Abstract
Since membership of national communities does not generally stem from contracts, capabilities, talents, achievements or political values, it provides members with a wide range of personal choice as well as a secure and lasting sense of identity and belonging. This chapter, therefore, defends that this enables liberal theory to turn national groups into appropriate units to distribute and guarantee freedom and equality notwithstanding natural, social and political differences among their members.
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Notes
- 1.
Margalit, A.; Raz, J. “National Self-Determination”, pp. 443–8.
- 2.
Nonetheless, in the next section we will observe that the structure of nations as encompassing groups is at least as important as their character as such groups.
- 3.
These authors define encompassing, pervasive, societal and integrating cultures similarly. As these adjectives indicate, these cultures provide their members with meaningful ways of life spanning a wide range of human activities (social, educational, religious, recreational, economic, etc.) in both public and private spheres. In this way, these cultures are solid structures on which their members can base their life plans. Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 76, 80. Nielsen, K. “Liberal Nationalism and Secession”, pp. 124–5.
- 4.
See Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community and Culture, ch. 8. Nielsen, K. “Liberal Nationalism and Secession”, p. 125.
- 5.
If religious groups are also understood as, possibly, encompassing groups, they should be distinguished from national groups. Religious communities can be more exclusive, as they tend to require adherence to a particular belief. By contrast, (liberal) nations are more inclusive, because, generally, the group culture does not require members to share any conception of the good. Likewise, (liberal) nationalism does not require sharing a political ideology (members can be liberal, conservative, socialist and so on) or religion (members can be Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and so forth). What really matters is the will to live side by side and to be identified as a community of individuals with mutual sympathies who inhabit the same territory, share some memories and wish to govern themselves on secular (as opposed to spiritual) affairs.
- 6.
Kukathas, C. The Liberal Archipelago, p. 201.
- 7.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 96.
- 8.
Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, p. 49.
- 9.
Margalit, A.; Raz, J. “National Self-Determination”, p. 446.
- 10.
Miller argues that, for the most part, nationality, or national identity, is something involuntary, unchosen and unreflectively acquired. He goes on to qualify this by saying that in some cases people choose their nationality, for example, following migration. Miller, D. On Nationality, p. 43.
- 11.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, ch. 1. Individuals who form part of certain communities constitutive of identity can decide to cease to form part of them. For instance, emigration makes it possible to cease to be a member of a national community. Nations and States are neither voluntary associations nor communities of fate. Some members are born, by destiny, in a nation and State and, to a certain extent, remain members of it by their own will. Indeed, not changing can also be a choice and a form of exercising individual will.
- 12.
That belonging to a national community does not depend on sharing common political values, see § 3.3.
- 13.
In similar vein, Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 105–6.
- 14.
In particular, considering nations as imagined communities does not imply that they are false, fictional, unreal, fabricated and non-existent. See Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, p. 6. Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, p. 13. Keating, M. The Independence of Scotland, p. 12.
- 15.
In multinational polities, both competition and complementarity occur frequently between citizens’ identification with one nation or another. Competition and complementarity between belonging to different nations as encompassing groups do not mean that belonging to these groups is normally and preferably an individual act resulting from thought and reflection.
- 16.
Encompassing groups can include both national and ethnic minorities. These species of this genus will be discussed in the next section.
- 17.
In this regard, Buchanan classifies the theory of secession of Margalit and Raz as an ascriptive theory based on the principle of nationality: “thus Margalit and Raz appear to embrace the Nationalist Principle when they ascribe the right to secede to what they call ‘encompassing cultures’, defined as large-scale, anonymous (rather than small-scale, face-to-face) groups that have a common culture and character that encompasses many important aspects of life and which marks the character of the life of its members, where membership in the group is in part a matter of mutual recognition and is important for one’s self-identification and is a matter of belonging, not of achievement”. Buchanan, A. “Theories of Secession”, p. 38.
- 18.
Margalit, A.; Raz, J. “National Self-Determination”, pp. 457–60.
- 19.
See § 2.2.
- 20.
Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples, § 4.2.
- 21.
See § 2.4.
- 22.
Although great philosophers such as Hume used the “ideally rational and impartial spectator” method to extract the principles of justice, Rawlsian contractualism or constructivism is preferred here because, among other reasons, in the latter method the contracting parties are autonomous to agree their principles of justice. Justice as multinational fairness, drawing on Kant and Rawls, rejects a heteronomous moral theory and seeks an autonomous method to construct the fundamental principles of justice which have to govern societal coexistence. Moreover, the method is based on rational and reasonable deliberation and choice between free and equal beings. See Rawls, J. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” in Collected Papers, p. 311. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p. 161.
- 23.
Margalit, A.; Raz, J. “National Self-Determination”, p. 454.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 448.
- 25.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, ch. 2. Mira, J.F. Crítica de la nació pura, ch. II.
- 26.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, p. 11.
- 27.
This definition of national minorities includes indigenous peoples. Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, p. 20 and ch. 6.
- 28.
See Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community and Culture, ch. 8. Torbisco, N. Group Rights…, p. 165.
- 29.
When Patten rethinks about the notion of culture, he expounds what he calls a social lineage account. From this account, there is a distinct culture when a group of people share with one another the subjection “to a set of formative conditions that are distinct from the formative conditions that are imposed on others”. Precisely, this exposure by some group of people to a common and distinctive set of formative conditions and influences is similar to what we identify as structure. In this vein, Patten insists that “what is distinctive about a particular culture is the historical lineage of its formative institutions and practices”. Patten, A. Equal Recognition, pp. 50–2.
- 30.
Character has also been presented in a past–present–future approach nonetheless. Otto Bauer stressed that every “nation has a national character”. Bauer’s nation was a community based on common ancestry and, more important, common culture. However, in line with his socialist ideology, he defended an “evolutionary national policy” which called for the development and evolution of the national character. His understanding of the national character was therefore dynamic rather than static. Bauer, O. “The Nation”, pp. 41, 69.
- 31.
See Mill, J.S. Considerations on Representative Government, ch. XVI.
- 32.
“It is the cogito ergo sum of the philosophers applied to nationality”. Mancini, P.S. Della nazionalità, p. 39. In similar vein, Rovira i Virgili wrote in 1932: “national consciousness is the decisive element which demonstrates the existence of a nationality and which gives it spiritual and political strength”. “Without consciousness there is no genuine personality. Without national consciousness, territory is just a landscape, history is a phantom, law is a routine, language is just a dialect. Such elements, reduced to materiality, do not and cannot form a nation. They are a body, but soul is needed for the Nation to exist”. Rovira i Virgili, A. El principi de les nacionalitats, pp. 17, 37.
- 33.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 65. In similar vein, Calhoun, C. Nations Matter, p. 39: “Without the subjective component of self-understanding, nations could not exist. Moreover, once the idea of nation exists, it can be used to organize not just self-understanding but categorizations of others”.
- 34.
Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, p. 98. Although myths are often similar across different nations, this resemblance might not deny the existence of the latter but stress once again the importance of structure over character. Because the relevance of myths may not lie in their originality or uniqueness but in the shared, deep-rooted and durable conviction that they are our myths and, for that, they bind us together as a community. All this seems to bring us to Abadal’s mythomoteur (i.e. myths as creators of identity and sustaining of the group). See Armstrong, J.A. Nations Before Nationalism, pp. 291–3. Smith, A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 15. As we will see in the next section when criticizing the so-called constitutional patriotism, something similar might be said regarding moral and legal values in the sense that we do not need them to be genuine and unique for identifying the presence of a nation.
- 35.
Norman, W. Negotiating Nationalism, pp. 4–5.
- 36.
Miller, D. On Nationality, chs. 2–4.
- 37.
While Kymlicka speaks of ethnic minorities in Multicultural Citizenship, his later works compiled in Politics in the Vernacular often refer to such minorities as immigrant groups. In Miller’s view, ethnic minorities do not necessarily stem from migration. According to Miller, an ethnic group is a community formed by common descendants who share cultural traits, such as language and religion, which differentiate them from outsiders. Often “a nation emerges from an ethnic community which furnishes it with its distinct identity”. That said, the national community can incorporate different ethnicities, as the American nation, which subsequently incorporated Irish, Italian, and other ethnic groups to its Anglo-Saxon origins. Ethnic identities are more cultural than political, since ethnic groups do not normally aspire to become self-governing political communities. Miller, D. On Nationality, pp. 19–20. Miller, D. Citizenship and National Identity, pp. 127–8.
- 38.
Torbisco, N. Group Rights…, pp. 201–2.
- 39.
According to Mira, ethnic groups are based on a combination of basic ascription, lineage, culture and differentiated consciousness. Mira, J.F. Crítica de la nació pura, pp. 69–70, 113–14. Ethnos is a Greek word meaning people, which could come from ethos, which means norm or custom. Regarding the etymology of nation, see § 5.4.
- 40.
Mira, J.F. Crítica de la nació pura, pp. 61–2.
- 41.
Ibid., pp. 62–3. Torbisco, N. Group Rights…, p. 202. Kymlicka, W. “Liberal Multiculturalism as a Political Theory…”.
- 42.
Although voluntary nature can often be questioned from an economic materialism point of view.
- 43.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 24–5. The nationalist claim for a “Black State” was voiced, above all, in the southern States of the USA in the 1930s, and it was revived a few decades later under the leadership of Malcolm X.
- 44.
See § 5.3.
- 45.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, p. 15.
- 46.
Torbisco, N. Group Rights…, p. 202.
- 47.
See Bossacoma, P. “An Egalitarian Defence of Territorial Autonomy”.
- 48.
See Torbisco, N. Group Rights…, p. 218.
- 49.
Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, pp. 56–60, 242. Here immigrant groups must be understood in the restrictive sense: as groups which emigrate from their countries voluntarily—not slaves; and as immigrants to the exclusion of settlers. Internal immigrants—from within the same multinational State—who are members of the majority nation but emigrate to the minority nation do not tend to create new nationalist movements, but sometimes preserve or increase their previous State national identity and State nationalism.
- 50.
Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, p. 106. Although making this criticism, Moore justifies the different treatment in this way: fairness requires that the minority nations be compensated, because they normally have national self-determination projects of their own which are incompatible with the majority nation and this dictates that they should be treated differently from other types of minorities (pp. 130–1).
- 51.
“Nations look for countries because in some deep sense they already have countries: the link between people and land is a crucial feature of national identity”. Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice, p. 44.
- 52.
In cases such as these, various measures can be taken: (1) grant a right of internal self-determination to the traditional national community; (2) give the oldest national community a right of veto or of non-application of the legislation of the parent State in its community or territory; (3) if the ethnic community became the majority as a result of colonialism or violent occupation, it could be appropriate to adjust the normal rules of the principle of democracy under which every individual has to have a vote, as it would be just to give greater value to the votes of the original colonized inhabitants; and (4) conversely, in cases where the ethnic community became the majority as a result of involuntary relocation, such as the slave trade, adjustment of the “one man, one vote” principle in favour of the oldest national community seems intolerable.
- 53.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 62–3, 96–9.
- 54.
See Patten, A. Equal Recognition, ch. 8. The author offers a compelling account to explain why immigrants’ choice should count as voluntary, why immigrants can alienate their cultural rights and why the receiving society is morally permitted to give priority to national groups over immigrants in allocating scarce cultural rights. His last argument allows him to conclude that, even in cases where migration is not voluntary, the receiving State can prioritize the self-determination rights of the former over the latter.
- 55.
On the acceptance of immigrants as a liberty of States, see Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice, ch. 2. However, Walzer’s theory on immigration and naturalization seems to have certain incoherence: it is a theory based on the protection of cultural membership that ends up only protecting political membership (i.e. the State and its national majority) rather than cultural membership (i.e. the cultural minorities within the State). See Kymlicka, W. Liberalism, Community and Culture, ch. 11.
- 56.
This is a significant difference between immigrants and settlers. The colonizing people and settlers have no intention of adopting the nationality of the territory which they colonize, but instead set out to recreate a complete society anew. By contrast, immigrants are normally ready and willing to take the nationality and citizenship of the receiving country. Consequently, to treat immigrants as national minorities would be to treat them as settlers. See Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 78, 95.
- 57.
Kymlicka, W. “Liberal Multiculturalism as a Political Theory…”. Bauböck, R. “Beyond Culturalism and Statism”, p. 27.
- 58.
That said, the better receiving States fulfil their duty to assist burdened societies in establishing just political and social regimes, the more legitimate is the limitation of cultural rights to immigration. In similar vein, Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice, p. 48.
- 59.
Patten, A. Equal Recognition, p. 294.
- 60.
Margalit, A.; Raz, J. “National Self-Determination”, p. 441.
- 61.
See Hegel, The Philosophy of History, pp. 75, 419. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§ 347–51.
- 62.
Kymlicka, W. “Territorial boundaries”, pp. 253–4.
- 63.
“It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities”. Mill, J.S. Considerations on Representative Government, ch. XVI.
- 64.
In similar vein, Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, p. 1.
- 65.
Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples, § 4.3.
- 66.
Goodin, R.E. “What is so Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?”, pp. 680–2.
- 67.
Hardin, G. “The Tragedy of the Commons”, pp. 1243–8.
- 68.
See Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice, ch. 2. This function is drawn from and limited by liberal nationalism. By way of example, nationalism dictates that individuals born within the State frontiers or members of the nation who live in the diaspora should be given preference to acquire citizenship ahead of other immigrants, whereas liberalism dictates that protection of the national community and culture ought to give way to political refugees facing severe and unjust condemnation in their own country.
- 69.
Even a cosmopolitan like Kant advocates, in his Second Definitive Article of a perpetual peace, that the law of nations should be founded on a federation of free States. According to him, this federation of peoples would not be an international State (with the risk of inescapable tyranny), but a group of States, confederation or partnership. See “Perpetual Peace”, pp. 102–5. “The Metaphysics of Morals”, pp. 165, 171. Both in: Kant, Political Writings. For Kelsen, “There can be no doubt that the ideal solution of the problem of world organization as the problem of world peace is the establishment of a World Federal State composed of all or as many nations as possible. The realization of this idea, however, is confronted with serious and, at least at present, insurmountable difficulties”. “Only wishful thinking and ignorance of decisive facts allow us to underestimate the extraordinary difficulties we must encounter in organizing such a World Federal State; especially is this true if its constitution is to have a democratic character”. Kelsen, H. Peace through law, § 1. See also Pogge, T.W. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”, p. 63.
- 70.
Mill, J.S. Considerations on Representative Government, ch. XVI. At the end of the chapter he adds: “From that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government (as in the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity for breaking the connection altogether”. In the late twentieth century, Walzer argued that if the community is so radically divided that a single citizenship is impossible, then its territory must be divided too. Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice, p. 62.
- 71.
See Hobsbawm, E. Age of Empire, ch. 6. Anderson, B. Imagined Communities.
- 72.
From a liberal egalitarian perspective, see Kymlicka, W. “Territorial Boundaries”, p. 249 et seq. From a socialist perspective, see Lenin, V.I. “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”.
- 73.
It is not that we cannot nor should not have feelings of solidarity towards the whole of humanity. Nevertheless, in both descriptive and normative terms, a common identity, a past consisting of shared victories and defeats, a present consisting of constant relations and a will for self-government, together, in the future generate a more intense union with our nation than with humanity as a whole. It is similarly legitimate to feel special moral obligations towards your family and friends that are more intense than towards a fellow national, fellow citizen or stranger. See Miller, D. On Nationality, ch. 3. Couture, J.; Nielsen, K.; Seymour, M. (ed.) Rethinking Nationalism, pp. 623–5.
- 74.
This love, he follows, is shown in the great cultural productions of nationalism—such as poetry, prose, drama, music and plastic arts—of all forms and styles. Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, pp. 7, 141. Anderson links racism and antisemitism to class ideologies more than to nationalism (pp. 149–50).
- 75.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 96.
- 76.
Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, p. 37.
- 77.
This is illustrated by the development of liberal egalitarianism in small nation-States in Europe, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark or the Netherlands. This does not mean that nation-States are necessarily more egalitarian. For example, although there is more national division in Canada, Belgium and Spainthan in the USA, the former are more egalitarian. The presence of a Statewide national consciousness helps to develop welfarism and redistribution policies together with other factors such as the ethics of the nation or nations, and the institutional set-up including electoral, political party, collective bargaining systems. In addition, multinational States usually equip themselves with the institutions of consensual democracies and the need for a broad consensus can create barriers to extensive economic redistribution between citizens and territories. That said, economic redistribution can take place within the sub-State nations in such a way that high general redistribution is obtained.
- 78.
See § 5.2.
- 79.
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, p. 2. Socialist movements and States have tended to become national not only in form but also in substance. This is also the place to recall the Latin American revolutionary motto “Patria o muerte”. Anderson warns that even the Soviet authorities imposed a kind of Russian nationalism (p. 46). Interestingly, in 1924, Otto Bauer argued that socialism allows the “full self-determination by the nation”, which for him means the complete realization of the nation as a cultural community of all members, as happened “in the era of clan communism”. Bauer, O. “The Nation”, in particular, pp. 48–51.
- 80.
Hayek, F.A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume 2. The Mirage of Social Justice. p. 134.
- 81.
Hayek, F.A. The Road to Serfdom, pp. 105–7.
- 82.
Ibid., pp. 163–76.
- 83.
Acton, j.E.E. “Nationality”, par. 19.
- 84.
Ibid., pars. 23–5.
- 85.
Mazzini, G. Scritti, p. 462. According to Mazzini, this common duty arising from sharing a national consciousness is important because without it (and without faith in God) universal suffrage can turn into a system for numerical oppression, of the more over the less. Mazzini, G. Doveri dell’uomo, p. 17. Similarly, Mancini said that conservation and development of nationhood was not only a right but also a legal duty for Humanity. Mancini, P.S. Della nazionalità, p. 41.
- 86.
Renan, E. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, p. 29.
- 87.
Miller, D. On Nationality, chs. 2 and 3. In similar vein, Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 98.
- 88.
(1) Reasons based on the sociability of human nature: since human beings are cultural, gregarious and contextual individuals and since most of them have limited altruism, an intensification of altruism towards one’s own culture, community and context seems intuitive. (2) Sentimental and psychological reasons related to identity and fraternity: sharing a national identity, which is an important part of our own individual identity may engender and legitimize special obligations. If special obligations stemming from friendship, love and family ties are acknowledged and accepted, why should we not recognize and accommodate special obligations stemming from other fraternal ties such as patriotism and nationalism? “However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it”, wrote Rawls in A Theory of Justice, p. 398. Thus, ethical humanism can be excessively demanding. (3) Reasons based on the community and its attendant obligations: some special obligations may honour ties of affection and fraternity, instead of a justice founded on purely impersonal criteria. Common sense gives certain priority to the “we feelings”. “Political association, like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is in itself pregnant of obligation”. See Dworkin, R. Law’s Empire, p. 206 et seq. (4) Reasonsbased on contractualism: if the political rights and obligations of a society are founded on some social contract, it seems reasonable that the contracting parties should enjoy special rights and obligations in comparison with human beings from other societies. Although the contract may be hypothetical, the nature and feelings of the contracting parties are important. (5) Normative reasons based on national self-determination: being unable to treat members of the nation differently from other human beings could negate the idea of national self-determination. If all the obligations had to be universal, there would not seem to be room for communities, nations and States. (6) Normative reasons based on reciprocity: the likelihood that mutual cooperation is greater between members of our own nation, combined with the moral capacity to demand extra efforts from compatriots, leads to accept more intense and extensive obligations towards fellow nationals. By contrast, universalism could lead to individualistic egoism if solidarity to foreigners were denied since no similar solidarity would be expected from them. (7) Institutional and utilitarian reasons: because solidarity and fraternity towards humanity are difficult to manage institutionally—imagine how complicated to establish a worldwide liberal egalitarian democracy would be, it is more realistic to opt for more intense and extensive special obligations towards fellow nationals. With those closest to us, we are in a better position not only to know, assess and meet their needs, but also to keep an eye on those who, because of malice, negligence, carelessness, idleness, free riding or ingratitude, do not deserve to benefit from our obligations.
- 89.
Couture, J.; Nielsen, K.; Seymour, M. (ed.) Rethinking Nationalism, pp. 623–5. Although the advocates of ethical universalism have normally accused the particularists of being partial, it might be appropriate to draw a distinction between partiality in the design of a norm and impartiality in its application. See Miller, D. On Nationality, pp. 51–4.
- 90.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 95. Defending certain special or particular moral obligations between members of the relevant national community is compatible with defending a principle of basic equality between persons, which is broadly accepted.
- 91.
See Goodin, R.E. “What Is so Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?”, pp. 673–4. Goodin draws no distinction between “State” and “nation”, nor between “citizenship” and “nationality” (p. 663).
- 92.
See Kelsen, H. Principles of International Law, § III.C.2. This protection of foreigners must not be confused with diplomatic protection, which gives the State both right and duty to protect its citizens, also when they are outside its frontiers. The special ties between citizens and State do not only apply within the territory of the latter. What is more, such bonds of loyalty and protection are two-way: the State has the duty to protect the citizen, but the citizen, in turn, has the duty to defend the State. Accordingly, the tie of citizenship or nationality generates heavy duties of responsibility, representation and protection. Brownlie, I.; Crawford, J. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, p. 607.
- 93.
See Miller, D. On Nationality, chs. 4–5. Calhoun, C. Nations Matter, ch. 4. Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, ch. 10. Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, ch. 4.
- 94.
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, p. 38. Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, pp. 213–14.
- 95.
The match between State and nation is not directly linked to consensual democracy in the more institutional and organizational sense, since this sort of consensualism is more connected to strong pluralism and especially plurinationalism. Nevertheless, there is no normative or practical impediment to stop nation-States from deciding to adopt consensual mechanisms if they believe that by increasing the level of consensus they will improve the quality of their democracy. On the contrary, nationalism generates some values that could facilitate seeking and reaching democratic consensus.
- 96.
Miller, D. On Nationality, pp. 82–3, 162.
- 97.
Habermas, J. “Citizenship and National Identity” (1990), Appendix II to Between Facts and Norms, p. 500.
- 98.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 125.
- 99.
Depriving nationality because of failure to share the values set out in the Constitution could be contrary to freedom of thought and to political pluralism. In particular, depriving nationality for failure to share the values of the Constitution could turn liberal States into dangerous militant democracies. See Bossacoma, P. “Who Would the Citizens… Be?”, § 10. Norman, W. Negotiating Nationalism, pp. 60–1.
- 100.
See ch. 12. This similarity between political values is not exclusive to Norway and Sweden, but can also be seen between Norway and Denmark. The Scandinavian, or more broadly and generally Nordic, model is often referred to for its political and organizational values.
- 101.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, p. 188. See Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, ch. 13.
- 102.
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism, p. 121.
- 103.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, p. 93.
- 104.
Ackerman, B. We the People (1), pp. 36–7.
- 105.
See Bossacoma, P. “Un esguard…”.
- 106.
On Scotland, see Keating, M. The Independence of Scotland, pp. 41–9. On Catalonia, see Bossacoma, P.; Sanjaume-Calvet, M. “Asymmetry as a Device for Equal Recognition…” in Popelier, P.; Sahadžić, M. (ed.) Constitutional Asymmetry in Multinational Federalism, pp. 435–9.
- 107.
Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, p. 230.
- 108.
See § 3.1.
- 109.
Beyond being incorrect and superfluous, the definition of the nation as project can be dangerous, because it favours thinking of the great destinies of certain nations to the detriment of neighbouring nations: the Manifest Destiny of the USA to populate the whole continent with a single nation (President J. Q. Adams); the German mission over the inferior Slav peoples (Engels); the Russian people’s great mission in the world (Bakunin); and, in Spain, the fatherland as a unity of destiny in the universal (J. A. Primo de Rivera). Mira, J.F. Crítica de la nació pura, pp. 93–5.
- 110.
Fontana, J. “La societat catalana contemporània”, p. 142.
- 111.
Bauer, O. “The Nation”, pp. 60–1.
- 112.
See Van Middelaar, L. The Passage to Europe, pp. 300–6.
- 113.
See Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, pp. 119, 125, 398.
- 114.
Recall that Rawls’s social contract did not disregard the importance of nationalism, but worked with a simplified model of the nation-State.
- 115.
In this vein, Bogdandy, A.; Cruz Villalón, P.; Huber, P.M. El derecho constitucional…, p. 47.
- 116.
See Bossacoma, P. Sovereignty in Europe, §§ 5–7.
- 117.
Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, p. 273.
- 118.
Mira, J.F. Crítica de la nació pura, p. 121.
- 119.
Requejo, F. Las democracias, p. 257.
- 120.
See § 2.2.
- 121.
Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, p. 244. Hobsbawm, E. The Age of Empire, p. 150. Patten, A. Equal Recognition, p. 3.
- 122.
Requejo, F. Las democracias, p. 255.
- 123.
In fact, to a large extent, Habermas himself bases his theory on citizenship and constitutional patriotism on German reunification and European integration. Habermas, J. “Citizenship and National Identity” (1990), Appendix II to Between Facts and Norms, pp. 491–2.
- 124.
More specifically, think of the difficulties which the Eurozone has had with responding to the asymmetrical economic shocks caused by the economic crisis from 2008 on. Turning the EU into a nation of nations would bring it closer to an optimum currency area. The values of trust, loyalty, cooperation and solidarity which national identity brings can help to correct certain structural factors which prevent the EU from becoming an optimum currency area (for lack of homogeneity, flexibility, mobility and solidarity). Indeed, the coincidence, in time (Treaty of Maastricht), between establishment of European citizenship and the monetary union may not be fortuitous. Still, alongside European citizenship as a political and legal bond, if Europe is to become a sort of federal Union steps should be taken to build a plurinational European identity, a European sense of a common destiny and so forth. See Bossacoma, P. Sovereignty in Europe. Bossacoma, P. “Unidades de la Unión”, pp. 223–45.
- 125.
See Van Middelaar, L. The Passage to Europe, ch. 7.
- 126.
Dicey, A.V. Introduction to… the Law of the Constitution, p. 141.
- 127.
See § 14.1.
- 128.
See § 3.1.
- 129.
Norman, W. Negotiating Nationalism, p. 34.
- 130.
Nations do not emerge out of thin air, but require some pre-existing cultural material. Nations being social constructions by no means implies that they are easy to build or dismantle nor that they are infinitely malleable. See Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism, ch. 4. Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, pp. 8–14.
- 131.
Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, ch. 5. See, mutatis mutandis, Smith, A.D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 16–8.
- 132.
These cases may show that it can be more complicated to define the general concept of nation than the inter-subjective consensus from which a specific group is considered a nation. The qualification for membership of a national community is not necessarily exclusive. In fact, people can be and consider themselves members of more than one nation at the same time. People can also identify more or less with one of them and can change their identification from one to another. In particular, Catalonia–Spain, Scotland–UK and Quebec–Canada can be considered overlapping or nested nations. See Miller, D. Citizenship and National Identity, pp. 125–31.
- 133.
In similar vein, Pavković, A.; Radan, P. Creating New States, pp. 13–14.
- 134.
A paradox of multinational federalism is that even though it offers a viable alternative to secession for minority nations, it may help to understand secession as a realistic and feasible alternative. See Popelier, P.; Sahadžić, M. (ed.) Constitutional Asymmetry in Multinational Federalism.
- 135.
See § 5.3.
- 136.
See ch. 7.
- 137.
See ICJ, Frontier Dispute case of 1986 (Burkina Faso/Mali), pars. 23–5.
- 138.
Ibid., par. 25. Regarding the uti possidetis principle, see Oduntan, G. International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa.
- 139.
“In many cases, national minorities are correct to point out that administrative boundaries frequently have no moral basis themselves, or that they were often drawn in accordance with a moral or political conception that is irrelevant in the current political situation, or drawn by the central State in order to facilitate assimilation of the minority or its control by the dominant group. It is therefore hard to see why these boundaries should be cast in stone, as the only unit in which self-determination can take place”. Moore, M. The Ethics of Nationalism, p. 159. See Requejo, F. “Plurinational democracies, federalism and secession”, p. 74. By way of example, the decisions on the geographical borders between the federated States in the USA were designed to guarantee an Anglo-Saxon cultural majority in each State. Some territorial boundaries were drawn to make sure that Indians or Hispanics were in the minority (e.g. Florida) while recognition of other territories as a federated State was delayed until the Anglo-Saxon settlers outnumbered the indigenous population (e.g. Hawaii). Kymlicka, W. Politics in the Vernacular, pp. 24, 98–9. Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, p. 112.
- 140.
This interpretation is easier to defend being aware that the uti possidetis principle is not jus cogens: “No doubt the principle is not peremptory and the states concerned are free to adopt other principles as the basis of a settlement”. Brownlie, I.; Crawford, J. Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, p. 239.
- 141.
This is the magic formula in elective theories of secession. See Beran, H. “A democratic theory of political self-determination for a new world order” in Lehning, P.B. (ed.) Theories of Secession, pp. 32–59. Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, ch. 3.
- 142.
On this matter, Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, p. 59. Monahan, P.J.; Bryant, M.J. Coming to Terms…, pp. 16–17, 36–7. Monahan and Bryant sharply point out that any impracticalities arising from partition could hardly be blamed on the unionist approaches but they would be another complicated effect of secession.
- 143.
See § 13.3.
- 144.
See Wherrett, J. “Aboriginal Peoples and the 1995 Quebec Referendum”, pp. 4–7. Dion, S. “Why is Secession Difficult…?”, pp. 277–8. Monahan, P.J.; Bryant, M.J. Coming to Terms…, pp. 37–8.
- 145.
Examples of exceptional cases could include geostrategic or military enclaves such as the Panama Canal and the Faslane naval base. The latter is on Scottish territory but could remain under British sovereignty in the event of secession. The case of some waters of the Gulf of Fonseca could be an example of co-ownership because of geographic reasons. Despite their exceptionality, both condominiums and enclaves can be created by explicit agreement or can arise tacitly too. See ICJ Judgements of 1992 concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute and of 1960 concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory.
- 146.
See ch. 5.
- 147.
The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia refers to the “people of Aran” and its “cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic identity”. The Parliament of Catalonia passed Statute 1/2015 on the special status of Aran, which reads that “Aran is a national reality” and refers to the right of the people of Aran to decide their future. According to one Aranese mayor: “If Catalan people wish to exercise, in a referendum, their legitimate democratic right to self-determination, Aran will have to stand on the sidelines of this consultation. The citizens of Aran should not be called to participate because Aran is not Catalonia. It forms part of Catalonia administratively, but is a different people. Historically, Aran constitutes a different nation to the Catalan. If the citizens of Aran were to participate in the consultation to decide the political and administrative future of Catalonia, they would be intervening in a decision which, legitimately and democratically, lies with Catalan people alone. Once Catalan people have decided what the future of Catalonia should be, it would be up to the people of Aran to decide, likewise democratically, the path to be taken for the future of Aran. When this time comes, the citizens of Aran will have to use their right to self-determination, nowadays misnamed right to decide, and decide by referendum whether they wish to remain with Catalonia or not”. Medan, E. “Aran no és Catalunya” El Periódico, 19 October 2013.
- 148.
In addition, it is important that all decisions adopted, in one sense or the other, must be in tune, as far as possible, with the Principle of territoriality.
- 149.
See Couture, J.; Nielsen, K.; Seymour, M. (ed.) Rethinking Nationalism, pp. 46–59.
- 150.
If this group were more or less territorially concentrated within the borders of an independent Catalonia and it kept nationally identified and pushed to reunite with Spain, it could also be considered a sort of redentist group. See ch. 1.
- 151.
For example, Spanish ought to be recognized as a co-official language of an independent Catalonia or, if not that, as part of Catalonia’s cultural heritage, with privileged recognition by the administration and judiciary. Respectful monolingualism offering significant institutional recognition of Spanish would also be in line with liberal nationalism.
- 152.
“There are linguistic and cultural minorities, including aboriginal peoples, unevenly distributed across the country who look to the Constitution of Canada for the protection of their rights”. Reference re Secession of Quebec, par. 96. The Clarity Act reiterates the importance of protection of minorities by making them participants in the deliberations on secession. In turn, Articles 11 and 12 of the Quebec Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec State (Bill 99) recognize the existing rights of the aboriginal nations of Quebec and place an obligation on the Government of Quebec to foster improvement of their economic, social and cultural conditions.
- 153.
See § 2.5.
- 154.
See § 2.7.
- 155.
These thoughts on liquidity are based on López Bofill, H. Nous estats i principi democràtic, pp. 68–9, who, in turn, drew inspiration from the liquid modernity defined by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman.
- 156.
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 79, 184–5.
- 157.
See Ovejero, F. La seducción de la frontera.
- 158.
Both remedial and primary theories of secession can be based on multinational views of equality (aiming for equality between majority and minority nations or between their members). Justice as multinational fairness, by means of the hypothetical multinational contract, is grounded on a particularly deep sense of equality among nations.
- 159.
See Buchanan, A. Secession, pp. 16–17.
- 160.
See § 2.2.
- 161.
See Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, §§ 39, 82.
- 162.
“The final political end of society is to become fully just and stable for the right reasons. Once that end is reached, the Law of Peoples prescribes no further target such as, for example, to raise the standard of living beyond what is necessary to sustain those institutions”. Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples, § 16.3.
- 163.
In similar vein, Miller, D. On Nationality, p. 115.
- 164.
Inspired by Buchanan, A. Secession, p. 133.
- 165.
See Rawls, J.; Van Parijs, P. “Three letters on The Law of Peoples…”.
- 166.
See § 2.2.
- 167.
To take marriage as an analogy, a broad majority of Westerners could agree that, ideally, it is a perpetual tie of love, cooperation and solidarity. But, in practice, this ideal or guiding principle of marriage for life is not conceived in such a manner as to render marriage indissoluble. To take the analogy further in more economic terms, secessiontaxation can work like alimony to provide compensation for the spouse who comes out less favourably from the separation or divorce.
- 168.
Secession cannot leave the parent State so devoid of resources that it could not guarantee the primary goods and basic interests of its members, to the extent that the parent State could not guarantee justice as fairness between its members. If this were to happen, the seceding State would deprive the parent State of self-determination. In this respect, Miller, D. Citizenship and National Identity, p. 123.
- 169.
Luke 10, 25–37.
- 170.
See Wellman, C.H. A Theory of Secession, ch. 2. Wellman speaks of “minimal cost” (p. 30), but the term “relatively low cost” is preferred for several reasons. Common sense, intuition and interpretation of the original source suggest that the cost must be relatively low compared with the substantial risk to the others. Although the Good Samaritan duty does not demand acts of heroism, the Samaritan people and the Good Samaritan are often said to have been poor.
- 171.
See § 2.4.
- 172.
See Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples, §§ 4, 15–16.
- 173.
See § 2.2.
- 174.
The first principle of The Law of Peoples reads: “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples”.
- 175.
Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples, § 15.3. In similar vein, Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Political Writings, p. 166.
- 176.
When speaking about multinational States or supranational organizations like the EU, Rawls seems to indicate that there might be an intermediate position between these principles. Rawls, J.; Van Parijs, P. “Three Letters on The Law of Peoples…”.
- 177.
Despite leaning towards an ethical particularism based on the ties of community and justice as reciprocity stemming from cooperative ties and the bonds of society, there may be a series of more or less intensive obligations which should be extended beyond reciprocity schemes and beyond the boundaries of the society in question. That is to say, there should also be redistribution in favour of persons or communities who do not produce profits, contribute or cooperate, and who do not, and perhaps will not, bring any benefit (e.g. in favour of the incapacitated and of the least-developed nations). As regards redistribution between persons who, in principle, form part of a society but do not participate in the relations based on reciprocity within it, the fact that they are under an obligation to obey, at the risk of sanctions, seems sufficient to sustain a certain redistributive justice. See § 3.3. Consequently, the theory of distributive justice adopted here is not based exclusively on community, reciprocity and mutual benefit. However, when there is a clearly continuing system of cooperation (increasing the ties of community and the obligation for fair play), the obligation for distributive justice can become more intense and extensive, above all in institutional and practical terms. That said, in a globalized and interdependent world, a strong cooperative context stretching beyond State frontiers also exists, at both regional and world levels. For this reason, justice as reciprocity can also bring with it a moral obligation for redistribution and solidarity between peoples. See Beitz, C.R. Political Theory and International Relations, Part 3 and Afterword (1999). In this context, where international law and politics impose more and more obligations on all sides, the obligations to obey, at the risk of sanctions, derived from them can also increase the redistributive obligations. See Buchanan, A. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, Part 1.
- 178.
In general, in cases of internal secession (within a federal State to form a new federated State), the federal solidarity which would remain may be sufficient and no more than a secession fee ought to be agreed. See § 13.3. Likewise, if the seceding State were to remain in an international organization with high levels of solidarity, as may be the case of the EU, perhaps such solidarity, complemented by a secession fee, would suffice.
- 179.
See ch. 4.
- 180.
The duty of distributive justice can reappear over the course of time if the injustice was committed in the distant past. See § 4.2.
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Bossacoma Busquets, P. (2020). The Principle of Nationality. In: Morality and Legality of Secession. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26589-2_3
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