Abstract
A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to share a secret among a set of n parties such that any authorized subset of the parties can recover the secret, while any unauthorized subset learns no information about the secret. A leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme (introduced in independent works by Goyal and Kumar, STOC ’18 and Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai and Rabin, CRYPTO ’18) additionally requires the secrecy to hold against every unauthorized set of parties even if they obtain some bounded leakage from every other share. The leakage is said to be local if it is computed independently for each share. So far, the only known constructions of local leakage resilient secret sharing schemes are for threshold access structures for very low (O(1)) or very high (\(n -o(\log n)\)) thresholds.
In this work, we give a compiler that takes a secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure and produces a local leakage resilient secret sharing scheme for the same access structure, with only a constant-factor asymptotic blow-up in the sizes of the shares. Furthermore, the resultant secret sharing scheme has optimal leakage-resilience rate, i.e., the ratio between the leakage tolerated and the size of each share can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Using this secret sharing scheme as the main building block, we obtain the following results:
-
Rate Preserving Non-Malleable Secret Sharing. We give a compiler that takes any secret sharing scheme for a 4-monotone access structure (A 4-monotone access structure has the property that any authorized set has size at least 4.) with rate R and converts it into a non-malleable secret sharing scheme for the same access structure with rate \(\varOmega (R)\). The previous such non-zero rate construction (Badrinarayanan and Srinivasan, EUROCRYPT ’19) achieved a rate of \(\varTheta (R/{t_{\max }\log ^2 n})\), where \(t_{\max }\) is the maximum size of any minimal set in the access structure. As a special case, for any threshold \(t \ge 4\) and an arbitrary \(n \ge t\), we get the first constant-rate construction of t-out-of-n non-malleable secret sharing.
-
Leakage-Tolerant Multiparty Computation for General Interaction Patterns. For any function f, we give a reduction from constructing a leakage-tolerant secure multi-party computation protocol for computing f that obeys any given interaction pattern to constructing a secure (but not necessarily leakage-tolerant) protocol for a related function that obeys the star interaction pattern. Together with the known results for the star interaction pattern, this gives leakage tolerant MPC for any interaction pattern with statistical/computational security. This improves upon the result of (Halevi et al., ITCS 2016), who presented such a reduction in a leak-free environment.
Research supported in part from DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE Award W911NF15C0210, AFOSR Award FA9550-15-1-0274, AFOSR YIP Award, a Hellman Award and research grants by the Okawa Foundation, Visa Inc., and Center for LongTerm Cybersecurity (CLTC, UC Berkeley).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is what we call the set of authorized subsets of parties.
- 2.
As the extractor is a strong seeded extractor, Ext\((s,w_i)\) is statistically close to uniform even given the seed.
- 3.
For the security of this modification to go through, we need the adversary to specify all the secrets and leakage functions upfront – it cannot adaptively choose the secrets and leakage functions depending on the previous leakage.
- 4.
k-monotone means that all authorized sets in the access structure are of size at least k.
- 5.
The case of multiple output parties reduces to the case of single output party by considering each output party computing a specific function of the other parties input.
References
Aggarwal, D., et al.: Stronger leakage-resilient and non-malleable secret-sharing schemes for general access structures. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/1147 (2018). https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1147
Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Wichs, D.: Survey: leakage resilience and the bounded retrieval model. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ICITS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5973, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14496-7_1
Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Simultaneous hardcore bits and cryptography against memory attacks. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 474–495. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_28
Bitansky, N., Canetti, R., Goldwasser, S., Halevi, S., Kalai, Y.T., Rothblum, G.N.: Program obfuscation with leaky hardware. In: Lee, D.H., Wang, X. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 7073, pp. 722–739. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_39
Bitansky, N., Canetti, R., Halevi, S.: Leakage-tolerant interactive protocols. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) TCC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7194, pp. 266–284. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_15
Benhamouda, F., Degwekar, A., Ishai, Y., Rabin, T.: On the local leakage resilience of linear secret sharing schemes. In: Shacham, H., Boldyreva, A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2018, Part I. LNCS, vol. 10991, pp. 531–561. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_18
Bitansky, N., Dachman-Soled, D., Lin, H.: Leakage-tolerant computation with input-independent preprocessing. In: Garay, J.A., Gennaro, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2014, Part II. LNCS, vol. 8617, pp. 146–163. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_9
Beimel, A.: Secret-sharing schemes: a survey. In: Chee, Y.M., et al. (eds.) IWCC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6639, pp. 11–46. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20901-7_2
Beimel, A., Gabizon, A., Ishai, Y., Kushilevitz, E., Meldgaard, S., Paskin-Cherniavsky, A.: Non-interactive secure multiparty computation. In: Garay, J.A., Gennaro, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2014, Part II. LNCS, vol. 8617, pp. 387–404. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_22
Boyle, E., Garg, S., Jain, A., Kalai, Y.T., Sahai, A.: Secure computation against adaptive auxiliary information. In: Canetti, R., Garay, J.A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2013, Part I. LNCS, vol. 8042, pp. 316–334. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_18
Boyle, E., Goldwasser, S., Jain, A., Kalai, Y.T.: Multiparty computation secure against continual memory leakage. In: Karloff, H.J., Pitassi, T. (eds.), 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 1235–1254. ACM Press, May 2012
Boyle, E., Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y.T.: Leakage-resilient coin tossing. Distrib. Comput. 27(3), 147–164 (2014)
Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., Wigderson, A.: Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation (extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2–4 May 1988, pp. 1–10 (1988)
Benhamouda, F., Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: Robust non-interactive multiparty computation against constant-size collusion. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017, Part I. LNCS, vol. 10401, pp. 391–419. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_13
Blakley, G.R.: Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In: Proceedings of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, vol. 48, pp. 313–317 (1979)
Badrinarayanan, S., Srinivasan, A.: Revisiting non-malleable secret sharing. In: Ishai, Y., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2019, Part I. LNCS, vol. 11476, pp. 593–622. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_20
Chaum, D., Crepeau, C., Damgaard, I.: Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols (extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2–4 May 1988, pp. 11–19. ACM (1988)
Chor, B., Goldreich, O.: Unbiased bits from sources of weak randomness and probabilistic communication complexity. SIAM J. Comput. 17(2), 230–261 (1988)
De Santis, A., Desmedt, Y., Frankel, Y., Yung, M.: How to share a function securely. In: 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 522–533. ACM Press, May 1994
Desmedt, Y., Frankel, Y.: Threshold cryptosystems. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 307–315. Springer, New York (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34805-0_28
Damgard, I., Hazay, C., Patra, A.: Leakage resilient secure two-party computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/256 (2011). http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/256
Dodis, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM J. Comput. 38, 97–139 (2008)
Dziembowski, S., Pietrzak, K.: Intrusion-resilient secret sharing. In: 48th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 227–237. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2007
Dziembowski, S., Pietrzak, K.: Leakage-resilient cryptography. In: 49th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 293–302. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2008
Feige, U., Kilian, J., Naor, M.: A minimal model for secure computation (extended abstract). In: 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 554–563. ACM Press, May 1994
Frankel, Y.: A practical protocol for large group oriented networks. In: Quisquater, J.-J., Vandewalle, J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1989. LNCS, vol. 434, pp. 56–61. Springer, Heidelberg (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46885-4_8
Faust, S., Rabin, T., Reyzin, L., Tromer, E., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Protecting circuits from leakage: the computationally-bounded and noisy cases. In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 135–156. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_7
Goldwasser, S., et al.: Multi-input functional encryption. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Oswald, E. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8441, pp. 578–602. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_32
Goyal, V., Ishai, Y., Maji, H.K., Sahai, A., Sherstov, A.A.: Bounded-communication leakage resilience via parity-resilient circuits. In: Dinur, I. (ed.), 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 1–10. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2016
Garg, S., Jain, A., Sahai, A.: Leakage-resilient zero knowledge. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 297–315. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_17
Goyal, V., Kumar, A.: Non-malleable secret sharing. In: Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2018, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 25–29 June 2018, pp. 685–698 (2018)
Goyal, V., Kumar, A.: Non-malleable secret sharing for general access structures. In: Shacham, H., Boldyreva, A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2018, Part I. LNCS, vol. 10991, pp. 501–530. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_17
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In: Aho, A. (ed.), 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 218–229. ACM Press, May 1987
Gupta, D., Maji, H.K., Wang, M.: Constant-rate non-malleable codes in the split-state model. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/1048 (2017). http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1048
Guruswami, V., Umans, C., Vadhan, S.P.: Unbalanced expanders and randomness extractors from Parvaresh-Vardy codes. J. ACM 56(4), 20 (2009)
Guruswami, V., Wootters, M.: Repairing Reed-Solomon codes. In: Wichs, D., Mansour, Y. (eds.), 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 216–226. ACM Press, June 2016
Halevi, S., Ishai, Y., Jain, A., Kushilevitz, E., Rabin, T.: Secure multiparty computation with general interaction patterns. In: Sudan, M. (ed.), ITCS 2016: 7th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, pp. 157–168. Association for Computing Machinery, January 2016
Halevi, S., Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B.: Secure computation on the web: computing without simultaneous interaction. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 132–150. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_8
Halderman, J.A., et al.: Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys. Commun. ACM 52(5), 91–98 (2009)
Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., Wagner, D.: Private circuits: securing hardware against probing attacks. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 463–481. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27
Kocher, P., et al.: Spectre attacks: exploiting speculative execution. CoRR, abs/1801.01203 (2018)
Kumar, A., Meka, R., Sahai, A.: Leakage-resilient secret sharing. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018:1138 (2018)
Kanukurthi, B., Obbattu, S.L.B., Sekar, S.: Non-malleable randomness encoders and their applications. In: Nielsen, J.B., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2018, Part III. LNCS, vol. 10822, pp. 589–617. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_19
Lipp, M., et al.: Meltdown. CoRR, abs/1801.01207 (2018)
Micali, S., Reyzin, L.: Physically observable cryptography (extended abstract). In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 278–296. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24638-1_16
Naor, M., Segev, G.: Public-key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 18–35. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_2
Nielsen, J.B., Simkin, M.: Lower bounds for leakage-resilient secret sharing. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2019:181 (2019)
Rothblum, G.N.: How to compute under \({\cal{AC}}^{\sf 0}\) leakage without secure hardware. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 552–569. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_32
Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 22(11), 612–613 (1979)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding authors
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 International Association for Cryptologic Research
About this paper
Cite this paper
Srinivasan, A., Vasudevan, P.N. (2019). Leakage Resilient Secret Sharing and Applications. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019. CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11693. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_17
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-26950-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-26951-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)