Abstract
Dependability case, assurance case, or safety case is employed to explain why all critical hazards have been eliminated or adequately mitigated in mission-critical and safety-critical systems. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is the most employed graphical notation for documenting dependability cases. System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a technique, based on System Theoretic Accidents Model and Process (STAMP), to identify hazardous control actions, scenarios, and causal factors. STPA is considered a rather complex technique, but there is a growing interest in using STPA in certifications of safety-critical systems development. We investigate how STAMP and STPA can be related to use of assurance cases. This is done in a generic way by representing the STPA steps as part of the evidence and claim documentations within GSN.
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Change history
02 September 2019
In the originally published version of this chapter there was an error in figure 2. This has been corrected.
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Acknowledgements
The work of the first author was supported by CNPq (grant numbers 403921/2016-3 and 306186/2018-7). The work of the second author was supported by the national projects on aeronautics (NFFP7-04890) and the research centre on Resilient Information and Control Systems (www.rics.se).
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Hirata, C., Nadjm-Tehrani, S. (2019). Combining GSN and STPA for Safety Arguments. In: Romanovsky, A., Troubitsyna, E., Gashi, I., Schoitsch, E., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11699. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26250-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26250-1_1
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