Abstract
In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism.
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Notes
- 1.
Parrini, Paolo. 1998. Knowledge and Reality. An Essay in Positive Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- 2.
Parrini, Paolo. 2002. Sapere e interpretare. Per una filosofia e un’oggettività senza fondamenti. Milan: Guerini.
- 3.
Parrini, Paolo. 2011. Il valore della verità. Milan: Guerini.
- 4.
See Parrini, Paolo. 2015. Il problema del realismo dal punto di vista del rapporto soggetto-oggetto. In: Realtà, verità, rappresentazione, ed. P.L. Lecis, V. Busacchi, and P. Salis, 21–51. Milan: Franco Angeli. 45.
- 5.
Parrini, Sapere e interpretare, 72. (My translation. The quotes are from: Preti, Giulio. 1974. Lo scetticismo e il problema della conoscenza. Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 29:3–31, 123–143, 243–263. Here 3, 7, 12—my translation).
- 6.
Parrini, Il problema del realismo, 44. (My translation). According to Parrini, this applies also to those forms of metaphysical realism that adopt an attenuated version of correspondentism.
- 7.
Parrini, Paolo. 1976. Linguaggio e teoria. Due saggi di analisi filosofica. Florence: La Nuova Italia.
- 8.
Parrini’s view of the relativized a priori must be distinguished from Michael Friedman’s view. The latter was developed some decades later and draws on, with some hesitations, the neoempiricist thesis of the conventional and linguistic character of the “coordination principles.” On this point see Parrini, Paolo. 2017. Epistemologia e approccio sistemico. Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 2:239–253 (248–249); Westphal, Kenneth R. 2017. Empiricism, Pragmatic Realism, and the A Priori in Mind and The World Order. In: Pragmatism in Transition, ed. P. Olen and C. Sachs, 169–198 (175).
- 9.
Parrini, Paolo. 2006. A priori materiale e forme trascendentali della conoscenza. Alcuni interrogativi epistemologici. In: A priori materiale. Uno studio fenomenologico, ed. R. Lanfredini, 15–39. Milan: Guerini. 35.
- 10.
For example, experience alone cannot tell us if within Newtonian physics (with its implicit postulation of absolute space and time and the Euclidean structure of physical space) the “clash” with new experimental data is due to the physical or to the geometrical component. As we know, whereas Lorentz’s transformations adapt the laws of optics to the new data (thus preserving the absolute character of space and time), Einstein chooses to turn the constant value of the speed of light into a constitutive principle of the theory of special relativity (thus renouncing the absoluteness of space and time). On these themes see especially: Parrini, Paolo. 2012. Fenomenologia e empirismo logico. In: Storia della fenomenologia, ed. A. Cimino, V. Costa, 81–110. Rome: Carocci; Parrini, Paolo. 2014. About the “Parting of the Ways.” Three Roads or Four? Philinq II, 2:141–159.
- 11.
Parrini, Il problema del realismo, 33.
- 12.
See ibid., 24.
- 13.
Parrini, Paolo. 2015. Ontologia e epistemologia. In: Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia, ed. R. Lanfredini, 39–77. Milan: Mimesis. 70.
- 14.
Parrini, Il problema del realismo, 46. (My translation).
- 15.
Parrini, Knowledge and Reality, 151.
- 16.
See Lecis, Luigi. 2013. La via stretta tra realismo metafisico e relativismo radicale. In: A Plea for Balance in Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paolo Parrini, ed. R. Lanfredini, A. Peruzzi, 253–268. Pisa: ETS.
- 17.
Friedman, Michael. 2000. A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger. Chicago–La Salle: Open Court.
- 18.
Friedman refers to the three “ways” that were represented by Ernst Cassirer, Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger at a famous meeting in Davos in 1929. On this theme see Parrini, Fenomenologia ed empirismo logico; Parrini, About the “Parting of the Ways”; Parrini, Paolo. 2017. A priori, Objectivity and Judgment. Crossing the Paths of Kantianism, Phenomenology and Neo-Empiricism: A Tribute to Giulio Preti. Diogenes 61(2):59–72.
- 19.
Parrini, About the “Parting of the Ways”, 145ff.
- 20.
For the comparison between Husserl and Schlick on the theme of intuition see: Lanfredini, Roberta. 2002. Conoscibilità del contenuto: forma e intuizione in Schlick e Husserl. In: Forma e contenuto. Aspetti di teoria della conoscenza, della mente e della morale, ed. R. Lanfredini, 67–84. Milan: LED.
- 21.
See Parrini, A priori, Objectivity and Judgment, 7.
- 22.
Husserl, Edmund. 1983. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (trans: Kersten, F.). The Hague: M. Nijhoff. § 85.
- 23.
An example of realist phenomenology is Barry Smith’s “qualitative ontology”: Smith, Barry. 1995. The Structures of the Common-Sense World. Acta Philosophica Fennica 58:298–317; Smith, Barry. 1999. The Truth and the Visual Field. In: Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. J. Petitot, F.J. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J.-M. Roy, 317–329. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. This view brings together Husserl’s phenomenology with James Gibson’s ecological theory of perception. The latter, in turn, implies a form of “direct” or “naïve” realism (see Gibson, James J. 1967. New Reasons for Realism. Synthese 17(2):162–172; Gibson, James J. 1972. A Theory of Direct Visual Perception. In: The Psychology of Knowing, ed. J.R. Royce, W.W. Rozeboom. New York: Gordon & Breach). However, in contrast with Gibson’s direct realism, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology conceives of the object of perception as the correlate of a process of constitution. For this reason, the material thing is not an absolutely transcendent reality with respect to the cognitive process (on this point see: Zohk, Andrea. 2013. On the Reality of Percepts: Husserl and Gibson. Phenomenology and Mind 4:46–53). On the contrary, Smith argues that by combining Husserl’s phenomenology with Gibson’s ecological theory it is possible to develop “a radically new, realist interpretation of Husserl’s ‘constitutive phenomenology’” (Smith, Truth and the Visual Field, 319) and “a new, naturalized interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology.” (Ibid., 317).
- 24.
Husserl, Ideas I, 90. On this point and in relation to the crucial concept of motivational links see: Lanfredini, Roberta. 2004. Fenomeno e cosa in sè. Tre livelli di impossibilità fenomenologica. In: Fenomenologia applicata. Esempi di analisi descrittiva, ed. R. Lanfredini. Milan: Guerini.
- 25.
Husserl, Ideas I, 101.
- 26.
On the distinction between an empirical and a metaphysical version of scientific realism see: Parrini, Sapere e interpretare, 61. See also Parrini, Knowledge and Reality, 115ff.
- 27.
See Sellars, Wilfrid. Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. In: Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, ed. R. Colodny. 35–78. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- 28.
Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (trans: Carr, D.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 51.
- 29.
See Parrini, A priori, Objectivity and Judgment, 8.
- 30.
Parrini, Paolo. 1994. On Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: Truth, Form, Matter. In: Kant and Contemporary Epistemology, ed. P. Parrini, 195–230. Dordrecht: Springer.
- 31.
See ibid.
- 32.
Husserl, Ideas I, 89. See also: Lanfredini, Fenomeno e cosa in sè, 171; Lanfredini, Roberta. 2006. La nozione fenomenologica di dato. In: A priori materiale. Uno studio fenomenologico, ed. R. Lanfredini, 59–94 (91–93); Lanfredini, Roberta. 2012. Fenomenologia e epistemologia. In: Storia della fenomenologia, ed. A. Cimino, V. Costa, 395–416 (411–412).
- 33.
See Lanfredini, La nozione fenomenologica di dato.
- 34.
Parrini, A priori materiale e forme trascendentali della conoscenza, 37.
- 35.
Parrini stresses the presence of this fluctuation between the factual-psychological level and the normative level also in Kant, in relation to the individuation of the forms of sensibility and in the way of framing the transcendental deduction of the categories. See Parrini, On Kant’s Theory of Knowledge.
- 36.
For instance in: Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (trans: Steinbock, A.J.). Dordrecht: Springer; Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution (trans: Rojcewicz, R., Schuwer, A.). Dordrecht: Kluwer; Husserl, Edmund. 1969. Formal and Transcendental Logic (trans: Cairns, D.). The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
- 37.
Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 26.
- 38.
On this point, see especially the analyses of the role of the living body in the process of constitution in Ideas II.
- 39.
Matherne, Samantha. 2016. Kantian Themes in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Perception. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98(2):193–230.
- 40.
Ibid., 207.
- 41.
This development of phenomenology in a genetic and embodied direction is also at the base of the “enactive” approach developed by Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. On this point see Pace Giannotta, Andrea. 2017. Varela on the Pragmatic Dimension of Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 13(1):78–81.
- 42.
For the development of the concept of empirical naturalism, which is based on the phenomenological form of empirical realism, as opposed to metaphysical naturalism, see Pace Giannotta, Andrea. 2018. Genetic Phenomenology and Empirical Naturalism. Teoria 38, 2.
- 43.
Parrini stresses the distinction between the “epistemologic” and the “scientific-naturalistic” planes, in constrast with the attempts at “naturalizing epistemology.” According to Parrini, the prospective success of such a project, which is “doubtful” and “far from being realized,” would mean that “not only epistemology, conceived of as the analysis of the conditions of validity of our cognitive claims, but also ontology, conceived of in the terms of the problem of realism and anti-realism would disappear; only natural science would remain.” Parrini, Il problema del realismo, 49. (My translation). See also Parrini, Ontologia e epistemologia, 75.
- 44.
Hesse, Mary. 1974. The Structure of Scientific Inference. Berkley, CA: University of California Press. See also Lanfredini, Roberta. 1988. Oggetti e paradigmi. Per una concezione interattiva della conoscenza scientifica. Rome: Theoria; Parrini, Knowledge and Reality, 74ff.
- 45.
For the details of this analysis see Parrini, Knowledge and Reality, 74ff.
- 46.
Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, 13.
- 47.
Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, 644.
- 48.
See Banks, Erik C. 2003. Ernst Mach’s World Elements. A Study in Natural Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer; Stubenberg, Leopold. 2014. Neutral Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2014.
- 49.
Parrini, Paolo. 2018. Ernst Mach and the Disenchantment of Metaphysics. In: Ernst Mach tra scienza e filosofia, ed. P. Gori, 33–52. Pisa: ETS.
- 50.
In the light of this analysis we can also look at the phenomenological conception of scientific objectivity. Husserl’s criticism of the absolutization of Nature as the object of physics is in accordance with Parrini’s criticism to the metaphysical version of scientific realism, which would presuppose an absolutistic conception of reality. Husserl conceives of the object of natural-mathematical science as the object of a sort of second order constitution, which is based on the primary constitution of the material thing in ordinary experience. The latter, in turn, doesn’t give us access to an alleged metaphysical reality “in itself.” The phenomenological view of experience is therefore centred on the fundamental correlation and co-constitution of the two poles of the cognitive process. At the same time, it is compatible with the empirical and not metaphysical version of scientific realism, which acknowledges the empirical reality of the entities posited by natural science. See Parrini, Knowledge and Reality, 32 and 115ff.; Parrini, Sapere e interpretare, 61.
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Pace Giannotta, A. (2020). Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini’s Positive Philosophy. In: Buongiorno, F., Costa, V., Lanfredini, R. (eds) Phenomenology in Italy. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 106. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25397-4_12
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