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Iranian Society: Manifestations of Culture

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Modern Iran in Perspective

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Political Science ((BRIEFSPOLITICAL))

Abstract

Linguists, historians, and theologians, are but a few who have researched and written on the nuanced relationships between our thoughts, behaviors, and the language that we use. Our experiences are translated into our language and, similarly, our thoughts are expressed through language and manifest in behavior.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Translated by author.

  2. 2.

    On the contrary, and in a baffling sense, some believed that “…experiences of protest, rebellion, coup, and revolution attest to a state of anomie in contemporary Iranian life.” (Rajaee 2007, pp. 8)

  3. 3.

    These throning and dethroning cycles bear a remarkable history that is outside the framework of this study. Nevertheless, I don’t do it justice if it is not briefly mentioned. The Qajar Dynasty was part of sequential dynasties that ruled Iran since the eleventh century. Following the path of the last 700 years, the Qajar perpetuated similar tribal qualities, such as selling control of various provinces, marriage among blood-related family members, nepotism, etc. The last king of Qajar succeeded close to ten generations of kings, while Pahlavi was established by a man with a modest background, which is an anomaly in Iranian history, and hence he is often subjected to extreme scrutiny and judgment. Pahlavi rulers (father and son) essentially altered the overall structure of the country in light of a modernization scheme; ended geographic jurisdiction (BoLouk) by local land-lords (Amirs) and laid the foundation of urban well-to-do class that asserted its modern aspiration through a mimicry of western style in art, literature, and intellectual posturing, etc. The infatuation with the West and Westernization, however, has been widely marked as one of the main factors that derailed traditional qualities of Iranian society, and hence paved the way for the downfall of their reign. The 1978 Revolution turned Iranian society and its petty bourgeoisie structure up-side down and created a new socioeconomic class in its own image and according to its own values and tenets.

  4. 4.

    According to Edward Shils, philosophical ideas and traditions “…tend to be confined by the boundaries of their own civilization partly because of their connections with a complex of religion and linguistic tradition.” (Shils 1981, pp. 136) He, however, noted that Aristotle and Plato’s philosophies are the exception.

  5. 5.

    According to Ann Lambton, one of the studded scholars of Iranian history, “The impact of the West, as distinct from contact with the West, did not make itself felt noticeably until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and in the first instance it was felt in the form of military pressure.” (Lambton 1957, pp. 12)

  6. 6.

    Jalal Al-l Ahmad offered this analogy in the opening chapter of his book, OCCIDENTOSIS: A Plague from the West. He began the following sentence by stating, “But perhaps it more closely resembles an infestation of weevils. Have you seen how they attack wheat? From the inside.” (Ahmad JA 1984, pp. 27)

  7. 7.

    Procrustes, in Greek myth, was the cruel owner of an estate in Attica who abducted travelers and cut off their heads to ensure they fit his bed perfectly. Every aphorism here is about a Procrustean bed of sorts: faced with the imperfection of the unknown and the unobserved, some of us tend to back-fit the world into reductive categories such that only someone of my immense intellect is able to point out the inherent futility of modern life. See also Taleb (2010).

  8. 8.

    In the framework of this study, a context-bounded idea is referring to ideas that are confined by time and place—ideas that were based on the history [time] of Europe [place].

  9. 9.

    In the same interview, Dr. Malayeri points out, “In human history, many languages are born and many languages have disappeared. Among the important existing languages and cultures of the world, only a few can be dated back to some 3000 years ago. Persian is such a language and today we speak a language that is the child of an ancient culture and language. What other language in the world has this specific quality? Maybe Chinese, Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit. Look at Egypt, such a magnificent civilization; it completely lost its language and culture… The Persian language has always been a vehicle of culture and civilization. This language has offered many valuable literature and poetry to the world with poets like Ferdowsi, Khayyam, Mowlavi (Rumi), Hafez, etc. The invaders who conquered Iran took it to other countries from China in the east to Ottoman Turkey in the west… We should not rely entirely on the English language [to make our language relevant in today world], because it may not be the dominant language forever. Iranians in general blame Arabic for the shortcomings of the Persian language. But this is incorrect. We must actually blame ourselves. We do not take care of our language and do not have a scientific approach. We simplify everything and have a tendency to blame others for our own weaknesses…In the past Iranian clerks replaced Persian words with Arabic words. And even they replaced these Arabic words with more difficult Arabic words. Imposing Arabic rules to Persian also was by Iranians, and Arabs are not to be blamed. Even today Iranians do not want to accept the challenges to which Persian is confronted and threats its future.” (Akhami 2015)

  10. 10.

    Majlis’s succession was formally opened by Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar. Mozaffar’s son and successor, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, became Shah on January 21, 1907, and a few months later dissolved the Majlis due to, as he claimed, its contradiction to Islamic law. On June 23, 1908, the Shah bombarded the Majlis with the military and the political support of both Russia and Britain. According to W. Morgan Shuster, “Five days later the Persian Minister of Finance, Saniu’d-Dawla was shot and killed in the streets of Teheran by two Georgians, who also succeeded in wounding four of the Persian police before they were captured. The Russian consular authorities promptly refused to allow these men to be tried by the Persian Government, and took them out of the country under Russian protection, claiming that they would be suitably punished.”(Shuster 1912, pp. lv)

  11. 11.

    Formally signed by Count Alexander Izvolsky, Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador to Russia, the British-Russian Convention of 1907 stipulated the following: (1). That Persia would be split into three zones: A Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the southeast, and a neutral “buffer” zone in the remaining land; (2). That Britain may not seek concessions “beyond a line starting from Qasr-e Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd (Yazd), Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers.”; (3). That Russia must follow the reverse of guideline number two; (4). That Afghanistan was a British protectorate and for Russia to cease any communication with the Emir. For more details and map see Iran Review (2013).

  12. 12.

    Interestingly, the first Congress of the Bolshevik Party on Iranian soil held shortly after the declaration on 2 July of 1920 by Adalat (Justice party), which later became the Persian Communist Party (PCP). According to Reza Ghods, “Almost all of the members of this congress were Iranian Azeris and Armenians who had worked in Turkestan and the Caucasus, and very few spoke Farsi.” (Ghods 1990, pp. 506, Italic added)

  13. 13.

    Also known at the time as Sardar Sepah— Commander-in-Chief of the Army

  14. 14.

    Mossadegh believed “Ahmad Shah lost his throne because of his opposition to the Agreement [the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919]. Honoured be a shah who would give up the throne for the good of his country.” (Zirinsky 1994, pp. 76, footnote 79).

  15. 15.

    Sulaiman Mirza Eskandari rose against his own cousin, the Mohammad Ali Shah. It should be also noted that he was also founder of the Socialist Party of Persia and founding member of the Tudeh Party in Iran.

  16. 16.

    However, his illness forced him to return home. He resumed his studies in 1911, this time in Neuchâtel in Switzerland. Upon his return to Iran in 1914, he was appointed governor-general of the important Fars province. He remained in the government following the rise of Reza Khan in 1921 and served as minister of finance and then briefly as minister of foreign affairs until 1923 when he was elected to the Majlis.

  17. 17.

    Having said that, one must note that Reza Shah did retain some of the Qajar elite family members in his government. For instance, Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim al-Mamalek), the son of the court physician and himself had served as a doctor at the Qajar court, was forced into retirement by Reza Shah, but later “regained the Shah’s confidence by turning his large estate outside Tehran into a highly successful cotton plantation.” (Abrahamian 2008, pp. 101) Ali Mansur (Mansue al-Mamalek) who, according to Abrahamian (2008), “typified part of the old elite that had swallowed its pride and submitted to Reza Khan.” (pp. 101) Hussein Ala (Mu’in al-Vezareh) was one the major landlords and the son of Ala al-Mulk, also titled al- Saltaneh: “In 1922, the India Office [The India Office was a British government department established in London in 1858] described the family [of Ala al-Mulk] as one of the most influential in the whole southeast of Iran.” (Abrahamian 2008, pp. 103) Ala served as Reza Shah’s English translator, and as the country’s representative in London and Washington. Ahmad Qavam (Qavam al-Saltan) also Muhammad Mossadeq’s cousin, “best represented the notables eager to reassert aristocratic power at the expense of the Pahlavis.” (Abrahamian 2008, pp. 105) Qavam, headed “four different cabinets and an impressive array of ministries – of war, justice, finance, and interior.” (Ibid.) After a brief exile in France, he had been permitted to retire to his tea plantation in Gilan. One observer wrote that he reentered politics in 1941 ‘openly baring his teeth at the royal family’. Another suspected that he planned to set up a republic with himself as president. The shah complained to Bullard that Qavam was a ‘dangerous schemer’ who was ‘eager to implement some desperate design’ and had surrounded himself with ‘a gang of cut-throats’. Bullard himself described Qavam as the most shrewd, energetic, skillful, courageous, ambitious, and authoritative of the old-time politicians”. (Abrahamian 2008, pp. 103) However, Reza Khan’s action to take in these individuals may not be related to his compassion but rather based on the need for schooled individuals to run the government and see its daily function. This is due to the fact that, at the time, only members of elite families could receive schooling since “public education” as we know today did not exist in Iran and “schooling” was mainly for the elite offspring.

  18. 18.

    This strategy, to appoint an agent with a modest background in a prime minister position to curb descents and tame chaotic conditions in the country for the Qajar rulers had been proven an effective policy in the past. For instance, Mirza Taghi Khan Farahani, better known as Amir Kabir (also known by the titles of Atabak and Amir-e Nezam), who was appointed as the chief minister by Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (a nephew of his wife was Mohammad Mosaddegh), to deal decisively with various revolts, e.g., the Salar in Khurasan, Babis as well as Aga khan Mahallati, and also reestablished army as the key instrument for the survival of shah, as well as mastery over the country by himself. In addition, Amir Kabir like Reza Shah, initiated financial discipline within the government together with fiscal measurement to regain lost revenue taxes. For more details on Amir Kabir see Amanat (1991).

  19. 19.

    See Abrahamian (2008), pp. 103.

  20. 20.

    A similar interpretation of this proverb in English is, “one must cut one’s coat according to one’s cloth”.

  21. 21.

    Without a doubt, centuries of external meddling of imperial powers in the internal affairs of Iran cannot and should not be ignored. And yet, reducing all internal affairs to such interventions is belittling the country and diminishes its people into nonexistence. Moreover, if all troubles and anxieties are caused by external beasts, then all developments and progress must also be initiated and sustained by them. I totally reject the idea of the nation as an innocent bystander at the mercy of the power in the same manner that I also negate the notion of conspiracy. Internal affairs of any country, I believe, are direct reflections of the internal social, economic, and political evaluation and conditions of that country.

  22. 22.

    For instance, and relative to his rival Mossadegh, Reza Khan’s brand of governing was uncompromising; where Mossadegh saw beneficial consequences of compromises with groups from a wide spectrum of political views, e.g., Soviet-based Tudeh party and Religious ulama, Reza Khan could not see any benefit to give in an inch. For him, governing by consensus was not governing at all. History, however, has proven both men wrong. Mossadegh paid the price for his less stanchly style when both the Tudeh party and Ulama turned on him, which loosened his grip on power and eventually led to his downfall; and Reza Khan’s sticking-to-my-principle approach left him with no friends, which resulted in abdication by the foreign invader forces in total silence.

  23. 23.

    An interesting analogy can also be drawn between the manner in which Reza Khan deposed the Qajar monarch and Mossadegh’s plan to remove his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from the throne. In fact, the resemblance is striking; in both cases, challenger’s attempts formed gradually and step-by-step. Second, the army was brought under control, in Reza Khan’s case, he took over the command and in Mossadegh’s instance, many of young Pahlavi’s Army chiefs were replaced, including the Chief of Staff, Taghi Riahi, who later took office as the Minister of National Defense in the interim government of Mehdi Bazargan in 1979.

  24. 24.

    According to Goldstein (2010), “Reza Shah rule was tyrannical, brutal, and corrupt. In his attempts to modernize Persia, he weakened the ulama by attempting to wrest from it control of schools and the legal system and establishing Western-Style secular version of both…His admiration for the Nazi finally alienated the British, and they forced him to abdicate and go into exile in 1941. He did leave his mark on his nation, however; in 1935, he changed the country’s name from Persia to Iran.” (pp.106–7) This is what we get from experts whose previous works, e.g., Viruses, Animal Behavior and Germ Theory, qualify her to write about Iranian history, in which ulama is perceived as an object (it).

  25. 25.

    In fact, in an informative discussion, Rezun (1981) effectively illustrates that the relationship between ideological consideration and national imperial interests is nothing more than subordination of the former to the latter in Soviet foreign policy toward Iran between 1925 and 1941.

  26. 26.

    In fact, Gurko-Kriazhin’s article in 1926 entitled “Coup d’Etat in Persia” was one the first such article on the subject of the dynastic coup. (Rezun 1981, pp. 48)

  27. 27.

    This is a sentiment shared by most members of Qajar family, which is expressed vividly by the last Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah, who, upon hearing of his dethronement, made the following proclamation while residing in Paris, “At this tragic moment when the future of my country is at risk, all my thoughts are with my people, to whom I address this declaration: the coup d’état just committed by Reza Khan against the constitution and my dynasty, was committed through the force of bayonets. It contravenes the most sacred laws and fatally leads my people into great calamities and undeserved sufferance. I strongly raise my voice in protest against this coup d’état. Now and in the future, I consider null and void all acts emanating from such a government and committed under its rule. I am and remain the legitimate and constitutional sovereign of Persia, and I wait the hour of my return to my country to continue serving my People.” (Zarrinkafsch-Bahman 2018)

    One can also detect a similar tone and pose in Mossadegh’s trial, when in his defense he stated, “My only crime, and my great – even greater – crime is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry, and removed the network of colonialism, and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth from this land…my life, reputation, person and property—and those of others like me – do not have the slightest value compared with the lives, the independence, the greatness and the pride of millions of Iranians…Since from the style of the prosecution as well as the trial process, it is clear that I shall die in prison, and that they will put down this voice and energy which I have always put in the service of the people…I say farewell to the brave and dear people of Iran…”. (Katouzian 1999, pp. 200)

  28. 28.

    Various arguments are made to justify Mossadegh’s autocratic actions during his tenure as prime minster as political necessities to salvage his administration, stabilized the political atmosphere at the time and established his authority as decision makers. I reject these arguments on the following grounds: First, these justifications are made on the grounds that Mossadegh was committed to democracy and he was a democratic ruler, which is stretching the imagination a bit far. He could not rule as such because he was not elected democratically but rather chosen by Majlis under special circumstance. But more importantly, Iran was not a democratic nation since there were no national structures or institutional settings to support it, even if Mossadegh was sincere in his desire to be a democratic prime minister. de Bellaigue (2012), one of Mossadegh’s ardent supporters, quotes Mossadegh as saying that a trusted leader is “that person whose every word is accepted and followed by the people.” (pp. 59) To which, de Bellaigue (2012) adds: “His understanding of democracy would always be coloured by traditional ideas of Muslim leadership, whereby the community chooses a man of outstanding virtue and follows him wherever he takes them.” (pp. 59)

    If this is the standard to which we are held, then Hitler in Nazi Germany was the truly democratic ruler. In addition, Mossadegh’s actions, e.g., to close down Majlis, were choices he made according to alternative selection, and hence if they turned out to be damaging to his reputation, they should be considered as bad choices. Finally, one must note that a justification is not an explanation; the latter is not an excuse, while the former often is because it is made when there is no explanation possible.

  29. 29.

    This is due to the crumbling of multinational empires – the prolonged decay of the Ottoman Empire and the sudden collapse in the First WWI of the Habsburg and Romanov – left in its wake a broad north-south belt of new states in East Central Europe, stretching from the Baltic littoral to the Balkan peninsula. All of these states were created as nation-states, legitimated by their claim to be the states of and for particular nations. Moreover, all were not only nation-states but nationalizing states, characterized, to differing degrees and in differing ways, by a distinctive politics of nationalization. (Brubaker 1996, pp. 415)

    In contrast, some proponents of Mossadegh often make exaggerated claims that seem like they have some axe to grind, or simply do not have a broad and positive perspective of their own history, and hence misunderstand it. On the latter, for instance, it is not uncommon to hear phrases like “Mossadegh’s services to the country were unmatchable in the history of Iran.” (remark by a liberal clergyman, Yousefi Ashkevari, and recited in Yaghmaian (2012), pp. 239, footnote no. 5). In terms of the former, there is a belief that suggests before the Mordad 28, 1953, and particularly during his administration, Mossadegh set an unprecedented example of a democratic leader who ruled Iran democratically [which by definition means by majority vote]. I consider this observation as what it is, a claim, and hence treat it as such. For one thing, Mossadegh became a prime minster as the result of bewildering consequences, in which the incumbent prime minister and military figure who played a central role (prior to his appointment) in moving Iranian armed forces into Azerbaijan as the separatist movement there collapsed, Ali Razmara, was assassinated by the member of Fadaiyan-e Islam Kahlil Tahmasebi less than 9 month after he took office on March 7, 1951; Kahlil Fahimi acted as prime minister for a week (March 7 to March 12), which then replaced by Hossein Ala (one of the ardent supporters of Qajar monarchy, schooled at Westminster and studied law at the University of London, after which admitted to the exclusive bar at Inner Temple) from March 12, 1951 to April 27, 195, who was replaced by Mossadegh, which received endorsement of the majority sets in Majlis, the National Front, and consequently approval of the Shah. Soon after, the assassin Razmara was released and pardoned as a solider of Islam by Mossadegh’s administration and Majlis approval, but he was re-arrested after the 28 of Mordad and executed in 1955. For the second thing, the notion that Mossadegh or anyone acted in the manner that resembled a democratic ruler, is far from the flattering adjective it seems to insinuate. The reason is twofold: First, an action, as such, is obviously out of context in a country like Iran at the time, and hence it shoulders no positive bearing either on the society as a whole or political domain in particular. Being a democratic leader, even if such a claim is accurate, adds nothing of value in the country that barely holds its sovereignty against the onslaught occupation and dire consequences of two world wars. Second, most tyrants and demented leaders around the world, were elected and acted democratically when they committed unspeakable crimes against humanity such as, Napoleon, Hitler, George Bush, etc., and most revolting ideologies such as Fascism rose within the democratic societies.

  30. 30.

    This does not imply that he should be commended for the manner in which he ruled, or to justify any kind of cruelties he has caused, but rather to put in perspective the history of our country, its leaders, and the context in which Iranian states function to which Hassan Ghazi Moradi stated, “The Kings’ cruelty has been criticized in classic Iranian literature and political writings and the axis of political theory in Iran has been justice—with a specific meaning—and the kings were given advices to rule with justice. The oppositions to cruelty of the kings, before and after the introduction of Islam, were formed because of its contradiction with the ideal kingship and not because of the unity of chaos and despotism. In these works, the type of rule while giving morality superiority over politics was essentially the noted issue.” (Moradi 2017, pp. 22)

  31. 31.

    Pahlavi 1966, pp. 315. Translation by the author.

  32. 32.

    According to Dehkhoda lexicon, modern is defines as up-to-date, new; modernized (Moteggaded) is defined as a new tradition and customs, opposite of Mor’taje (reactionary); in the Moein lexicon, modern is defined as fresh, current. Moteggaded is defined as no’gara (an innovator, avant-garde) – someone who seeks new things, or in a popular form, someone who acts according to Europeans tradition. In English, the etymology of the modern as adjective as “now existing” and in 1580 “of or pertaining to present or recent time” is rooted in Middle French moderne and directly from Latin modernus. In Shakespearian language, it is often used in term of “every-day, ordinary, commonplace”.

  33. 33.

    It should be noted that the ideas that Descartes and philosophers that followed him promoted also faced resistance and descent. For example, Montesquieu (1721/2008) stated, “Western philosophers, and above all the followers of Monsieur Descartes maintain that the souls of all creature, excepting man, are material and mortal: and that a beast [man] is no different to a machine like a watch or a clock…I shall not believe that they [modern philosophers] are in Paradise until I have the good fortune of seeing them there, but nevertheless I do not share the view of the modern philosophers who supposed their souls to be purely material…there is something pleasant and amusing in watching the behavior of ants, their wise prudence, and to see how they work during the entire summer to amass the store of food that they need during the winter. There is not a bird, not a four-legged beast, not a fish, that does not refute this hypothesis by Descartes”. (pp. 233) For fascinating discussions on similar topics, see Sternhell (2010).

  34. 34.

    To which Neurologist Antonio Damasio in Descartes’ Error, reminds us what we relinquish to be, Descartes ideal man, “The truly embodied mind I envision, does not relinquish its most refined levels of operation, those constituting its soul and spirit…..Perhaps the most indispensable things we can do as human beings, every day of our lives, is remind ourselves and others of our complexity, fragility, finiteness, and uniqueness.” (Damasio 1994, pp. 252)

    Damasio, also points out the functional connection in regions of the brain where emotions and reasoning interact and noted “Damage in this sector [anterior cingulate cortex] not only produce impairment in movement, emotion, and attentiveness, but also cause a virtual suspension of the animation of action and of thought process such that reason is no longer viable.” (Ibid., pp. 72)

  35. 35.

    The history of political movements in twentieth-century Iran provides a telling narrative, particularly in terms of the role played by the Soviet State. Like most countries of the era, political movements, for the most part, were based on the Left inclinations, which often, but carelessly, are labeled as socialism and communism. Another commonality that the Iranian left shared with their counterparts around the world was that most left parties were, more or less, associated with the Soviet state rather than the ideology it represented. The root cause of this deviating, substituting an ideology for a state, can be traced back to the Tudeh party, the pro-Soviet dominant group among all the left groups in Iran. This open and fairly established association makes the role played by the Soviet state in the internal Iranian affairs as well as advancing or impeding development of the country a significant factor, which manifests itself in various forms. For instance, the role Soviet State played to abdicate Reza Shah, or the outright reliance of Iranian socialists, or “free thinking Iranian” in words of Sulaiman Mirza Eskandari, on Soviet’s support. On the former, according to Cosroe Chaqueri, “Initially, the Britain did not intend to force the old shah to abdicate: the Soviet did.” (Chaqueri 1999, pp. 500) Chaqueri later elaborated by stating, “…while the Soviets at this time supported the idea of establishing a republic in Iran, the British wished to return the Qajar dynasty to the throne. It was only after the meeting in London between Sir Anthony Eden and the son of the last Qajar Crown Prince Mohammed Hasan Mirza, the next Qajar prince in line for kingship, Prince Hamid, that the British decided in favor of Mohammed Reza, because the Qajar candidate turned out to be illiterate in Persian.” (Ibid, footnote no. 17). The latter issue of dependency on Soviet’s support also reveals itself in the early days when one of the founders and the first chair of the Tudeh party, Sulaiman Mirza Eskandari, the highly respected radical Qajar prince, told his interlocutor, the Soviet Officer, “It is absolutely clear that we the free thinking people [socialists] ourselves will not be able to do anything without your [Soviet] help. We need help. In general, the historical moment that now lives, at the moment the Red Army is in Iran [in reference to Anglo-Russian occupation], must be used for the improvement of the situation in Iran.” (Ibid, pp. 502).

  36. 36.

    See also Cronin 2004, pp. 2–3. It is also important to note that for the interwar generation of common Iranians, the Left was generally perceived by two categories: the Soviet-Tudeh and British communist. The genesis of latter term is related to Mostafa Fateh, the highest-ranking Iranian employee of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and one of the founders of the Hamrahan Party, which curiously in Farsi means “Fellow-travelers”. According to Habib Ladjevardi, “The Hamrahan Party, founded by Mustafa Fateh, Dr. Hasan Mosharaf Naficy and others, adopted a Socialist ideology and attempted to offer competition to the Tudeh Party. However, Since the key founder [Mustafa Fateh] was an employee of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the party was given a British label and became known as ‘Trottist,’ in reference to Alan Trott, oriental secretary of the British legation.” (See Ladjevardi 1995, pp. 275, footnote 81). The reader might also be interested to know that Dr. Hasan Mosharaf Naficy was also the finance minister during the occupation of Iran during the WWII and associated with the controversial devaluation of the rial at the time in which he was later labelled as a traitor. He was also the first head of the Plan Organization in Iran during Mossadegh’s government and “later led the oil nationalization movement to a disastrous conclusion”. (See Dadkhah 2001, pp. 181)

  37. 37.

    See Eshraghi (1984) and Bakhash (2015).

  38. 38.

    Beside the ahistorical quality of these claims, the manner in which certain parts of the country were annexed by foreign forces, most notably Russia’s army, is a contributing factor for the local resistance. For instance, the Russians executed the constitutional revolutionaries of Tabriz and their relatives en masse and many civilians of Tabriz as well. The total number of executions is estimated to have been about 1200. Russians also destroyed part of the Arg of Tabriz by shelling it.

    (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1911_Russian_invasion_of_Tabriz#/)

  39. 39.

    The republic was consisting of small territories, including Mahabad and its close cities of Piranshahr (one of the Iran’s oldest cities and its foundations date back to the pre-Islamic era of Iran and the emergence of the kingdom of Media) and Ushnaviya (Naqadeh).

  40. 40.

    According to Arash Reisinezdeh, “the Kurdish question has been historically less crucial in Iran than in Iraq and Turkey, where the existence of Kurds was denied for decades. Culturally and linguistically related to the Iranian people, the Kurds never faced the brutality and ethnic cleansing from Tehran as they did from Ankara, Baghdad, and even Damascus. On top of that, a third of Iranian Kurds are Shia Muslim. Conversely, the Iraqi state, like Turkey, has been more prone to Kurdish separatism.” (Reisinezdeh 2018, pp. 63).

  41. 41.

    See Ashraf (2006).

  42. 42.

    For von Herder (1968), the concept of the Volk (people) was captured by the phrase Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil), which later was appropriated by the Nazis for their wicked purpose.

  43. 43.

    In the case of Iran, Hamid Ahmadi, accurately points out, “What we need is methodology and epistemology based on the historical sociology of Iran to be able to explain issue such as identity, nation-building, nationalism or ethnicity. This methodological-epistemological approach should consider the importance of time and space in the application of existing theoretical and conceptual models currently popular in Western social science. Explaining sensitive and complicated issue such as identity requires the extensive use of the native history, cultural and sociological based on a general and ahistorical application of general social science theories.” (Ahmadi 2005, pp. 127) Furthermore, Ahmadi featured some recent general applications of Western-oriented models such as Mustafa Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation : The Construction of National Identity , in which “the author’s simplistic application of Benedict Anderson’s model to Iran encourages him to conclude that the civilization, political, and cultural legacy of Iran is reducible and attributable to the construction of an Iranian identity and image of political continuity by the nineteenth century European Orientalism.” (Ibid, pp. 128, footnote)

    Although some literature in the last decade has touched on the issue of identity, nationalism and nation-building in Iran in a way that reflects the application of a historical sociology tradition and thus presents more realistic analyses of Iranian society (e.g., Ashraf 2004 and Sabet 2000), few studies have concentrated on explaining the causes behind the dynamic of national unity and political continuity in Iran in the past and the fact that different religious and linguistic group, especially non-Farsi speaking have contributed to these dynamics and even have promoted the factors that are the foundation of Iranian national unity and identity.

  44. 44.

    Ahmadi observation is indicative of how little Iranians are inclined to learned from the past. We may, however, learn much from it, if not what it meant to the people who lived through it, then perhaps what they unwittingly told us about us and our inner selves. Indeed, history and a life of community, by their essence, reflect an attitude toward space, and space, which is the psychic reflection of one’s world view.

  45. 45.

    According to Encyclopedia Britannica, “Sykes-Picot Agreement, also called Asia Minor Agreement, (May 1916), secret convention made during World War I between Great Britain and France, with the assent of imperial Russia, for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various French- and British-administered areas. Negotiations were begun in November 1915, and the final agreement took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France.” (see https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement)

    Many believed the current dire condition of the region is rooted back to the agreement. If you look at the Middle East today, there’s essentially five artificial nations that were created by Sykes-Picot, the most prominent ones being Iraq and Syria – and Jordan being another one. But anyone looking at Iraq and Syria today see absolutely that the artificial borders that were created have now completely disintegrated. (see https://www.npr.org/2016/05/13/477974553/lawrence-in-arabia-author-examines-lasting-impact-of-sykes-picot-agreement)

  46. 46.

    The entire quotation is as follows: “…apart from a few relatively permanent political entities such as China, Korea, Vietnam, and perhaps Iran and Egypt which, had they been in Europe, would have been recognized as ‘historic nations’, the territorial units for which so-called national movement sought to win independence, were overwhelmingly the actual creation of imperial conquest, often no older than a few decades, or else they represent religio-cultural zones rather than anything that might have been called ‘nation’ in Europe.” (Hobsbawm 2012, pp. 137)

    It is important to understand the meaning of a historic nation from the perspective of a Modern man. According to Norman Davis, “during the nineteenth century, the concept of ‘the historic nation’ was one of the basic tolls of the historian’s trade. Developed by Hegel, and refined by Marx, it referred to that select company of nations which were qualified, through their achievements in a broad range of political, military, economic, social and culture sphere, both for the sovereign control of their own state and for an independent role in world affairs. It implied the existence of a second category of ‘unhistoric nation’, whose deficiencies in one or other of the necessary accomplishments condemned them to a subservient position and eventually to assimilation and extinction. Under the influence of the popular theory of Evolution, the fate of nation on the international scene was linked to that of biological species in the natural world, where only the fittest can survive and where the unadapted must expect to perish.” (Davis 2001, pp. 245)

  47. 47.

    Here, I am not talking about modernization, e.g., of military, but modern era in a sense of questioning the merit of traditional ways of thinking or living, emergence of mass economic production, and development of political institutions based on public participation. More importantly, I am not talking about a sort of modernity that prevailed in a circle of few but as a phenomenon that captured the imagination of the public in a manner that affects the whole society.

  48. 48.

    I view this discrepancy as a direct result of unequal development and wealth distribution, to which few have ability to decide for the rest of the society. However, Cottam (1979) offered a different as well as illuminating perspective: “The difficulty of travel in Iran helped accentuate a very striking feature of Iranian nationalism: the fact that until the 1950s nationalism was the property of the very few.”(pp. 25) Cottam (1979) explained “the difficulty of travel in Iran” earlier in the chapter by stating, “Before the time of Reza Shah, whose rise to power began in 1921, travel [in Iran] was mainly by camel caravan and hence was prohibitively slow and costly for most city or town dwellers.” (pp. 24–25)

  49. 49.

    For instance, see Ansari (2012) and Bill and Louis (1988).

  50. 50.

    The issue of oil and political agenda in Iran received little attention by students of Iran. However, it has been widely examined in the context of contemporary Iranian political figures, most notably Dr. Mossadegh. For instance, Haim and Kedourie (2005) stated, “Mossadegh believed that oil revenue could further develop and haul Iran out of its cycle of poverty. But he intended to accomplish this within the bounds of the existing economic system and the principle of sound finance. Mossadegh may have doubted whether the economy, if left to itself, could make the necessary adjustment to an oil-less economy.” (pp. 89–90) On the concept of oilless economy , however, Cottam (1979) made an illuminating point, “A much misunderstood doctrine attributed to the Mossadeq government was the so called ‘oilless economy’. Here, as so often in political affairs, terminology can be sufficiently misleading to help produce major errors of judgment. An ‘oilless economy’ sounds like the doctrine of an irrational fanatic, and since this was the image of Dr. Mossadeq in many Western minds, the phrase was interpreted literally. In fact, however, responsible Iranians have never held such an idea. Their view can be summarized as follows: “Iran has a magnificent, God-given resource which if properly utilized can rise the standard of living of the people, establish a healthy industrial-agriculture economy, and restore much of the prestige and dignity Iran has lost. However, this resource is not an unlimited one and possibly will be exhausted in a half-century. Consequently, it is this generation’s duty to posterity to achieve the maximum return from this great resource. Not only must the monetary return be at maximum, but the Iranian government in power must be totally devoted to the holy purpose of utilizing the oil revenues justly. Such a government cannot be lackey of foreigners, nor, which is saying the same thing, can it be based on the power of the effete ruling families who have no interest other than their own immediate profit. If no such monetary returns can be attained and if no such government can secure and retain office, then it is best that Iran’s oil stay underground until these conditions are achieved, despite the suffering that cutting off the oil revenue would produce.” (pp. 201–202) Emphasis added.

  51. 51.

    What I am arguing here is not to belittle importance of nationalism as one of the main determinants of political behavior, attitude or strategy of our political leaders in Iran, which also were among the most ardent advocates of modernity, but rather to point out that nationalism, unlike its Western versions, was not a factor in development of mass political participation in modern Iran. For those who still insist that nationalization of oil in Iran was a manifestation of nationalism, I will offer the following: (1) The Nationalization Law of 1951, in which passed by the Majlis passed in March 15 and signed by Shah on May 2, was not put on the ballot, and hence cannot be viewed as an initiative supported by masses throughout the country; (2) it was not intended to incite mass political participation, like Nazism in Germany, Italy, USA, England, etc., but rather chosen as a strategy by governments in office from 1922 onward; (3) it was a policy tool for incumbent governments to secured total control over the most important revenue generating sector instead of receiving oil royalties from Anglo-Persian oil company; (4) the nationalization law initiated not for an ideology ground but rather according to Marbury Efimenco as a result of “Iranians felt that the profits were in no measure commensurate with the prevailing practice in Saudi Arabia nor adequate in relation to the production figures for Abadan, which in 1950 amounted to 32.3 million tons.” (see Efimenco 1955, pp. 393); and finally, (5) since the claim of nationalization was based on nationalism is often made by those who considered Dr. Mossadegh as a national hero of the modern Iran, which makes one wonders why anyone insists to preview a national hero in a company of well-known nationalists like Hitler, Mussolini, and recently Trump. It should also note that oil development policy was one of the major concern of the Iranian government as far back as 1922, and to which Reza Shah acted when in December 27, 1932, he canceled the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) concession. Henceforth, Iran received higher dividends, relative to the pre-cancelation agreement, on ordinary shares and four shilling for each tone sold or exported, with minimum annual guarantee of £1,050,000 pound, which later in 1944 increased to four million pounds sterling.

  52. 52.

    In my previous work, Iran Revisited , I argued that in Iran we have a lack of togetherness particularly when it comes to defending the country against external threats. This, however, does not mean exclusion of others or inclination to see oneself as superior to others, or a propensity to declared one independent from the main land, but rather implies an extreme attachment of a community to its geographical position in which the best possible strategy was to defend locally. (See Pirzadeh 2016)

  53. 53.

    Cottam (1979), pp. 5.

  54. 54.

    The frame that was largely confined to states in which the population were relatively homogenous, very often called for the existence of a definite territory, a common and distinctive traditions and customs, a common language and religion, and a belief in racial homogeneity.

  55. 55.

    The text of his speech is available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3940

  56. 56.

    Before going forward, I must make a comment on what constitutes tradition for me. By tradition I do not imply this or that tradition, but the role in human societies of tradition as such – in the very wide sense of everything that is traditum, handed down, from one generation to another. To talk about tradition in this sense is to talk about the enduring substance of the past in human affairs. And yet, contemporary discussions in social sciences have paid very little attention to this bearing. This deficiency, according to Shils (1981) is due to the “progressive” viewpoint of most social scientists, who tend to look upon the past, if at all, as an obstacle to “progress”. My negation of this view begun by describing the Enlightenment as the great anti-traditional force in “modern thought”, which ironically could not escape the circular logic, for it give birth to tradition of its own including those in the field of science. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment created the modern attitude of cynicism and criticism, which in principle puts all traditions – and tradition itself – under suspicion. In short, “what we have inherited is as bad as it can be”. I reject this notion and instead recite a telling story of tradition. In the exterior of Tevye’s house (the main character of Fiddler on the Roof) a fiddler is seated on the roof, playing. Tevye begun by saying, “A fiddle on the roof. Sound crazy, no? But in our little village of Anatevka, you might say every one of us is a fiddler on the roof, trying to scratch out a pleasant, simple tune without breaking his neck. It isn’t easy. You may ask, why do we stay up there if it’s so dangerous? We stay because Anatevka is our home. And how do we keep our balance? That I can tell you in a word—tradition! …Because of our tradition, we’ve kept our balance for many, many years. Here in Anatevaka we have traditions for everything-how to eat, how to sleep, how to wear clothes. For instance, we always wear a little prayer shawl. This shows our constant devotion to God. You may ask, how did this tradition start? I’ll tell you—I don’t know! But it’s a tradition. Because of our tradition, everyone knows who he is and what God expect him to do.” (Stein et al. 1964, pp. 13)

  57. 57.

    The Beveridge’s work, Social Insurance and Allied Services, is a British government report, published in November 1942, influential in the founding of the welfare state in the United Kingdom. For illuminating discussions on this and other related topics see Renwick (2018).

  58. 58.

    For informative discussions of this tradition see Sternhell (2010).

  59. 59.

    See Spencer (2012), pp. 68.

  60. 60.

    It should be noted that Veblen and Weber works were not compatible in their objectives and principles. While both make use of the concept of rationality in their interpretation of modern life and culture. Veblen, Ries argues, made use of it to ridicule the conspicuous waste and consumption of the leisure classes of modern industrial culture. (Ries 1964, pp. 121). More precisely, Veblen’s theory of rationality is divided into two levels. First, is concern with the nature of human action and its rationality; called the problem of individual rationality. Here, he rejects rational calculative action. The second level of rationality, the problem of social rationality, presents distinctive attributes of modern industry, which saturates modern society and determines all types of social action with that society. (see Yilmaz 2007, pp. 841). Weber, however, regarded the rationalization of modern life a threat to human civility. Rationality was equated with bureaucracy and the process of rationality was associated with routine, mechanization, and dehumanization: What Marx saw as the dehumanization and exploitation of the workers by capitalism, Weber saw as part of a much more general process in which the individual becomes detached from control and mastery over the conditions of his life.” (Ries 1964, pp. 121)

  61. 61.

    Ahmed (2018) in Journey into Europe: Islam , Immigration, and Identity offers a different view of Herder’s philosophy, which is informative as well as compatible with the content of the present study.

  62. 62.

    See Sharifi (2013), pp. 67.

  63. 63.

    See Bhabha (1984).

  64. 64.

    Gardiner (2002) explores the difficulty in defining corruption. His examination considers the differences in law of various nations, the consideration of the publics opinion, and the effects on the public. Each of these different perspectives provides different challenges for defining corruption.

  65. 65.

    See The World Bank Group (1997)

  66. 66.

    See Grant (2014).

  67. 67.

    In fact, the strength of Western nations, despite sharing certain historical and cultural similarities, e.g., inner-continental wars, religion, etc., is that each nation developed its own distinct cultural institutions, economies as well as political systems. France’s economy is so different than the economies of Germany or Italy, and America’s democracy could not be more different than that of Britain, which is closer to the US than any other country in the world. These differences are also apparent between and within North-South and East-West European regions. Even in respect to welfare states, Europeans have always differed from country to country: the social democratic version of Scandinavia with high public spending, strong trade unions, universal benefits and support for women to stay in the labor market; Germany’s conservative welfare states were built around the traditional family with a strong contributory principle; and finally, the Anglo-American welfare state that emphasizes guaranteed minimums rather than universal benefits. (for more details, see Andersen GE (1990))

  68. 68.

    For an interesting discussion on the history of Iran/Persia see:

    “History of Ancient Persia, The Persian Gulf and Iranian Plateau” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bIb83a-sp9A.

    “East to West: Between Two Rivers” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYHOKy9s3ag

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGdE82JN3Hw

  69. 69.

    This collective choice, however, has been under immense scrutiny for the wrong reasons, and is regularly interpreted as a failed attempt to attain democracy—as if liberating yourself must be in accordance with a predetermined prescription — the way in which others, namely Western nations, achieved it for themselves. This erroneous view, unfortunately, often prevails among our prominent western-educated scholars. I am particularly addressing some of the conventional analyses of the Iranian revolution, which failed to see the 1978 Revolution as an authentic movement based on innate values. Among these analyses, for instance, is a view that was initiated by a prominent Iranian scholar, Abbas Milani of Stanford Centre for Iranian Studies, which claimed, “The Iranian revolution of 1979 was a failed transition to democracy.” (Milani 2013, pp. 342)

  70. 70.

    The following example clarifies my point about Bacon’s role as Star Chamber of inquisitorial royal court: Bacon opened his work entitled Cases of Treason; with the Trial, Penalties, and Proceeding Therein with the following, “Where a Man compasses or imagine the Death of the King, the Kings Wife, the Kings eldest Son, and Heir apparent, if it appeared by any Overt act, it is Treason; Where a Man violate the Kings Wife, the Kings eldest daughter, unmarried, the Wife of the Kings eldest Son, and Heir apparent, it is Treason; Where a Man levies War against the King in the realm, it is Treason;…Where a Man persuades or withdraws any of the Kings Subjects from their obedience, or from the Religion established by his Majesties, with an Intent to withdraw any from the King’s Obedience, It is Treason; Where a Man absolved, reconciled, or withdrawn from his Obedience to the King, or promises Obedience to any other foreign Power, it is Treason.” (Bacon 1733, pp. 265)

  71. 71.

    See Rabins (2015).

  72. 72.

    To be fair to the Greek, as well as Islamic philosophers, this may be due to the fact that the available knowledge at Bacon’s time, e.g., technology, was totally absent in the ancient era. Therefore, they could not take into consideration what they did not know at the time. This point is also acknowledged by Bacon himself, as he stated, “It is well to observe the forces and virtue and consequences of discoveries; and these are to be seen nowhere more conspicuously than in those…which where unknown to the ancients.” (see Bacon 1857, pp. 114) Nevertheless, neither in Islam nor in Greece, we have come across someone like Bacon to raise a similar concern.

  73. 73.

    What I mean by “truth” and “real” here is neither philosophical conceptualizations, nor transcendent perceptions of both terms, but rather common views we often hold in our daily conversations. When we talk about what is truth, we generally refer to what is real as opposed to fictional, and vice versa. Truth in this sense is synonymous with real or, to paraphrase, “separating fact from fiction.”

  74. 74.

    The egalitarian implications of Descartes’ doctrine of cognitive equivalence have not gone unnoticed. “Since reason is a universal human quality,” writes Petru Comarnesco, “it is certain that the point of departure of this Cartesian social ethics may be called democratic” [in the same manner that Adam Smith’s notion of invisible hand indicates optimal allocations of goods/services and resources] (Comarnesco 1942, pp. 499) The fact that “the organization of the Cartesian society implies or aims at an intellectual aristocracy” does not necessarily undermine the democratic thrust of this teaching, for even the egalitarian Jefferson believed society should be directed by its “natural aristocracy.”(Ibid., pp. 500)

    See also de Jouvenel (1957) and Taylor (2001).

  75. 75.

    Isaiah Berlin criticized this view of freedom in his 1958 lecture “Two Concepts of Liberty”, and stated, “…if to be free-negatively-is simply not to be prevented by others from doing whatever one wishes, then one of the ways of attaining such freedom is by extinguishing one’s wishes.” (Berlin 1969, pp. 31)

  76. 76.

    For instance, in political science and economics, human institutions and individuals are previewed with apprehension and suspicion. In fact, this inclination is often regarded by political scientists as the strength of a modern democracy, which entails the mechanism of check-and-balance. We were often told that power corrupts men, therefore, he must be controlled; but self-interest will free him, so he must pursue it — as if, man pursues power for the sake of his community and not himself. In economics, while a very self-interested agent is perceived as the main driving force in an economy, he, nevertheless, must not be trusted because of the direct consequences of self-interest pursuits, e.g., rentier culture . (See Delany 1999) He is a maximizer for the good of all, but not trustworthy for his own community. This perhaps explained why in today’s democratic societies of the western hemisphere, i.e., the United State, we are witnessing the promotion of paranoia and mistrust that pit each individual against the other in the spirit of freedom and an autonomous free man.

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Appendix A

Appendix A

Descartes’ vision is perfectly matched with that of his pre-Enlightenment neighboring fellow, Francis Bacon. Bacon envisioned the manner in which to understand and order reality known as Empiricism, or as is commonly referred to as the scientific method. Bacon, the one-time clerk of the infamous Start Chamber, the ruthlessly inquisitorial royal courtFootnote 70, apparently was agitated with the ancient Greek tradition of analytic thinking, the approach that emphasizes the “why” of things in science.Footnote 71 The Greek, he wrote, had not “adduced a single experiment which tends to relieve and benefit the condition of man, and which can in truth be referred to the speculations and theories of philosophy.”(Bacon 1857, pp. 74) According to Charles Taylor, Bacon, “constantly hammers home the point that the traditional science [the Greek tradition] have aimed at discovering some satisfying overall order of things, rather than being concerned to see how things function; I find even those who have sought knowledge for itself, and not for benefit and ostentation, or any practical enablements in the course of life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong mark—namely, satisfaction (when men call Truth) and not operation”. (Taylor 1992, pp. 213) In short, Bacon believed the Greek tradition of inquiry, which also provided the bedrock of Islamic philosophical tradition to this day, bears no fruit. In other words, the Greek approach is not only useless, but the knowledge it rendered is far from accurate.Footnote 72 To correct this perceived deficiency, Bacon turned his attention to the “how” of things, and in doing so came to the realization of three mechanical discoveries: printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. In his words, these three discoveries “have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world; the first in Literature, the second in warfare, and third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes; insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.” (Bacon 1857, pp. 114) In his most celebrated work Novum Organum (1622), he outlined the goal of his scientific method, which was “to establish and extend the power of dominion of the human race itself over the universe.” (Ibid.) For Bacon, nature is perceived as a “storehouse of valuable resources,” in the words of Rifkin (2009), and the only relation that mattered was how the power is used to own it. Reality, for Bacon, “was objective and manifested in expropriation. We come to know nature by the way we manipulated it.” (Rifkin 2009, pp. 154)

These visions and mindsets, which had been refined and developed further through centuries by other Western thinkers, were not only important for the development of classical physics, but also had a tremendous influence on the general modern Western way of thinking up to the present day, in which a man in the western hemisphere equates his identity with his mind, instead of with his whole organism. Seeing a world in black and white confinement of rationality shapes the mentality and reality of a man in a different way than a man whose view of the world is not boxed in (bounded by reason alone), and therefore see the world in color. In another word, Western modern individuals are only aware of themselves as isolated selves existing; a modern existence that mostly celebrated as individualism in which “The mind has been separated from the body and given the futile task of controlling it, thus causing an apparent conflict between the conscious will and the involuntary instincts. Each individual has been split up further into a large number of separate compartments, according to his or her activities, talents, feelings, beliefs, etc., which are engaged in endless conflicts generating continuous metaphysical confusion and frustration. This inner fragmentation of man mirrors his view of the world ‘outside’ which is seen as a multitude of separate objects and events. The natural environment is treated as if it consisted of separate parts to be exploited by different interest groups. The fragmented view is further extended to society which is split into different nations, races, religious and political groups.” (Capra 2010, pp. 23) In retrospect, Descartes and Bacon schemes of things constructed the most basic notion of modern thoughts and consciousness including wide ranges of modern perceptions and conceptions, from perception of real and what constitute truthFootnote 73 to delineation of freedom and what denotes equality.Footnote 74 For instance, the modern paradigm e.g., Cartesian thesis argues that reality is made up of truth, which exist a prior, and hence fixed and absolute. In this respect, we don’t create truths but discover them. In short, truths/reality are objective autonomous phenomena, and hence cannot be make out of our experiences, e.g., the explanation we make about the common experience that we share with each other. Similarly, to be free, argues the modern man of reason, is not depend on or beholden by others. This view is clear prevailed among classical economists, who set the tune of a modern economics, in which views an individual as an autonomous agent that is free to pursue his distinct self-interest in the material world. This is a negativeFootnote 75 freedom that exclude other, independent of others to the extend that a man is an island to one-self, in which William Ernest Henley classic poem Invictus alluded: “I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of soul”. The strength of this self-sufficiency is based on the ability to close oneself off from others and treat others with wariness. This is the principle that has been imbedded in the social science fields, the modern western paradigm of human scholarship.Footnote 76 Thomas C. Patterson, in his classic work, Inventing Western Civilization , summarized brilliantly the works of Descartes and Bacon, these vanguards of modernity, by reminding his readers their worldview that portrayed “society as a machine that resemble a gigantic clock. By removing society from its historical context, they stripped away its content. As human society became abstraction devoid of context and content, discussion of civil society, the state, and the civilized person were also framed in increasingly abstract terms.” (Patterson 1997, pp. 35–36)

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Pirzadeh, A. (2019). Iranian Society: Manifestations of Culture. In: Modern Iran in Perspective. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25708-8_2

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