patrick Lenta, “Democracy, Rights, Disagreements and Judicial Review,” South African Journal on Human Rights 20, no. 1 (2004): 39.

  57. 57.

    Sandra Liedenberg and Konesh Pillay, Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book (Cape Town: Community Law Center University of the Western Cape, 2012), 56.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 12.

  59. 59.

    Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (Soobramoney case).

  60. 60.

    Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case).

  61. 61.

    Soobramoney case (n. 59), para. 54.

  62. 62.

    Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) 132 (Treatment Action Campaign).

  63. 63.

    Ibid., para. 98.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., para. 99.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., para. 114.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Oscar Sang, “The Separation of Powers and New Judicial Power: How the South African Constitutional Court Plotted Its Course,” ELSA Malta Review, no. 3 (2013): 117.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., 118.

  69. 69.

    Kate O’Regan, “Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers Under the South African Constitution,” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 8, no. 1 (2008): 187.

  70. 70.

    Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 (10) BCLR 1009 (CC); 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) (Kaunda case)

  71. 71.

    Ibid., para. 67.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para. 69.

  73. 73.

    Mohamed and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).

  74. 74.

    Kaunda case (n. 70), para. 123.

  75. 75.

    Erik S. Herron and Kirk A. Randazzo, “The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts,” The Journal of Politics 65, no. 2 (2003): 422; Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis,” American Journal of Comparative Law 44 (1996): 605.

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Jegede, A.O., Tendani, S. (2020). Interdependence Versus Checks and Balances of Power: A Reflection on the Role of Constitutional Court in South Africa. In: Addaney, M., Nyarko, M.G., Boshoff, E. (eds) Governance, Human Rights, and Political Transformation in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27049-0_4

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