Abstract
This chapter introduces a book that argues that the EU accession conditionality can have a much deeper impact on the aspiring member’s politics and institutions than what is suggested by most of the literature on EU conditionality (primarily as the simple trade-off between reforms and rewards). The chapter first summarizes the literature that studies the contribution that membership in international organizations can make to a country’s democratic transition. It further considers how far the literature on EU conditionality reaches in qualifying the Union’s influence on the aspiring member. Then, in consideration of the specificity of the Turkish case (where the 2002 victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was most often explained in terms of “reconciliation” between secularism and Islam), the chapter discusses the limits of the often used “inclusion/moderation hypothesis” while suggesting that Islamism can have itself a role, in a specific regional-cultural setting, as an ideational and mobilizing factor.
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- 1.
- 2.
The parameters used here to qualify Turkey with regard to democracy are clarified in the next chapters.
- 3.
“An EU–Turkey Reset,” a commentary also signed by Emma Bonino, Albert Rohan, Wolfgang Ischinger, Hans van den Broek, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, Michel Rocard and Nathalie Tocci. See Project Syndicate, 15 March 2015.
- 4.
See, for instance, Arthur I. Cyr, “Turkey’s Continuing Role as a Pivotal Ally in a Rapidly Changing Region,” Orbis, 59.2 (Spring 2015).
- 5.
Mark Landler, “Obama’s Support of Erdogan Is Stark Reminder of Turkey’s Value to U.S.,” New York Times, 21 July 2016.
- 6.
See Asli Aydintasbas, “The Discreet Charm of Hypocrisy: An EU–Turkey Power Audit,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations (23 March 2018).
- 7.
General Affairs Council, Conclusions, Brussels, 26 June 2018, par. 30, 35.
- 8.
Following negotiations in 2015, in March 2016 Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu proposed to German chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte (rotating president of the EU) a plan in which Turkey would take back all irregular migrants entering Europe from Turkey with no right to asylum. Asylum seekers that year were 1.3 million. See Pew Research Center (2 August 2016) at http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-torecord-1-3-million-in-2015/.
- 9.
Officially denied, in fact the postponement of the publication of the highly critical 2015 Report until after the November election was acknowledged by Commission President Jean-Claude Junker in an exchange with Erdogan in mid-November. Jasper Mortimer, “Did EU Meddle with Turkish Elections?” Al-Monitor, 18 February 2016.
- 10.
Competitive elections were introduced in Turkey in 1946. The tortuous political history of the country makes it irrelevant to qualify the phase of political evolution of the early 2000s as democratic “transition” or “consolidation” (when democracy is accepted by all parties as the only game in town). To stress their role as “personae dramatis” of Turkey’s “new politics,” Turkish acronyms and names are used in the text only for the Welfare Party, or Refah Partisi, and its successors: Fazilet Partisi, or Virtue Party, and the latter’s successors: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), or Justice and Development Party, and Saadet Partisi, or Felicity Party. Other parties are referred to by the acronym of their names in English, except for the commonly used PKK for Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party.
- 11.
In March 2016 Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom praised the EU–Turkish migrants agreement—while the Turkish government was taking over Zaman, then the most widely-read daily in the country—as an opportunity to influence political developments in Turkey. See “EU May Lead Turkey Towards Democracy—Sweden’s Foreign Minister,” CTK English-Language News Service (Prague), 15 March 2016.
- 12.
See Zulfikar Dogan, “Why Is Erdogan Threatening Showdown on EU Visa Waiver?” Al-Monitor, 3 June 2016.
- 13.
- 14.
Cited in Cengiz Candar, “Outrage Over Istanbul Bombings Turns Anti-Kurdish,” Al Monitor, 14 December 2016.
- 15.
Speech in Elazig, cited by Semen Aydin-Duzgit, “De-Europeanization Through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP’s Election Speeches,” South European Society and Politics, 21.1 (2016).
- 16.
Aydintasbas “The Discreet Charm of Hypocrisy,” cit.; Nathalie Tocci and Dimitar Bechev, “EU Should Keep Turkey Close and Erdogan Even Closer,” Politico, 17 July 2018—have characterized the Turkey–EU relationship as one of “structural interdependence.”
- 17.
That correlation, even if of the past, makes the Turkish case of democratic backsliding a specific one and one apart from the present debate on “democratic recession.” See “Is Democracy Dying?” Introduction to special issue of Foreign Affairs, 97.3 (May–June 2018); various issues of Journal of Democracy in recent years.
- 18.
See, for instance, Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, “How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversal or Promoting Consolidation?” World Politics, 67.1 (January 2015); Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization,” in G.O’ Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Antonaeta Dimitrova and Geoffrey Pridham, “International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits,” Democratization, 11.5 (2004).
- 19.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, cit., especially pp. 100–7. More specifically: Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization,” International Organization, 56.3 (Summer 2002); Laurence Whitehead, International Aspects of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy, 16.3 (July 2005). Levitsky and Way expanded their analysis in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 20.
Philippe Schmitter, “An Introduction to Southern European Transition,” in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule, cit., p. 5. A discussion of the relevance of domestic or external factors in the democratic evolution of countries, is in Jay Ulfelder and Michael Lustik, “Modeling Transition to and from Democracy,” Democratization, 14.3 (June 2007).
- 21.
See Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization,” cit.; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, cit.; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit.; Poast and Urpelainen, “How International Organizations Support Democratization,” cit. An earlier exploration of the “entanglement” between domestic politics and international relations is Peter Gourevitch’s, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, 32.4 (1978); also Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International Organization, 42.3 (1988).
- 22.
See Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John M. Owen, “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organizations, 56.2 (2002).
- 23.
See Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit., pp. 24–25. For related bibliography see footnotes 20 above and 25 below.
- 24.
See Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science, 33 (January 2003); Nita Rudra, “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,” American Journal of Political Science, 49 (2005).
- 25.
See Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, “On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598.1 (March 2005); Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, “Double Take: A Reexamination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (1997); Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit.
- 26.
Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy, 15.4 (October 2004).
- 27.
“Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,” International Organization, 63 (Winter 2009), p. 9. Emphasis added.
- 28.
Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit., p. 25.
- 29.
Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit.
- 30.
See, in particular, Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Access Process,” in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005).
- 31.
William Wallace has pointed out how the Commission’s Agenda 2000 provided “the most precise definition of European values outside the European Convention of Human Rights extending more widely than the Convention into the details of market rules and public administration.” “Where Does Europe Ends? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion,” in Jan Zielonka (ed.) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002). On the specific evolution of the EU’s democratic normativity see Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, 40.2 (2002).
- 32.
EU is used in the text, in some cases, also with regard to before 1993.
- 33.
See Geoffrey Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach and Priorities,” Democratization, 14.3 (2007), p. 451.
- 34.
An objective of the CFSP, according to the TEU, Art J. 1, now 11. 1, was “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
- 35.
Presidency Conclusion: Copenhagen European Council, SN 180/1/93. See Chapter 5, Sect. 1.
- 36.
Pridham, Designing Democracy, cit., pp. 30–31.
- 37.
See, for instance, Tanja A. Börzel, “Building Member-States: How the EU Promotes Political Change in Its New Members, Access Candidates and Eastern Neighbors,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations, 8.1 (2016). Börzel, p. 79, defines EU membership as “the core of the EU’s transformative power.” See also Heather Grabbe, “How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity,” Journal of European Public Policy, 8.4 (2001), p. 1015. A more articulated discussion of what constitutes the “reward” and related “leverage” is in Rahime Suleymanoglu-Kurum, Conditionality, the EU and Turkey: From Transformation to Retrenchment (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), especially Chapters 1 and 2.
- 38.
The acquis communautaire is the accumulated laws and other legal acts, and court decisions that constitute the body of EU law.
- 39.
Vachudova, Europe Undivided, cit, especially pp. 125ff. lists the tools available to the Union to influence aspiring members. She defines the “active leverage” exerted by the EU in Chapter 5. Also, Heather Grabbe, “How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity,” Journal of European Public Policy, 8.4 (2001)—suggests reliance of the EU on a series of policies, separated into five categories—gatekeeping, benchmarking, model provision, money and advice/twinning—to which are attached incentives and sanctions for compliance or lack of it.
- 40.
A quick review of the literature on Europeanization is in Senem Aydin-Duzgit and Alper Kaliber, “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanizing Candidate Country?” South European Society and Politics, 21.1 (2016), pp. 3ff.
- 41.
See Alexander Burgin, “Why the EU Still Matters in Turkish Domestic Politics: Insights from Recent Reforms in Migration Policy,” South European Society and Politics, 21.1 (2016); Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse, “From Europeanization to Diffusion: Introduction,” West European Politics, 35.1 (2012). An extensive discussion of the mechanisms of integration into the EU is Börzel’s, “Building member-states,” cit. Also Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Candidate Countries and Conditionality,” in P. Graziano and M.P. Vink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agenda (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Hakan Cavlak and Hayriye Isik, “The Limits of Conditionality: Turkey–EU Taxation Negotiations,” International Journal of Finance and Banking Studies, 4.4 (2015).
- 42.
For instance, Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality,” cit., p. 450; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit., p. 27. The power of the membership perspective was recognized early on by the very Commission: “The incentive for reforms created by the prospect for membership has proved to be strong. Enlargement has arguably been the Union’s most successful foreign policy.” “Wider Europe: Communication from the Commission,” Brussels: March 2003. For critical considerations regarding the analytical inertia related to that approach, see Toneva-Metodieva, “Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 15.4 (2014).
- 43.
“International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment,” European Journal of International Relations, 6.1 (2000).
- 44.
See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Candidate Countries and Conditionality,” cit.; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy, 11.4 (August 2004).
- 45.
Olli Rehn, “Deepening and Widening: The False Dichotomy,” Lecture at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Athens, 9 March 2006).
- 46.
See, for instance, Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, cit., p. 199. See the critical observations offered by Toneva-Metodieva, “Beyond the Carrots and Stick Paradigm,” cit.
- 47.
See Nikola Tomic, “When the Carrot Is Not Sweet Enough: Conditionality Versus Norms as Model of EU Influence on Serbia’s Foreign Policy,” Südosteuropäische Hefte, 2.1 (2014), p. 100. Also Gergana Noutcheva, “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s Normative Power in the Western Balkans,” Journal of European Public Policy, 16.7; Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East,” cit.; Cavlak and Isik, “The Limits of Conditionality,” cit.
- 48.
See, Toneva-Metodieva, “Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm,” cit.; A. Mungiu-Pippidi, “EU Accession Is No ‘End of History’,” Journal of Democracy, 18.4; Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Why No Backsliding? The EU’s Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession,” Comparative Political Studies, 43.4 (2010). For post-accession conditionality, see Rachel A. Epstein and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe After Enlargement,” Journal of European Public Policy, 15.6 (2008); Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania After Accession,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (January 2014).
- 49.
For instance Börzel, “Building Member-States,” cit., pp. 77, 79, 95ff; Tanja A.Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization: Fighting Corruption in the Souther Caucasus,” West European Politics, 35.1 (2012), especially p. 83. Following the ouster from power of Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich after he refused to sign the Association Agreement (in the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership), on signing the same document the new president Petro Poroshenko declared: “By signing the Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine, as a European state, sharing common values of democracy and rule of law, is underlining its sovereign choices in favor of future membership in EU in accordance of Art. 49 of the EU Treaty.” Video on the signing ceremony in EurActiv, 27 June 2014. Georgia and Moldova also signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014.
- 50.
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” and “Conclusion: The Impact of the EU on the Accession Countries,” in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
- 51.
See Tanja A. Börzel and Digdem Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a Concept to Its Limits?” KFG The Transformative Power of Europe, Working Paper 36 (February 2012), p. 6.
- 52.
For instance, Thomas Risse, Maria G. Cowles, and James Caporaso, “Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction,” in M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, and T. Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Aydin-Duzgit and Kaliber, “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil,” cit., p. 5.
- 53.
See Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey,” cit., Section 4; also Börzel, and Risse, “From Europeanization to Diffusion,” cit.
- 54.
Ioannis Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” SAIS Review, 26.1 (2006)—points to the consistency of the EU membership aspiration with Ataturk’s identification with European civilization (see the next Chapter).
- 55.
Wade Jacoby, “Managing Globalization by Managing Central and Eastern Europe: The EU’s Backyard as Threat and Opportunity,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17.3 (2010); Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States,” Living Reviews in European Governance, 1.3 (2006).”
- 56.
Börzel, “Building Member-States,” cit., especially pp. 92, 97; Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey,” cit., especially pp. 8, 9; Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization,” cit. For an early discussion of that position see Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” International Organization, 9 (2005).
- 57.
Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” cit., p. 33.
- 58.
Nathalie Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reforms?” South European Society and Politics, 10.1 (April 2005).
- 59.
Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey,” cit., p. 9.
- 60.
Umut Aydin and Kemal Kirisci, “With or Without the EU: Europeanization of Asylum and Competition Policies in Turkey,” South European Society and Politics, 18.3 (2013).
- 61.
An early, broad definition by Claudio Radaelli equates Europeanization to “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures, and public policies.” Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy,” in K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 30.
- 62.
For instance Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey,” cit.
- 63.
For instance, K. Barysch et al., “Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey” (London: Center for European Reforms, 2005), and more recently, Munevver Cebeci, “De-Europeanization and Counter-Conduct? Turkey’s Democratization and the EU,” South European Society and Politics, 21.1 (2016); Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey,” cit., Section 5. See also the last Section of the present Chapter.
- 64.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, in “Governance by Conditionality,” cit., pp. 667ff., list, as part of “rule transfer” by the EU, cases in which no incentive is involved—when “a state adopts EU rules [because] it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules” and when “a state adopts EU rules if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively. by Börzel and Risse, “From Europeanization to Diffusion,” cit., contemplate the adoption of EU-inspired reforms without incentives, but only when the reforms are in line with their policy choices and electoral strategies.
- 65.
See Chapter 7, Sect. 3.
- 66.
Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in the New Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); also Alon Ben-Meir, “Is Islam Compatible with Democracy?” American Thinker, 13 July 2013.
- 67.
Hamid, Temptations of Power, cit. See also Ali Younes, “Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Opposition Act as If They are Playing a Zero-Sum Game,” Foreign Policy In Focus, 17 December 2012; Muqtedar Khan, “Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt,” Middle East Policy, 21.1 (Spring 2014).
- 68.
If it was soon to commit itself to a sectarian power grab, the Morsi government had reached power legitimately.
- 69.
For the debate on the inclusion/moderation hypothesis see Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” World Politics, 63.2 (April 2011). See also Chapter 3, footnote 55.
- 70.
For instance, in 2012 Oliver Roy wrote, regarding the upcoming elections in Arab countries, that “Islamists as well as Salafists are entering into a political space formatted by certain constraints […that] will not only limit their supposed ‘hidden agenda’ of establishing an Islamic state, but will push them toward a more open and democratic way of governance.” “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy, 23.3 (July 2012), p. 8. But that was not the way things were to develop in Egypt as elsewhere.
- 71.
See also Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates?” cit., Conclusion section.
- 72.
A similar position is summarily offered by Shadi Hamid, “The Brotherhood Will Be Back: Commentary,” New York Times, 25 May 2014: “The lesson of the Arab Spring isn’t that Islamist parties are inimical to democracy, but that democracy, or even a semblance of it, is impossible without them.”
- 73.
A crucial condition suggested by many transition theorists is the isolation of the extremists, in the transition, and the prevailing of the moderates. Thus, responsibility for the negative developments in Egypt was assigned to the “authoritarian habits” of all actors and insufficient moderation of the Muslim Brothers—while in fact is the very emergence of multiparty politics that produces a polarized political landscape. For a critique see Jemie Allison, “Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria,” Democratization, 22.2 (2015). For an overall critique of the incompatibility between extreme and violent positions and democratic transition see Nancy Bermeo, “The Myths of Moderation: The Role of Radical Forces in the Transition to Democracy,” Comparative Politics, 29.3 (1997). Some students of democratization see that process as a non-linear, complex and uneven one. For example, Lawrence Whitehead, Democratization Theory and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 244.
- 74.
The 1997 coup in Turkey and the 2013 Egyptian one are cases in which the regime felt the level of risk to its survival as too high. For the inclusion or exclusion of the Islamists by different regime see Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, “Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco,” Journal of North African Studies, 11.2 (2006).
- 75.
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Martin Heper, “Civil–Military Relations in Turkey: Towards a Liberal Model?” Turkish Studies, 12.2 (June 2011); Martin Heper and Aylin Guney, “The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic,” Armed Forces and Society, 22.4 (1996), p. 620. Only recently the academic literature has begun to recognize the nature of the secularist Turkish state of the 1990s as generally un-democratic. For instance, Ergun Özbudun and Omer Faruk Genckaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (New York: Central European University Press, 2009).
- 76.
See, for instance, Beken Saatcioglu, “De-Europeanization in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of Law,” South European Society and Politics, 21.1 (2016), p. 135; Cebeci, “De-Europeanization and Counter-Conduct?” cit. Such a rationalization (like also “shallow Europeanization”) has been proposed in the recent debate on the de-Europeanization of Turkey (Chapter 7).
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Zucconi, M. (2020). Introduction. In: EU Influence Beyond Conditionality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25560-2_1
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